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 Abstract 
 
Civil societies are voluntary groups of non-market and non-state sectors that 
support their own associational life and public interests. However, according to rules 
of law and instruments, the legitimate state and the political-institutional actions 
directly and indirectly influence the development of civil society organizations. 
Therefore, the state still holds the legitimate sovereignty to foster, regulate, and 
readjust the nature of civil society. This study highlights the importance of how civil 
society and its roles can be structured and molded by the state.  
In Thailand, according to the provision of the 1997 constitution, there is a 
new particular pattern of local groups of residents that have been structured by the 
state in the city areas. Central and local governments have provided administrative 
guidance and financial support as incentives to encourage and support those groups’ 
establishments and activities. The municipality as a local government has used 
political instruments such as rules and regulations in order to structure the group 
formation and management style. Apart from that, both even though those groups 
provide public interests, it is imperative for them to be able to provide the 
collaborative mechanisms between the local government and local residents. Thus, it 
is possible to say that those groups are promoted as political partisan groups through 
the state-designated local group of residents.   
Therefore, this study explores the new patterns of development of a local 
group of residents based on a geographically delimited condition that has been 
influenced by the state and to grasp its roles as a civil society organization. 
Furthermore, this study aims to determine the politicized conception of civil society 
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through the collaborative mechanisms between state or political institutions and 
local residents. 
 The study has first employed analysis to generate a broad understanding 
addressing the basic characteristics of civil society.  It has then elucidated features, 
types of functions and the nature of activities of neighborhood communities 
including its relation with institutions in the Thai political context. The comparative 
perspectives with previous literature review and the empirical survey data have been 
used.  
The result reveals that neighborhood communities are voluntary organized 
groups that have been shaped by state designation. The policies and financial 
supports of the government guide and fund most activities of neighborhood 
communities. These resulted in a high cooperation with the municipality that may 
contribute to building up social capital and developing the capacity building of the 
community. This could significantly illustrate the vitality and the strength of civil 
society organizations at the grassroots level.  For this reason, the relationship 
between neighborhood communities and the municipality can be viewed as a 
reciprocal exchange. This relationship would be deeply embedded based on feelings 
of a debt of gratitude due to the political patron offering help through various 
political instruments like policies and financial instruments. Therefore, the depth of 
the relationship between the municipality and neighborhood communities will be 
advantageous for the local government and local politicians to gain neighborhood 
communities as partisan groups. 
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 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
The concept of civil society has been discussed in a variety of uses and 
definitions among numerous scholars in different time periods. Many scholars have 
depicted that civil society organizations are non-state sector and have more roles and 
social power for public interests. Tocqueville accounted civil society as a sphere of 
mediating organizations between individuals and the state. His concept was based on 
a limited state that operated in conditions of socioeconomic equality and political 
freedom and mediated between personal interest and the national common good 
(Alagappa, 2004) .  In line with this, Frank Schwartz conceived civil society as a 
sphere that intermediated between families and the state in which social actors 
pursued neither profit within the market nor power within the state (Schwartz, 
2002) . For the modern concept, civil society refers to the shift that consists of 
sustained organized social activities which occur in groups that are formed outside 
the state, the market, and the families (Alagappa, 2004; Pharr, 2002; Tsujinaka, 
2002). Considering and recognizing the aforementioned definitions of civil society, 
in this study, I have assumed that civil society is the third sector in which voluntary 
groups that are non-market and non-state sectors are contributing a vast sphere of 
support to sustain associational life and public interests. 
Civil society had been used as a key variable to explain democratic political 
changes due to its connection with democracy. Civil society was reckoned as having 
the potential to liberate citizens from the oppressive state and to confer full liberal 
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economic and political freedom in the transition to democracy. The beginning of the 
1980s illustrated the struggle of civic movements against an authoritarian regime, 
especially between the communist and the military dictatorship in many countries. 
In Eastern Europe and Latin America, civil society was perceived as the social 
power that confronted political authority suppressing the liberty and legitimacy of 
public.  In the late 1980s, this occurrence was replicated in some Asian countries 
such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand wherein 
civil society was criticized for democratic transition and consolidation. They mostly 
erupted in a variety of form of citizens’  organizations (students, workers, farmers, 
professionals) combined efforts to mobilize public opinion struggling against their 
authoritarian government and military dictatorship to demand or prevent changes in 
the political system. However, they seemed an arena of power and struggle among 
competing interests, are lacked the capacity for permanent organization that 
therefore resulted to their immediate disbandment after their purposes were realized 
(Alagappa, 2004). In the mid-1990s, it should be noted that the Soviet collapse was 
the victory of the ideology towards democratic political changes in which the 
collapse of communism indicated the crucial role of civil society. The understanding 
about civil society through these periods was therefore looked into including the 
nature of the contrasts between the state and civil society. Civil society was credited 
as a political force concerning the transition from authoritarian and communist 
regimes to democracy. The nature of contrast also reflected the weakness of the state 
while it underscored the strength of civil society with its significant roles played in 
democratization.  
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The changes in the political system and political structure have brought 
about more liberty and freedom to the relationship and roles between the state and 
civil society.  In addition to probing into the understanding about civil society, the 
nature of the cooperation between the state, its institutions, and civil society have 
also been examined. Rather than oppositional to the state, the emerging trend of civil 
society is based upon the influence of the state and political institutional actions. 
Along with rules of law and instruments, the legitimate state and political 
institutional actions pervasively influence directly and indirectly the development of 
civil society organizations. The state has structured the organization of civil society 
with strict regulations in several countries wherein civil society sometimes becomes 
a link to political and economic governance. Moreover, civil society is sometimes 
organized as a mechanism to respond to state policies in delivering social services 
and in helping vulnerable groups while in some cases civil society is organized 
autonomously beyond the control of the state, focusing on the cooperation with the 
state institutions in solving social and economic problems. Therefore, if the nature of 
civil society organizations is that of a non-state sector, this study highlights the 
importance of how civil society can be structured by the state and how its roles are 
molded by the state.   
 
1.2 Problem statement 
Social integration has been specifically meant to make the Thai civil society 
express its public opinions and to create bargaining power with the state through the 
forms of social movement like in other countries. There were various social groups 
from time to time such as in 1973 and in 1976 wherein the student groups led by the 
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National Students Center of Thailand protested against the military dictatorship 
government in the democratization process to demand a  more liberal politics and 
aiming to confer full democracy. Also, other social groups emerged from the 
significant changes in Thai economic influence during the 1980s. Some of those 
social groups were farmers, laborers, assembly of poor people, slums, and 
marginalized people and others who protested against the government’s policies 
such as price guarantee of agriculture goods, employment minimum wages, tax 
rates, community rights and land holding.  Nevertheless, such movements were 
disbanded soon after achieving their immediate purposes. The outcome exposed that 
Thai civil society was in opposition to the state because groups were informally 
structured, unorganized, unsustainable, and seemed to be easily controlled by the 
state.  
Yet people uprising in May 1992, who were mostly from the middle class in 
Bangkok, a city that resisted the authoritarian government, brought about political 
reform.  The protestors overthrew the military dictatorship, which led to the 
crackdown and clashes between the military and the public causing numerous deaths 
and casualties.  In the end, the military government resigned and put a halt to the 
long military-dominated regime which was the impetus to a lot of debates on 
political reform a n d  drove the public to reconsider Thai’s political reform. 
Consequently, the new constitution1 promulgated in 1997 stipulates the rights and 
liberty of the people in public participation and political decentralization.  
                                                 
1 The first constitution to be drafted by popularly elected Constitutional Drafting Assembly which 
was formed with 99 members:  Seventy-six of them were directly elected from each of the provinces 
and 23 qualified persons short-listed by the Parliament from academia and other sources. A process of 
public consultation took place on a nation-wide basis. 
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Along with the provision of the 1997 constitution, people could have rights 
and liberty to unite and form an association, a private organization and other groups 
for protecting the public interest, maintaining public order and strengthening 
families and communities, etc. Subsequently, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), nonprofit organizations (NPOs), unions, foundations, neighborhood 
associations and other voluntary associations, including people in the corporate 
group level have started to grow and expand throughout the country. During 2001 to 
2006, the number of NPOs had increased to approximately 1,930 per year2. From 
2006 to 2008, there were 70,792 organizations all over the country3.  
To ensure the provision of 1997 constitution, there is a new particular pattern 
of a local group of residents that have been structured by the state in the city areas of 
Thailand. It is assumed that the state tried to promote a particular pattern of 
neighborhood community as a civil society in modern Thai politics. 
According to state sovereignty, the state powerfully shapes the organization 
of civil society through legality, regulations, and incentives as well as building 
relationships by means of distributing benefits and privileges to gain control and 
capture. The municipality has used political instruments as rules and regulations to 
structure the group formation and management style. Moreover, both central and 
local governments have intended to provide administrative guidance and financial 
support as incentives to encourage and support those groups’ establishments and 
activities. Even though those groups provide public interests, it is essential for them 
                                                 
2 Survey report of National Statistical Office indicated that the number of NPOs was 55,805 
organizations in the year 2001, until the year 2006, there were 65,457 organizations. (www.nso.go.th) 
3 The report of the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESBD) and the 
Johns Hopkins University Center for Civil Society Studies (JHU/CCSS) 2006-2008 Edition 
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to be able to provide the collaborative mechanisms between the local government 
and local residents.  Thus, it is possible to say that those groups are promoted as 
political partisan groups through the state-designated local group of residents.   
Therefore, this study explores the new patterns of development of a local 
group of residents based on a geographically delimited condition that has been 
influenced by the state and to grasp its roles as a civil society organization. Apart 
from that, this study intends to determine the politicized conception of civil society 
through the collaborative mechanisms between the state or political institutions and 
local residents. 
 
1.3 Research question and scope 
The previously mentioned problem statement talks about the new pattern of 
neighborhood association that is widespread in the municipalities of Thailand based 
on the state-designated local groups of residents.  
The 1997 constitution had provided the direction to open the means for 
widespread political participation and decentralized politics.  It had indeed opened 
opportunities for people to participate in politics and extensive decentralization to 
localities for the purpose of independence and self-determination of local affairs to 
ensure democracy.   The state has to regard human rights and liberty to unite and 
form an association, union, foundation and entity groups, to promote and encourage 
public participation, plus to reinforce and to develop families and the strength of 
communities. Consequently, the Ministry of Interior delegated the municipalities to 
encourage and support the gathering of local groups of residents to form their 
neighborhood community (self-reliance community) under the government’s 
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guideline structures and incentives, and exercise their involvement towards local 
affairs.  
Due to underscored points, my main research question asks how the state can 
structure neighborhood communities as a civil society in modern Thai politics. I 
have proceeded with this investigation by using the results of a survey of civil 
society in Thailand including the cross-national information from other JIGs 
countries to explain broadly the overall civil society structure in Thailand. Then, I 
have utilized the empirical survey data to investigate the nature and trends of 
neighborhood communities to reveal its features, types of functions and nature of 
activities. In addition, I have added the comparative perspective with the 
neighborhood association from the previous literature to show the distinctive 
characteristics of neighborhood communities as civil society in Thailand.  
The second research question pertains to analyzing the roles of Thai 
neighborhood communities towards participatory activities. These groups would 
realize the importance of public goods, be voluntary and autonomous status, from 
their privileged relationship with the state. However, based on Thai political culture 
and political structure, I contend two things.  First, the government sponsorship of 
organization would impact the political goals. Second, the political goals would be 
expressed through the role of civil society in response to the state policies. The fact 
that the state by municipality is structuring the pattern of neighborhood community 
and is giving them incentives and privileges makes me wonder whether the state is 
steering the civil society as a political partisan. In this analysis, I address the 
question: What are the roles of neighborhood communities towards the political 
relations in the Thai political context? To answer this question, the empirical survey 
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data has been utilized to investigate the nature of the participatory role and relation 
of neighborhood communities with the government in Thai political context.  
 
1.4 Implications 
The modern term used for civil society is as the third sector that consists of 
sustained, organized social activity that occurs in groups which are formed outside 
the state, the market and perceived as social actors that pursue neither profit within 
the market nor power within the state (Alagappa, 2004; Pharr, 2002; Schwartz, 
2002; Tsujinaka, 2002).  However, Pekkanen (2006) argues the legitimate roles of 
the state and its institutions in shaping civil society in Japan with state intervention 
and incentives as well as civil society in China that are shaped in response to the 
state policies (Yuanzhu, 2003). It shows that the significant roles and phenomenon 
of civil society, reflected through multi-dimensional factors like policy, cultural 
norms as well as political institutions, tend to be in cooperation with the state. 
While not underestimating the value of such highly distinguished roles and 
phenomenon of civil society, the present study points out the influence of state 
action in relation to the state policy. The combination of factors such as the norms in 
patron-client relationship and institutions that promote a particular pattern of civil 
society organization in Thailand and political instruments may affect the formation 
of civil society organizations and may lead to them becoming a political partisan 
group. 
Based on rule of law, the state is the main institution that has the autonomy 
to adopt its interventionist policies to control or manipulate all kinds of institutions 
as well as social groups.  Moreover, the state may create the reciprocity and 
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inequality of uneven power and status through a patron-client relationship with the 
society for gaining a long-run loyalty and support. Therefore, it is easy for the state 
and its institutions to adopt the rules, regulations, and incentives, which may 
concern the process of social groups’ formation and the development of the pattern 
of civil society.  
This study does not only accept civil society as an organized group, 
sustained and voluntary association in achieving public goods.  The case study will 
present a type of voluntary groups in the form of neighborhood communities based 
on self-reliance policies which are molded and strengthened by local governments. 
For these aspects, the state plays a role in fostering an environment in which many 
civil society organizations can flourish while those groups could be organized in 
response to the state policies. The creation and incentive of neighborhood 
communities of the state show the virtue of the state which provided the citizens 
more attention to social development. However, it also illustrates that the state as a 
political patron is directing civil society organizations in the municipality by giving 
them incentives and privileges so that they could support a political goal and may 
become a partisan that implicate the connection between civil society and 
democracy.  
 
1.5 Brief introduction of civil society in Thailand 
The basic trends of the conception of Thai civil society was a realm 
independent of the state (Schwartz & Pharr, 2003) , it was organized in distinction 
from the state sector and recognized as a civic association that mainly focused on the 
area of charities and social services. The latter of the ideas of civil society has often 
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been viewed as an intermediate realm in which society can organize itself aiming in 
opposition and coalition to the state.  This study analyzes the civil society in 
Thailand as a realm of charities, political ideology, and perspective of law and 
policy. 
 
Realm of charities 
Thai civil society has a long tradition of philanthropic organizations, which 
mostly emerged throughout the early 1960s with varied purposes and roles 
(Pongsapich, 1993) and which were formed as voluntary groups in relation to 
religious organizations and civic groups. According to the NESDB’s4 survey in 
Thailand, it was revealed that about 70% of non-Profit institutions and its volunteers 
in 2006 were related to religious organizations that included temples, churches, 
clubs and associations administering religious services.  Moreover, its revenue at 
9.6% was considerably very high, 0.7% higher compared with eight other countries5  
(The National Economic and Social Development Board, 2006 – 2008).    
Pongsapich (1993; 1995a; 1995b) explained that Thailand’s long traditional 
Buddhist temples have long performed philanthropic functions by providing refuge 
for the needy and serving as community centers and their schools offering education 
to the public. The Christian missionaries6 also provided the philanthropic activities 
                                                 
4 National Economic and Social Development Board is a national economic and social planning 
agency of Thailand, providing directly the recommendations on national economic and social issues 
to the government, composes of 15 economic and social experts, including the governor of the Bank 
of Thailand and the director of the Bureau of the Budget. 
5 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Japan, New Zealand, United States. 
6 The first Catholic missionary arrived in 1567-1568 while Protestant missionaries first arrived in 
1828 (Pongsapich, 1993). 
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in the form of church, hospitals and school activities and work for hill tribe people 
and poor people towards community development.  
There were other organizations in the form of ethnic minorities. According to 
Pongsapich (1995) and Tangchonlatip (1997), the nationalist movements in Thailand 
and the threat of overseas communist ideology among Chinese brought about many 
conflicts and mistrust among the people of different ethnic origins. The mistrust of 
Chinese led to the association of Chinese immigrants in the form of “secret 
societies” that provided assistance and protection to a certain group of people. These 
associations were later transformed into mutual aid and speech associations that 
serve the needs of occupational groups and new immigrants.  Another type of 
Chinese philanthropic organization was the “Po Tek Tung”  Foundation formed in 
1920 and had been recognized as the first official philanthropic organization in 
Thailand to be registered since 1937.  Initially, this foundation supported the poor 
Chinese people in Thailand and expanded its role and scope of operation to social 
welfare and disaster, then later became recognized as the benevolent society in 
Bangkok. In addition to these welfare associations were the Cantonese Association 
who founded a cemetery in 1884 and a clinic in 1903 as well as the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce that was founded in 1932 to 1933.  
There were likewise the modern forms of philanthropic organizations 
initiated by Thai citizens.  According to Pongsapich (1995b), Sapa U-nalom Deang 
formed in 1890 which later became the Thai Red Cross, was recognized as the first 
non-government organization. The organization’s objective was to care for wounded 
soldiers and to provide general medical and other supplies.  The Women City Club 
(Samakhom Satri Thai Haeng Sayam)  was formally established in 1932.  The 
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Women’s Culture Club was formed in 1943 in order to promote social activities and 
culture and provide welfare to those in need.  During that period, many more Thai 
organizations sprang up, for instance, international clubs such as Rotary, Lions, 
Sontas, and Youth Men's Christian Association (YMCA) came to existence as 
national networks with branches in the provinces (Pongsapich, 1995b). Although 
these clubs were associated with the provision of social welfare,  most of the 
associations and the clubs represented philanthropic activities of the upper class or 
persons who have high social and financial status. Most of the activities performed 
aimed to provide contribution more than to enhance or strengthen social 
development. 
 
Realm of political ideology 
In the early 1970s, the concept of civil society has been presented to the 
public as the new political ideology. Civil society organizations could be considered 
as organized interests and could act as interest groups or pressure groups which 
influence the election and affect the policy-making process in the political system 
(Tsujinaka, 2008, p. 6). Some groups have emerged in the form of civic movements 
to protest against the authoritarian government and pushing for a transition to full 
democracy. The student groups demonstrated against military dictatorships in 1973 
and 1976 to demand a more liberal politics and to confer to full democracy. Later, 
there was the middle-class uprising in May 1992 against the authoritarian 
government led by the Confederation of Democracy, Assembly of the Poor, Labour 
Union, the Student Federation of Thailand, Farmers Federation of Thailand and 
others which affected political reform in terms of decentralization and public 
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participation. Hence, the history of Thai politics evidently shows that civil society 
has an impact on democratization in Thailand (Dhirathiti, 2002).  
Up to the present, there are other political pressure groups which may be 
considered as political alliances of social movement embedded in notions of 
conservative against neo-liberal and pro-rich cronyism. The People's Alliance for 
Democracy (PAD) or the Yellow Shirts was originally the anti-Thaksin coalition 
and the conservative force associated with the royalists and the military 
(Kitirianglarp and Hewison, 2009, p. 454) .  The PAD membership was not mainly 
consisted of a group of ultra-royalist but also included conservative Buddhist 
groups, working-class Bangkok residents, and anti-Thaksin Southerners. They 
played crucial roles in the civic movement in the Thailand political crisis of 2005 to 
2006, and 2008.  On the other hand, the United Front for Democracy Against 
Dictatorship ( UDD)  which is commonly called Red Shirts, is a political pressure 
group opposed to the military government and the PAD since 2006.  The UDD is 
composed of mostly rural masses from the Northeast (Isan)  and Northern Thailand 
and of urban lower classes from Bangkok and of some intellectuals. The movement 
seems to have received support from former Prime Minister in exile Thaksin 
Shinawatra. Due to these, Thai civil society organizations not only accounted for the 
democratization but were also depicted as pressure groups to protect their political 
ideologies and interests and seemed to play a crucial role in political partisan. 
 
Realm of law and policy 
During the late 1990s, there was a growing perception that social groups 
have started to grow and expand throughout the country of Thailand to conform with 
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the provision of 1997 constitution related to the rights and liberty to unite and form 
an association.  Pekkanen (2006) asserted that the state, based on rule of law, 
powerfully shapes the organization of civil society. With regard to differences in law 
and regulations, the state and institutions can create varying incentives for the 
organization of civil society.  Under the circumstances that Thai society has a long 
history of state influence, Lertpaithoon (1999) described civil society from the 
perspective of law and policy.  
In line with the perspective of law, civil society can be roughly classified 
into groups that are recognized and unrecognized by law as a legal person. The state 
uses the rule of law as a mechanism pushing civil society to fall into such categories 
as foundations, associations, cooperatives, and unions, which are bound by many 
clauses and limitations but provide some grant support and privileges. On the other 
hand, civil society that is unrecognized by law such as clubs, forum of the poor, 
students federation may be weak in cooperation with the state and can form itself 
without grant supports and privileges.  
According to the perspective of policy, civil society could be structured in 
consonance with the state’s desired policies.  In this regard, it is necessary to raise 
awareness on the potential mutual benefits of establishing closer and continuous 
cooperative mechanisms of the governmental and civil sector throughout the policy 
making process. Following the purpose of the 1997 constitution of Thailand that 
stresses public participation and democratic decentralization, the Ministry of Interior 
by Department of Community Development has promoted itself to local residents as 
a voluntary group at Tambon and Village7 level to manage, maintain and conserve 
                                                 
7 Detailed explanation is given in chapter four. 
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their environmental resources.  Moreover, the Department of Community 
Development also has promoted and has supported local residents to establish the 
Women Clubs in order to provide and develop their basic knowledge about 
vocational and health care training for women in local areas. Conversely, when the 
assembly of people make various demands, these tend to be regarded with suspicion 
and mistrust and are always subjected to control and scrutiny (Lertpaithoon, 1999). 
These may be the effect of various rules and regulations which were issued to 
control the people assembly and led to state policies that aim to control and inspect 
the organization of civil society.  
According to the socio-political change and modernization, the state has to 
change its roles to engage in social responsibility and to be more open to the society 
while the public sector increases its power. The stipulation of 1997 constitution has 
brought significant changes to modern Thai politics like NGOs that extend to NPOs 
which have started to grow and expand in both cities and rural areas. The state is 
also structuring and promoting the civil society through empowering and 
strengthening many voluntary organizations under the type that the state desires, 
including supporting state organizations to act as the civil society organizations 
through its policies.  
 
1.6 Chapter arrangement 
Following this brief introduction, Chapter 2 covers literature review relating 
to the theoretical framework based on state-society relations. Different literatures in 
relation to the present research have focused on the concept of civil society and the 
other two concepts about clientelism and corporatism which demonstrate the 
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relevance of the concept of civil society to modern political theory and relate to the 
political structural influence on civil society.  The literature of civil society 
encompasses the basic trends from the discourse in a variety of uses and definitions 
to describe the development and the pattern of using civil society in Thailand’ s 
context. Clientelism denotes the linkage between patron and clients derived from the 
kinship of the patrimonial social system which is perceived as cultural practices and 
strategies.  The literature in corporatism has shown the socio-political process in 
which organizations representing monopolistic functional interests engage in 
political exchange. These concepts have described the relation of the state and civil 
society under the circumstances that the state constructed civil society organizations. 
The others are concerned with the dissertation development, including conceptual 
framework and methodology used in the research.  
Chapter 3 aims to identify the emerging trend of civil society based upon the 
influence of the state and political institutional actions. This chapter first discusses 
Thailand’s political structures and political cultures.  The previous literature, 
researches and other documents have been added to provide discussions related to 
the political structure and the emerging role of civil society in Thailand. The state 
could promote several patterns of civil society organizations based on rules and 
regulations of political systems and state sovereignty.  Sometimes, civil society is 
adopted as a mechanism in response to the influence of state policies through 
political opportunity structures.  The second section remarks on the several 
ramification characteristics of the civil society in Thailand which is tied beyond the 
political structure like civic association, social movement, pro- and anti-state and the 
new form of neighborhood community.  
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In Chapter 4, I have tried to explain broadly the civil society characteristics, 
functions, and issues and to investigate the nature of participatory role and relation 
with the government. In this chapter, the characteristics of the civil society in 
Thailand has been focused on and analyzed based on the comparative discussions, 
previous literature reviews and the study on neighborhood organization. The first 
part of this chapter provides cross-national perspective information from the survey 
in Thailand and other JIGS8 countries that reveals civil society’s basic 
characteristics and tendencies of activities of civil society organization. Moreover, 
the civil society organizations in Thailand could consider themselves as the 
associational life that provides public capacities to support and serve the needs of 
their members and the public. The second part relates to investigating the tendency 
of civil society organizations beyond its interactions with the state. As an 
autonomous group, they received the administrative guidance and work in 
cooperating with and supporting policies and budget activities of the government. 
The use of forming coalitions and network, including civic movement, mass protest, 
and demonstration may be the most vital democratic means for lobbying in 
Thailand. The third part discusses the descriptive feature of civil society 
organization, focusing on the neighborhood community in the municipality of 
Thailand. This chapter presents how the state has molded and strengthened civil 
society organizations in the new form of neighborhood community. Those groups 
encourage the gathering of local groups of residents to facilitate more efficiency and 
effectiveness in providing social services.  The empirical survey data have been 
                                                 
8 Detailed description of using this survey has been discussed in the second section of chapter two. 
. 
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adopted to investigate the basic characteristics, nature of activities, the relationship 
among associations in the social and political process, and the interaction with other 
social, political and economic actors. Furthermore, the comparative perspectives 
with the previous literature especially the neighborhood association in Japan, have 
been added to present the neighborhood community’s basic nature, its  features and 
functions, its nature of activities and its relationship with the government. The final 
part covers the broad understanding of civil society while sketching out the nature of 
neighborhood community based on the state that has shaped and strengthened the 
civil society in the municipality of Thailand. 
Chapter 5 concentrates on the relationship between neighborhood 
community as a civil society organization and politics in Thailand. Contrasting the 
state and civil society, the state is powerfully shaping the organization of civil 
society through legality, regulations and incentives, building relationships between 
them by means of distributing benefits and privileges to gain control and capture. 
This chapter utilizes the multidisciplinary research design to analyze how civil 
society works in Thailand through the state-shaped structure and culture of civil 
society organization.  The findings would show the role and pattern of the state - 
civil society relationship in modern Thai politics. 
The concluding chapter summarizes the main discussion towards the civil 
society organization like neighborhood community in Thailand as a new pattern 
towards state-shaped civil society which could be recognized by its contribution to 
local development and social welfare based on self-reliance. However, the political 
implication of the study reflects the ramifications on the democracy with the partisan 
in modern Thai politics.     
 Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
   
2.1 Theoretical relation to the objective 
This chapter relates to a theoretical framework based on state-society 
relations.  The literature related to the present research has focused on three 
concepts: civil society, clientelism and corporatism. The literature on civil society 
encompasses the nature and trends of the discourse in a variety of uses and 
definitions to describe the development and the strength of civil society. In view of 
the several discourses that vary in using the concept of civil society in different 
situations and conditions, researchers concluded that political environment and 
political culture variables may have an impact on its roles and phenomenon in 
different political outcomes. Clientelism denotes to the linkage between patrons and 
clients derived from the kinship of patrimonial society system that includes cultural 
practices and strategies.  The literature in corporatism, under state capitalism, has 
shown the socio-political process in which organizations representing monopolistic 
functional interests engage in political exchange and intervention.  These concepts 
could not only give support in describing the relation of the state and civil society 
but could also fundamentally explain the nature, trends, and phenomenon of civil 
society in such environments. Clientelism and corporatism link the concept of civil 
society to modern political theory and to the political structure in Thailand.  This 
research stresses on the circumstance in which the state has molded the civil society 
organizations in Thailand. It also suggests ways for analyzing how the prevailing 
state’s mechanisms and strategies connect with civil society, which may have an 
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impact on political partisan in Thai’s political context. This chapter also provides a 
detailed discussion regarding the methodology used and its relevance to the present 
study. 
 
2.2 Concept of civil society 
The concept of civil society discourses is according to its phenomenon in 
relationship with the state. Earlier analyses viewed civil society in opposition to the 
state and further political discourse perceived it as having played a crucial role in 
opposition to the state as explicitly demonstrated during the struggle or reaction 
against oppressive state power and in the accompanying democratic transitions. 
Civil society is deemed as a class struggle to gain acquisitive power between rulers 
(elites) and those ruled. In addition, the liberal democratic regime views civil society 
as having the potential to liberate citizens from oppressive state and to confer full 
economic and political freedom on them, using power as the motor of the political 
system as the profit is the motor of the economy (Alagappa, 2004).  
On the other hand, others view civil society as a coalition to the state.  The 
state can play its role in fostering the political environments in which many civil 
society organizations can flourish. Civil society is generally perceived as the 
associational life or social actor that works autonomously for neither profit within 
the market nor for power within the state. As the state becomes more legitimate, it 
gains an ambiguous status indicating that civil society is possibly organized and/or 
shaped by the state.  Rather than working autonomously, civil society would be 
recognized as an organized group that cooperates with the state in serving public 
needs and enhancing public capacities to serve and support state policies and their 
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interests. In the case of economic growth, the development of civil society could be 
regarded as the solution to the socio-economic problems because of its cooperation 
with the state sponsorships and incentives. Hence, it is comfortable for the state to 
gain civil society as a partisan group through government’s sponsorship of 
organization and resource endowments.  As several discourses differ in using the 
concept of civil society, they suggest ways for analyzing its nature and trends 
including its roles and phenomena in different environments. In line with this, the 
following literature describes the development and strength of civil society based on 
a variety of uses and definitions. 
 
Civil society and the opposition views 
Early analyses viewed civil society through the political discourse that it can 
organize itself in resistance to the state power. Marx denoted civil society as an 
arena of alienation and exploitation that had to be overcome entirely through 
revolution ( Alagappa, 2004). Moreover, he viewed civil society as an element to 
retrieve the right of people that lean against the state hegemony, especially an 
authoritarian or totalitarian state. The civil society was a deep structure of class 
inequality wherein the state actually furthered the dominance of the bourgeois class 
over subordinate classes in civil society (Baker, 1998, p. 4). Furthermore, Robert 
Cox (1999) commented on the role of civil society as a surrogate for revolution “an 
alternate social and world order”. He considered civil society as the “crucial 
battleground” for citizens to regain control of public life and as a potential agent for 
the transformation of the state (Alagappa, 2004, p. 29). These contexts illustrate civil 
society as a sphere of action that expresses the struggle of civic movements to lean 
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against an authoritarian regime, especially totalitarian state and military 
dictatorships. 
Similarly, Cohen and Arato (1992) explicitly indicated that the opposition 
between the state and civil society illustrated an inadequacy of power or the gap 
between rulers (elites) and those ruled. They mentioned in their book “Civil Society 
and Political Theory” that modern political thoughts, both liberal democratic and 
communitarian regimes, would be affected in the transitions against authoritarianism 
and dictatorship. Civil society in this context indicates a shift concerning the 
transformation of structural reform achieved because of organized pressure from the 
ruled. This phenomenon has led to a reaction against centralized state power and has 
become the social revolution in European countries such as in Poland, France, and 
West Germany.  
According to Cohen and Arato (1992,   pp. 31 - 35), the opposition between 
civil society and the state in Poland from 1976 presented the relationship between 
polarizations that were society against the state, social order against the political 
system, public life against the state, and private life against public power. The idea 
of such relationships was the protection and/or self-organization of social life in the 
face of the totalitarian or authoritarian state.  The opposition represented a shift 
concerning the target of democratization and structural reform from below of a 
highly-articulated, organized, autonomous and mobilizable civil society 
accompanying the transformation of a self-organizing society aiming at social and/or 
political structure reforms.  
It is noteworthy that the French discourse of civil society derived from the 
political culture of the French is deeply connected to totalitarian statism and 
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capitalism.  Cohen and Arato (1992, pp.36-41) explained that the state is an 
instrument beyond conflict, while capitalism asserts the administrative penetration 
of society by the welfare state.  The French discussion has also preserved 
Tocquevillian distinction among civil society, political society, and state.  The 
concept of civil society is the space of social experimentation for the development of 
new forms of life, a new type of solidarity and social relations of cooperation and 
work. The political society included the public sphere for negotiation and 
compromise among autonomous groups.  Therefore, the French case implicated an 
independent civil society for the development of new forms of political society self-
organization, which is perceived as the sphere of private, voluntary association 
secured by rights.  The forms of self-organization of political society can be 
maintained without the protection and development of independent but political 
forms of solidarity, interaction, and a group of life.  
Cohen and Arato (1992, pp. 42-46) has further described that West Germany 
mediated between the state and civil society. The welfare state was a mechanism of 
the repoliticization of the economy and for dissolution of boundaries between state 
and civil society.  The point, however, implicates that the social or welfare statism, 
asserted by Claus Offe, links to the classical Marxian concept about the capitalist 
bourgeois society.  The state intervened into the capitalist economy and various 
spheres of civil society through the welfare state, which created fiscal and 
administrative problems and led to the defense of the ruled against the state and 
politics.  
The distinction in Latin American dictatorships presented the transition from 
military bureaucratic authoritarian rule to the restoration of individual and group 
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rights called “liberalization”  and to the establishment of citizenship participation 
also known as “ democratization”  in the early 1980s.  According to the repressive 
regimes, civil society culminates from mediating between individuals and the state 
through a network of groups and associations which are mobilized and concentrated 
form of mass mobilization.  Nevertheless, such civic movements were based on a 
minimal set of demands in distinct and successive layers of groups, associations, and 
organizations that lacked the capacity for coalescing into one permanent 
organization.  Moreover, they were disbanded immediately, “ self-dissolution” , if 
their purposes were realized.  Significantly, the features of civil society in this 
democratization process are possible potential rollbacks of military coups, polarized 
and zero-sum that endanger democratic consolidation and weaken political society’s 
ability to resist renewed authoritarianism. 
Alagappa’s (2004) project on civil society has been also deployed as a 
compelling perspective to explain political changes.  Western political leaders and 
liberal scholars credit civil society as a normative ideal toward its roles in the 
collapse of communism and authoritarianism and in the transitions to democracy. 
Civil society has the potential to liberate citizens from the oppressive state and to 
provide full economic and political freedom to them.  Civil society has shown a 
positive force in the development of democracy from the beginning of the 1980s in 
the context of fundamental political and economic changes, “human rights” and 
“free market capitalism”, and in the transitions throughout the world from 
authoritarian and communist regimes to democracy. The wake of the Soviet collapse 
in Eastern Europe was the most celebrated democratic transition.  The outcomes of 
the collapse of communism led to the citizenship (people) participation because of 
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more liberation and freedom based on rule of law and enhancement of accountability 
in politics. Additionally, civil society can affect state power and make demands from 
the state in pursuit of public interest.  
The concept of civil society is not only limited in the Eastern Europe, but it 
is also necessary to the understanding of the democratic change in Asian countries, 
such as the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Burma, and 
China throughout the late 1980s to late 1990s. The substantial part of the said 
change is related to the mass rallies and protests of citizens,  organizations, and 
movements that ousted a number of authoritarian governments. The members of the 
organizations were students, workers, farmers, merchants, professionals, and 
journalists. The mass movements, rallies, and protests are one manifestation of civil 
society which played an important role in mobilizing public opinions with the 
purpose of expressing support or disapproval of an incumbent government and to 
demand or prevent a change in the political system. However, such mass protests are 
based on a minimal set of demands due to the lack of capacity for permanent 
organization and representation so that they were disbanded after their immediate 
purpose was realized. The civil society in Asian countries is the transition phase of 
power, inequality, struggle, and cooperation of both voluntary and non-voluntary 
groups operating through its political orientations, interests, resources, capacities, 
and methods (Alagappa, 2004).  
 
Civil society as coalitions 
The influence of capitalism stimulated most scholars to view civil society as 
an intermediate group that consists of sustained and organized social activity that are 
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formed outside the state, the market, and the family (Schwartz & Pharr, 2003). 
Tocqueville presented his concept of civil society as a sphere of mediating 
organizations between the individual and the state (Tocqueville, 1873, p. 190). His 
concept is based on a limited state and legal framework that operated in conditions 
of socioeconomic equality and political freedom and also mediated between 
personal interest and the national common good (Alagappa, 2004). It shows that the 
role of civil society is linked to the political and economic governance,  and has 
become a mechanism in serving the public good.  
 The state normally holds legitimate sovereignty and can foster, create, 
sustain, regulate, and readjust the good civil society.  According to Tsujinaka, civil 
society organizations could initiate themselves as social groups in society.  When 
they become aware of the public good and become politically active, they may have 
political and policy interests and try to participate in the political process or become 
more actively involved in political process to achieve various public goods in 
various activities, in this sense, the civil society organizations become organized 
interests (Tsujinaka, 2008, pp. 6-10). These organized interests would act as interest 
groups or pressure groups, which influence elections and affect the policy-making 
process in the political system.  However, it is important for civil society 
organizations to be permanent, voluntary, active and realize the importance of the 
public good.  
 In many countries where the state holds legitimacy, the state has structured 
the organization of civil society. Jonah Levy pointed out in his book “Tocqueville’s 
Revenge”  that French civil society has been shaped not only by the legacies of 
policy-making but also by the political and institutional forces that have impeded 
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healing state intervention ( Levy, 1999) .  In China, there are groups organized in 
response to state policies th a t cooperate with the state in delivering social services 
(education) and in helping vulnerable groups (Yuanzhu, 2003).  
Pekkanen (2006) expresses that the state has shaped civil society 
everywhere.  He adopts the perspective of state-shaped civil society to investigate 
the patterns of development of civil society organizations in Japan.  According to 
him, state institutions in Japan, directly and indirectly, shape or create such a pattern 
of state-civil society relations. The term  “directly” refers to purposeful attempts to 
influence the configuration of organized civil society which can be the regulation of 
a group’s legal status or activities, tax benefits, direct financial flows such as grants 
and contracts and the like.  Pekkanen asserted that direct state actions have even 
greater effect in patterning civil society. This category includes legislation about the 
formation or operation of civil society organizations or tax codes relating to such 
groups. In contrast, “indirectly” refers to unintentional influences on civil society’s 
organization that are the by-products of institutional structure. The indirect category 
is concerned with service or in the interest of the state’s institution. 
Civil society might have a distinguishable concept in two approaches. First, 
civil society refers to the organized distinction from the state sector. The literature of 
civil society during the 1980s to 1990s encompasses the important roles of mass 
movements, rallies, and protests of civil society to mobilize public opinion with the 
purpose of expressing support or disapproval to the government and to demand or 
prevent a change in the political system. It assumes that most of the civil society 
actions in resistance to the state resulted from inequality and inadequacy of power, 
oppression, political ideology, and cultural variables.  Most of those actions played a 
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crucial role in serving effective functions to liberate citizens from the oppressive 
state and to confer full liberal economic and political freedom. Hence, civil society 
had been used as a key variable accountable for democratic political changes. 
Nevertheless, those groups were informally structured, unsustainable, unorganized, 
and easily disbanded. The second approach is that the roles of civil society are 
linked to political and economic governance and became state mechanisms in 
serving the public good. It is noteworthy that these trends have impacted the 
outcomes of the collapse of communism and authoritarianism and the transition to 
democracy, which has led to the civil society’s participation based on rule of law 
and enhancement of accountability in politics. Civil society was therefore looked 
into as to its nature of cooperation with the state, which presented its roles as the 
necessary effective function that nurture and strengthen democracy. In addition, 
through the legal framework, the state legitimately regulates and molds civil society 
while civil society normally organizes itself as a social actor that pursues neither 
profit within the market nor power within the state.  
 
2.3 Clientelism 
Clientelism has been discussed in several meanings. Clientelism may be 
defined through the explanatory statement of social anthropology to politics related 
to social exchange, class or ethnicity formation, patron-client ties and the dynamics 
of the factional system. Generally, clientelism describes the life expectancy through 
the exchange of mutual benefit and dependency based on the pressure of force. It is 
the linkage between patrons and clients derived from kinship of patrimonial society 
system as well as a deep-rooted inheritance derived from political culture. Referring 
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to Lemarchand’s work, clientelism cited a specific type of social structure.  Patron-
clients ties involve dyadic bonds that exhibit face-to-face relationship of exchange 
between individuals of unequal power and socioeconomic status (Eisenstadt & 
Lemarchand, 1981). Individuals enter this relationship voluntarily and acquire their 
legitimacy from expectations of mutual benefits in which asymmetry, diffuseness, 
and reciprocity between patron and clients are basic features of its social structure 
( Eisenstadt & Lemarchand, 1981, p. 15).  There are three characteristics of the 
exchange that result in patron-client ties: first, the inequality in power and obligation 
in terms of personal identity and interpersonal sentiments, second is by voluntary 
relations and mutual obligations, and third is by the mutual obligation and 
reciprocity between patrons and clients with informal and/ or illegal practices 
(Eisenstadt & Ronider, 1984, p. 49). 
Clientelism can be understood as a key element in the mechanisms of 
dependency and control of class domination. Lemarchand (1981) commented that 
clientelism has three perspective changes in the scale and structure of patron-client 
ties that are related to the social and economic process. The basic historical trend 
can be conceptualized in terms of a shift from patrimonial to a repressive form of 
clientelism.  In consonance, economic and political modernization has radically 
altered the bargaining relationship between traditional patrons and their clients from 
patrimonial to repressive forms of clientelism. The term patrimonial ties are 
characteristics of those rapidly disappearing relationships in which there is overt 
acceptance of traditional values by the subordinate and where crude physical 
coercion is mitigated by the paternalism of the rural patron.  On the contrary, 
repressive clientelism is a coercive response to the assault of modernity on 
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legitimacy. Repressive clientelism represents the expansion of the patterns of social 
exchange to the advantage of patrons and makes the condition of the dependence of 
clients increasingly exploitive or oppressive (Eisenstadt & Lemarchand, 1981,  
pp. 17 - 18). 
Furthermore, Eisenstadt & Lemarchand (1981, pp. 19 - 20)  remarked that 
clientelism also has an aspect of machine politics behind political modernization. 
The clientelistic forms go straight to the patterns of dependency and loyalty between 
patrons and their clients. The pattern of relationship has often been emphasized 
through the electoral competition pursued by political entrepreneurs. This has 
enabled the clients to use the vote as an instrument to shift the balance of exchange 
to their advantage and promoted the expansion of reciprocities between the 
politicians and constituencies.  Moreover, the societal fragmentation is through the 
organization of political machines wherein class formation preceded the introduction 
of suffrage that has made it possible for parties to organize themselves and articulate 
their demands in class terms. However, in practice, the clients have done the election 
without a choice while the dependency relations have done it through the selective 
allocation of patronage resources and the extension of special favors.  For these 
aspects, the patron-client ties promote the emergence of clientelistic machines, 
which ties to the expansion in scale of clientelistic networks. 
In addition, Lemarchand remarked about the atrophy of clientelistic nets that 
restrict the scope of patron-client ties to the ruling cliques like what has occurred in 
many states of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.  It was a new type of clientelism 
sets, which are primarily focused on armies and bureaucracies with the elimination 
of the electoral process and the removal of participatory structures.  This failed to 
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accomplish such results through its anarchic system; the social exchange thus takes 
the form of unrestrained corruption and extortion. It operates among highly 
personalized cliques and is used in the form of an exploitative monopoly of public 
resources (Eisenstadt & Lemarchand, 1981, pp. 25 - 26). 
Clientelism can be described as patron-client ties that are based on the power 
imbalance reflected through a minimum requirement of bargaining and reciprocity 
of each partner who provides a service that is valued by the other. According to the 
basic operation of personal exchange, it is the linkage between patron and clients. 
The patron is an individual of higher power and socioeconomic status, who uses his 
own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits for the client who has 
a lower status and reciprocates these by offering general support and assistance, 
including personal services to the patron (Scott, 1972, p. 92). Scott asserted that 
there are three factors related to the patron-client ties. The primary idea of inequality 
is concerned with the imbalance of exchange between the two partners. The 
imbalance expresses and reflects the disparity between the two partners’ relative 
wealth, power, and status. A client is someone who has entered an unequal exchange 
relation which highlights how dependent the client is on his patron’s service, along 
with a sense of debt or obligation and the buildup of the cost that the patron can 
draw on to obtain advantages at a later time. The second is the personal quality of 
the relationship of the patron-client ties that is derived from continuous dyad face to 
face. This interaction cultivates trust, loyalty, and affection between the partners, 
which create fictive kinship tie. The third distinctive quality of patron-client ties is 
diffused flexibility to which the patron may have a client who is connected to him 
by friendship, past exchanges of services and the past tie of each parent’s partner. It 
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is perceived as the multiplex relationship that reflects complete affection, which 
allows both the patron and the client to ask for flexibility, based on each partners’ 
needs and resources. The nature of exchange may cover a wide range of potential 
exchanges (Scott, 1972, pp. 93-95).   
The structure of patron-client roles from dyadic ties could expand to clusters 
and networks (Scott, 1972). The patron is a partner of the dyadic exchange who 
owns resources or power and functions as an intermediary or a broker to provide 
downward distribution of tangible benefits. In return for votes flowing up the 
vertical chain of patron-client structure, each patron depends on the downward 
distribution of patronage in the form of administrative favors in order to keep his 
own clients as followers.  Elections have shifted the balance of exchange so that it 
favored the client somewhat more than before. The consequence of this shift in 
exchange terms was a greater flow of material benefits toward the base of the 
patron-client network. 
In connection with the patron-client politics in Southeast Asia, Scott (1972) 
expressed his idea that the party competition on patron-client bonds and unstable 
features of patron-client democracies has an impact on electoral politics. He 
described that the improvement of the bargaining position of clients with the patron 
has affected the candidates by adding the new resources as their votes. The voters 
may ask a politician to favor them because of a personal obligation to reciprocate. In 
which case, the electoral patron obtains social approval and triumph at the polls over 
rivals or other candidates that reflect horizontal relationship by generally offering 
his clients better terms. Thus, it is necessary to promote the vertical integration of 
patron-client structures from the local level to the central government by 
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establishing a network of links extending down to the local level and taking 
advantage of the existing patron-client clusters and incorporating them into its 
structure. It is noteworthy that a party, which bested the polls, has to affiliate and 
secure the adhesion of the important local patrons who would consistently deliver to 
their clients. This establishes the reason why those parties have tried to create new 
links with village leaders which may give the local patron extensive discretion in 
administrative and development decisions affecting the locality. However, in return, 
the powerful local base is likely to lead to a certain localization of power. This 
feature of the patron-client structure has led to promote the expansion of patron-
client ties and the politicization. Knowing that an electoral vote is important, a local 
patron with a modest follower will try to obligate more clients to him in order to 
strengthen his electoral position. The final point about the impact of elections on 
patron-client structures is that they tend to heighten factionalism not unless one 
cohesive party completely dominates to promote the survival of local opposition 
factions (Scott, 1972, pp. 109-111.) 
According to Tomsa and Ufen, clientelism highlights the relationship 
between people that are bound together via social, economic or political networks. 
Clientelism is a means or strategy of linking parties to voters.  There are three key 
elements which are regarded as central to a clientelistic relationship that would 
preserve the clients to be a partisan in the political term. The first element is the 
status inequality in which generally, the patron is of higher social, economic or 
political status than the client. The element of iteration is necessary for repetitive 
exchange to maintain the loyalty of clients and a steady support by the patron. 
Reciprocity, the third element, is essential for clientelism to be maintained easily 
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because both the patron and client are mutually benefiting from the exchange 
(Tomsa & Ufen, 2013, p. 6).  However, clientelism would undermine partisanship 
based on attractive options from many parties that have a bond with the voters. 
Political elites are often unable to make a credible pre-election promise and 
therefore tend to provide targeted transfers to narrow groups of voters rather than 
universally accessible public goods. Nevertheless, all parties need to fulfill the high 
expectations of voters.  The outcome of the patron-client relationship would be the 
dependency and negotiation between those involved which promotes uneven 
relationship. 
  In political modernization, clientelism pervades through anonymous 
machine politics and competition between the providers of selective incentives. 
According to Kitschelt (2000), such clientelist linkages electoral constituencies that 
involve two different circuits of exchange. First, resource-rich but vote-poor 
constituencies provide politicians with campaign funds in exchange for material 
favors, which build up practices of rent seeking and market distortion. Second, vote-
rich but resource-poor constituencies provide vote and receive selective material 
incentives before and after elections in exchange for accruement of supporters 
(Kitschelt, 2000, p. 849). 
In recent years, clientelism almost has become a catchall phrase that is often 
used synonymously with a whole range of informal and/or illegal practices including 
patronage, vote buying, bribery and outright coercion.  The importance of political 
parties has been regarded as political apparatus in order to aggregate and represent 
competing societal interests, recruit new personnel into the political decision-making 
process, craft public policy agendas and to mobilize citizens into political 
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participation. At present, a new form of political activism based on social media and 
other online telecommunication tools have further highlighted the declining 
importance of political parties for the ordinary person.  In Thailand, formal 
organization party structures are so poorly institutionalized illustrating more 
political influences on factions than parties.  In this sense, political parties represent 
the interests of a certain social group and implement policies in favor of these 
groups (Tomsa & Ufen, 2013, pp. 2 - 4). 
Tomsa and Ufen attribute to the factors of modernization and political 
economy that erode clientelism wherein the relationship between business and 
politics becomes important.  The costs of clientelism increase as development and 
mobility rise based on anonymous machine politics. Thus, modernization would be 
the systematization and monetization of the old clientelism.  In Thailand, for 
example, the economic boom since the 1970s ushered in the rise of local and 
regional businessmen in politics. Moreover, a large public sector and a high degree 
of state intervention seem to be favorable for clientelism (Tomsa & Ufen, 2013,      
p. 8). 
Thailand has a long-term political culture of a patron-client relationship 
through the patrimonial bureaucracy and monarchy. The state is the main institution 
and has the autonomy in relation to other internal actors or institutions within the 
political, economic, and social system. It has the legitimacy to control or regulate all 
kinds of institutions and social groups.  Hence, clientelism relates to wealth, status, 
power of patrons, and the dependence of clients.  The competition for gaining 
political power, whoever wins the election, is significant, especially among business 
groups. The using of party (money) politics and the patron-client relation is a basic 
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mechanism for gaining long-run loyalty and support that will lead to the partisanship 
of the dependent clients.  Since 1970, the economic growth of Thailand definitely 
enhanced the attractiveness of public office and raised the stakes for party 
politicians.  The stronger businessmen are in politics, the more they become 
dependent on the state apparatus for licenses, credits, public offers, etc.  Thus, 
clientelism flourished from the use of patronage as a key strategy to maintain 
smooth relations between business and politics including between the parties and its 
clients.  This relationship was deeply embedded in fictive kinship structures and 
feelings of a debt of gratitude, including clientelistic network which is not only due 
to the supply side of political patron offering help, security, and prosperity for the 
clients in exchange for votes and long-term loyalty but also to the clients’  demand 
for such support.  During the election period, politicians tried to earn the loyalty of 
voters by creating new policies and campaigns to show their commitment, including 
building relationships between them by means of distributing benefits and 
privileges.  The pattern of relationships is seen through the provision of goods and 
services, also known as incentives, which showed the collaborative mechanisms 
between the patron state or political institutions and local residents as a political 
partisan. 
 
2.4 Corporatism 
Corporatism is seen as a highly complex phenomenon and has been defined 
differently.  It is denoted as the representative of the sectoral interests. The 
corporatization of interest representation is related to certain basic imperatives or 
needs of capitalism to reproduce the conditions of its existence and to continually 
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accumulate further resources. Differences in the specific nature of these imperatives 
or needs at different stages in the institutional development and international context 
of capitalism, especially as they affect the pattern of conflicting class interests, 
account for the difference in origins between the societal and state forms of 
corporatism (Schmitter, 1974, p. 107). According to Alan Cawson, corporatism is a 
specific socio-political process in which organizations that represent monopolistic 
functional interests engage in a political exchange with state agencies over public 
policy outputs and involving those organizations that combine interest 
representation and policy implementation through delegated self-enforcement 
(Cawson, 1986, p. 38) .  He classified corporatism into three approaches: post-
capitalism, a new form of state, and a political system of interest intermediation. 
  
Corporatism as post-capitalism 
This approach indicated the shift in the directive role of the state over  
economic-productive units, which take place within a market system by increasing 
state interventionism. The state develops a considerable degree of independence 
from economic interests in which the state predominantly directs and controls 
privately owned businesses and is able to impose its will upon producers (Winkler, 
1976). Evidently, the state is directing private capital and is not an instrument of a 
dominant class but embodies a kind of general will which is enshrined in the state 
policy. It is noticeable that corporatism is designated as an economic system 
opposed to market liberalism and having connotations of managerial 
bureaucratization and state intervention in the economy and planning (Lehmbruch & 
Schmitter, 1982, p. 3). By this regard, it seems that the system is no longer capitalist 
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for the reason that the state predominated over the rights of private capital and the 
market mechanism (Cawson, 1986, pp. 22-23).  
 
Corporatism as a new state form 
This approach describes corporatism as the state form taking the possible 
political structure of capitalism. Corporatism is the fusion of the process of 
representation and intervention determined in the form of corporations constituted 
based on their members’ economic functions. By contrast, the old form of state is a 
combination of institutions in which political interests are represented and forms of 
intervention are determined.  A parliamentary form involves the representation of 
citizen within the state by means of elections and the administration of state policy 
through bureaucracies in the context of the rule of law. In this sense, the process of 
representation and that of intervention are institutionally separated; the parliament 
and the permanent bureaucracy. In terms of corporatism, however, the new form of 
state shifts power into the social formation and stateless. Thus corporatism is seen as 
emerging alongside, and then domination, a parliamentary state form and combined 
functions of representation and administration. Also, there is no separation between 
making the policy and implementing it (Cawson, 1986, pp. 24-25). 
  
Corporatism as interest intermediation 
Schmitter developed the most systematic presentation of corporatism as 
interest intermediation. He initially viewed corporatism as a concrete set of an 
institutional practice in which the interest intermediation systems are arranged for 
linking the state and organized interests. Schmitter portrayed his ideas on 
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corporatism as a distinctive, modern system of interest or attitude representation, 
including the development of a particular model or ideal-typical institutional 
arrangement for linking the associational organized interests with the decisional 
structures of the state (Schmitter, 1974, pp. 85-86). With reference to Schmitter’s 
ideas, corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
noncompetitive, hierarchically-ordered and functionally-differentiated categories, 
recognized or licensed (if not created)  by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for 
observing certain control on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands 
and supports (Schmitter, 1974, pp. 93-94).   
However, among the different types of corporatism, Schmitter distinguished 
two forms of corporatization of interest representation, namely societal or liberal 
corporatism and state corporatism. Societal corporatism refers to the management of 
conflicting interests between organized societal groups. On the other hand, state 
corporatism refers to the relations between the state and organized interests.  The 
liberal or societal corporatism accounts for the democracy and that the state is not 
directly in position to dictate the terms of the agreement between sectors but 
involves institutionalized bargains struck between consenting parties in an effort to 
balance their own group interests and the gains for a wider public interest. The 
active interventionist state often helps to organize the relations between the various 
sectoral organizations. However, the state does not dominate directly, it leaves some 
degree of autonomy to the organizations and its intervention demands to control a 
common good of national interest which will be implemented effectively (Urger & 
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Chan, 1995, p. 30). On the other hand, the authoritarian or state corporatism stands 
for the top-down control. The weight of decision-making power lies on the side of 
the state in which the government takes charge of creating and maintaining all of the 
corporatist organizations and grants power to the assigned leader at will (Urger & 
Chan, 1995, p. 31).  
In summary, corporatism is referred to as a system of economic, political or 
social organization that involves the association of the people because of common 
interest into corporate groups.  Furthermore, corporatism has been used to describe 
the political arrangement under governments, including the peak organization9, both 
democratic and undemocratic.  It seems that the role of the modern state is thus 
central to the concept of corporatism in which the state is the arena wherein the 
process of corporatist politics takes place.  Upon rapid development, the state 
involvement in securing national interest has made particular the development 
strategy in adopting state-corporatist solutions through state-inspired modernization. 
For instance, the Japanese state had begun erecting corporatist structures to control 
and co-opt the agricultural cooperatives in the early 1990s to handle the purchase of 
agricultural inputs, sales of produce, and provision of credit with the government-
assigned association. In the 1930s, Japan’s small business sector was organized into 
government-aligned peak organization, which was sanctioned to control their 
membership. Similarly, since the early 1950s in Taiwan the state also took an active 
interest in regulating and controlling associations like industrial and commercial 
associations, professional, labor unions, including religious organizations. Also in 
                                                 
9 A group is organized into national, specialized, hierarchical, and monopolistic organization that the 
state determines which organizations will be legitimate and get channeled into the policy-making 
processes and often help implement state policy on the government’s behalf.   
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1963, Korea introduced legislation requiring all unions to be legally recognized by 
the government and stipulating that they were to be unified under a single union for 
each industrial sector, with the state given the power to intervene in their operations 
(Urger & Chan, 1995, pp. 33-35).  
Thailand’s democracy is variable from time to time, accompanied by a long 
term of bureaucratic regime.  Since the 1980s, the external capitalism has effected 
Thai socio-political changes to a more liberal democratic system.  The bureaucrats 
and non-bureaucrats, who are businessmen and politicians, share political power as 
the main actors and the shift in power has occurred mainly within political parties 
and the government. Therefore, they have become the bureaucrats in new forms of 
business politicians (conglomerates) who allocate and distribute power and benefits 
in the government. This power extends to the peak organization that could serve the 
decision-making power as a hierarchal top-down control in harmony with the 
consensus of corporatist organizations to enforce political and social stability.  In 
addition, the state-corporatist ideal has been adopted and embedded to control the 
grassroots through the policy-implementing process. For instance, Thai state 
established government-controlled with the state’s pro-poor populist policies, 
especially when Taksin and his Thai Rak Thai party won the election since 2001. 
The three important populist programs were the 30-Baht Health Care scheme, the 
Village Fund program, and the OTOP program that have been launched directly to 
the grassroots level. These populist programs account for the shift in the economic 
and political power including the constitutional fashion as well as the partisan in 
Thai politics. 
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2.5 Civil society in Thailand and its relation to the concept of partisan politics 
As mentioned earlier, civil society is considered as the third sector in which 
voluntary groups of non-market and non-state sectors are contributing in the vast 
sphere of support to sustain the public interests and social service. This concept has 
been known as the basic characteristic and general function of civil society event in 
the modern world. A number of classical and contemporary research works have 
been conducted on the concept of civil society from different perspectives and in 
most cases those have addressed on its roles in opposition to the state. However, this 
section shall focus on the ideas, which reveal the cooperation between the state and 
civil society on the circumstance that the state has molded civil society organization 
in the municipality of Thailand. This section shall also suggest ways in analyzing 
how the prevailing state’s mechanisms and strategies in connection with civil 
society, through patron-client ties and state corporatism, may have an impact on 
political partisan in Thai’s political context.  
The stipulation of 1997 constitution has brought significant changes to 
modern Thai politics to a more liberal democracy, leading to people’s participation 
and state’s decentralization, which impacted Thai political structure and its 
administration system. Moreover, the provision of 1997 constitution states that when 
the state’ s power decreases, the public sector’ s power increases. In line with that, 
people could have rights and liberty to unite and form an association, a private 
organization and other groups to protect the public interest, maintain public order 
and strengthen families and communities. The state has also opened more 
opportunities for people to participate in politics and extensive decentralization to 
localities for the purpose of independence and self-determination in local affairs.  
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As mentioned above, not only NGOs, NPOs, and other self-organizations 
have started to grow and expand, there is also another form of a voluntary group 
which the state has structured and promoted based on the state’s policies. Through 
legal, regulatory and financial means, the state inevitably and powerfully shaped the 
organization of civil society. Until now, the state acts to promote the establishment 
of social voluntary organizations at the grassroots level as mechanisms to support 
local government. With regard to the state’s policy, the Ministry of Interior 
delegated the municipalities to encourage and support the gathering of local groups 
of residents to form their neighborhood community (self-reliance community) under 
the government’s guideline structures and incentives, and exercise their involvement 
towards local affairs in reciprocal aids and self-reliance in urban areas. Those groups 
could refuse the domineering role of the state. In order to achieve grassroots social 
and economic development, cooperation with the state is stressed rather than 
conflicts.  It is precise to say that the state is structuring and promoting the civil 
society through the empowerment and strengthening of many voluntary 
organizations under the type that the state desires.  
This research thinks first about the groups that are formed outside the state, 
the market, and the family but work in cooperation with local governments in the 
provision and implementation of policies to achieve social works and public goods, 
as well as to fulfill its self-interests in the local community.  The case study in the 
form of neighborhood community called “ Chum Chon Yoi Nai Khet Thesaban10” 
which are promoted and founded by the local government gives an in-depth insight 
                                                 
10 It means the neighborhood community that is set up in the Municipality throughout the country. 
The present research has collected data within 4 provinces (as described in Chapter 4). 
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to empirically analyze basic units of civil society organization in the urban area. 
Furthermore, it reveals its features, types of the functions and nature of activities and 
tries to investigate the state and civil society relations based on the state molding 
civil society organizations in the municipality of Thailand.  
Looking at the big picture of the Thai political system, clientelism and the 
use of patron-clients ties flourished as a key strategy to maintain smooth relations 
between political patron and the others. This relationship would deeply be embedded 
based on kinship structures and feelings of a debt of gratitude, including clientelistic 
network which is not only due to the supply side of political patron offering help, 
security, and prosperity for the clients in exchange for vote and long-term loyalty, 
but also to the clients’  demand for such support.  The present research studies the 
relation of the state and civil society under the circumstance that the state acts as a 
patron that molds the neighborhood community as a civil society organization 
through inequality, uneven power and status, and reciprocity. These groups’ 
formation has to conform to the state designated regulations leading all of them to be 
in the same structures and patterns of management. The state has also strengthened 
and empowered them through the state’s policies and political instruments. Initially, 
the state has regulated basic activities related to primary health care and professional 
and money saving to strengthen the grassroots civil society. Additionally, both 
central and local government have also supported them with several forms of grants 
and budgeting. Neighborhood communities mostly involve their communicating 
demands to bureaucrats who work in the local government and to local government 
assembly members. By creating new policies and campaigns in accordance with the 
neighborhood community’s demands, politicians could earn the loyalty of voters, 
45 
 
show their commitment and build a long run relationship between them by means of 
distributing benefits and privileges.  It becomes the basic pattern of relationships 
between the state or political institutions and the local residents through deeply 
embedded fictive kinship structures and feelings of a debt of gratitude. 
Accordingly, the economic growth of Thailand since 1988 (economic boom), 
as an impact of democratic capitalism, increased the number of local and regional 
businessmen in politics, enhanced the attractiveness of public office, and raised the 
stakes for party politicians.  The relationship between business and politics became 
important in which not only that clientelism pervades through the political economy 
system, but also the state becomes an arena in which the process of corporatist 
politics takes place. Due to the rapid development, the role of the state tends to the 
concept of corporatism, which has been used to describe the political arrangement 
under governments or the peak organization where business-politicians are strong in 
securing national interest. The government has made particular the development 
strategy in adopting state-corporatist solutions through state-inspired modernization. 
The shift in power has occurred mainly within political parties and the government 
causing the decision-making extracted through hierarchal top-down control 
enforcing political stability.  Therefore, though the state constructed the civil 
societies, the state prefers to provide incentives and privileges to gain political 
support through the exchange of commitment and long-term loyalty.  The policies 
and political instrument become means for the party in the government to gain 
partisanship to win elections from the public, which is seen as the consequence of 
cultural practice between the patron and clients ties.   It is then easy for organized 
groups of civil society to become a political–partisan having a strong relationship. 
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2.6 Analytical model  
This study uses the multidisciplinary research design to analyze how civil 
society works in Thailand through the state-shaped structure and culture of civil 
society organizations.  The model shown on the next page is the reconstructed 
version of Tsujinaka’s (2002, 2008), which illustrates the relationship among actors 
in the political system.  Figure 2.1 shows the long-term political culture as elite 
clientelism. From 1932 to 1960s, the bureaucrats had high authority and clientelism 
was derived from a feudal system of absolute monarchy period.  However, from the 
1970s to 1980s, the new bargaining power of businessmen, effected by capitalism, 
became more important. Businessmen changed their role from budgeting sponsors to 
significant members of the political party in terms of capitalism with extreme 
political power.  At present, party structural system is stronger through the 
representative regime where the merging and acquisition of capitalists, political 
parties, politicians, military, civil servants and others have achieved a bigger and 
stronger party. It appears that their relationships are based on benefits and integrated 
without political ideology.  It implies that authoritarianism remains hegemonic and 
has adapted its pattern to patron-client relationships while the autocrats were elites 
who have changed from nobility to military and civilian bureaucrats, and 
businessmen, respectively. 
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Figure 2.1: Analytical model in studying civil society 
 
Source: This analytical model modified the idea of Yutaka Tsujinaka (2002, 2008). 
 
Based on the rule of the game, the modified figure has shown that the 
political system’s elite patrons (political parties) determined and played their 
hierarchy and harmonized through the distribution of privileges and incentives 
towards three layers that are referred to as 1) the micro level as policy process layer, 
2) the meso level as political process layer and 3) the macro level as social process 
layer.  All three levels have been covered and nurtured by a political culture of a 
patron-client relationship. Basically, the democratic policy formation is derived from 
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the social issue at the social process. In the social process layer, the circles represent 
the civil society organization as neighborhood communities whereas the upward 
arrows represent their needs or social issues in the social process layer.  In addition, 
most of the needs and social issues would be absorbed and refined through the soft 
filter of political ideology and clientelist system of political parties (through the 
rents) before being elevated to meso level as a political process layer and before 
some issues might be dropped out. After passing into the meso level, the issues were 
found as the policies and campaigns of political parties, which were elevated to 
policy process layer through the political process filter as a bargaining of power 
based on party politics.  The majority party has legitimated to success the policy 
decision-making and automated that its political campaign will become the state’s 
policies extracted through hierarchy top-down return to social process coming up 
with the distribution of privileges and incentives which could satisfy the local 
demands.  Through the hierarchy and harmonization, I have found the rent-seeking 
that support political parties as top, middle, and lower managers in each level who 
are willing to harmonize power and needs of the players of the political power.  On 
the other hand, the penetration of partisan politics has been reflected through the 
strong relationship based on patron-client ties between the local officials and local 
politicians and neighborhood communities.   
 
2.7 Methodology 
The present research on civil society in Thailand uses combined qualitative 
and quantitative methods for analysis. The qualitative method is based on the 
literatures, researches, reports, reviews, personal observations, and interviews. The 
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quantitative method had been done with the gathering of primary data through the 
surveying at the field. Moreover, comparative discussion on other civil societies had 
been added to support the explanation and arguments about the basic characteristics, 
functions, political involvement of civil society organizations in terms of its 
similarities and differences, and to explicitly show the distinctive characteristic and 
their nature of relation with the government.   
 
2.7.1 The use of survey method 
The survey conducted for the present research focuses on two samples that 
represent civil society organizations. The first follows the cross-national survey on 
civil organizations (known as JIGS Project11), founded by the Japanese Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, which conducted similar types 
of surveys in other 14 countries12. The other survey is derived from the national 
survey of neighborhood associations of Japan, which was carried out in 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 For details about the project visit the project website http://cajs.tsukuba.ac.jp/en/result/index.php. 
Some more detailed information about the JIGs project has been described in chapter 4  
12 14 countries include Japan, Korea, USA, Germany, China, Turkey, Russia, the Philippines, 
Brazil, Bangladesh, Poland, Estonia, Uzbekistan and India (1997-2014). 
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Table 2.1: Survey conducted in Thailand 
Survey conducted City Year Data source and Survey method Sample Distribution Valid Return Sample Return Rate(%)
Chiang Mai 90 76 84.4
Lamphun 17 17 100.0
Lampang 43 43 100.0
Mae Hong Son 6 6 100.0
Total 156 142 91.0
Chiang Mai 1976 237 12.0
Lamphun 363 75 20.7
Lampang 540 29 5.4
Mae Hong Son 117 35 29.9
Total 2996 376 12.6
the name lists of the Municipality Office/
Interview2011-2012NHA survey
2012-2013CSOs survey
Organization Directory/
Mail and reconfirmed with some Orgs. by 
phone interview
 
Table 2.1 shows the survey conducted in Thailand NHA survey (2011-2012). 
The population size and sample distribution were 156 neighborhood communities 
(NCs) and the valid response was 142 NCs (91.%). All data sources were obtained 
from the name list of the Municipality Office. The survey method had been done by 
both mail and direct interview with the president. The valid responses that were 
derived are as follows, Chiang Mai (84.44%), Mae Hong Son (100%), Lampang 
(100%) and Lamphun (100%). 
In the CSO survey (2012-2013), the population size and sample distribution 
were 2,996. The total valid response was 376 (12.6%). All data sources were 
obtained from the name list of Organization of the Department of Provincial and of 
the Municipality offices and I had also searched the website of Ministry of Social 
Development and Human Security and other Organization Directory. The survey 
method had been done mainly by mail and reconfirmed with some organizations by 
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phone. The valid response breakdown in each area was Chiang Mai (12%), Mae 
Hong Son (29.91%), Lampang (5.4%), Lamphun (20.7%), respectively. However, in 
comparative perspective with Kyoto, Rajshahi and Cebu, the selected data was only 
from Chiang Mai. 
The collected data had been processed using descriptive statistics which 
provides a wide range of statistic information on civil society organization related to 
their nature of characteristics and relation with the government. Moreover, the 
participatory observation and informal interviews were conducted with resource 
persons like civil society leaders and government administrators concerning civil 
society in Thailand.  
 
2.7.2 Application of data 
The data gathered from the survey had been numerically analyzed to identify 
the basic characteristics, functions, and political relations. The basic characteristics 
are concerned with the classification, policy interest, objective, resources, including 
members, employee, and budget. The present research is also to investigate and 
explicate the nature of civil society organizations related to participatory action in 
politics which include relation with the government influencing government 
decision and policy and lobbying the government. Most of the data gathered and 
used in Chapter 4 contain the explanation about the nature and trends of 
neighborhood community, focusing on its features and functions, nature of activities 
and relation between the neighborhood community and the government (both 
national and local government) in the Thailand context. To understand the nature of 
civil society organizations and pattern of civil society towards political relation, 
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Chapter 5 provides numerically analyzed data gathered from the CSOs in Thailand 
to provide a comparative study of civil society with other countries in Asia within 
JIGs project like Japan, the Philippines, and Bangladesh.    
The content analysis was done with different data gathered from literatures, 
researches, reviews and interviews regarding their perceptions on the political 
structure of Thailand, including the discussion on the nature of those civil society 
organizations, function, and their relation to politics. A detailed description of using 
this method has been discussed broadly throughout the research. 
 
2.7.3 Justification for selecting the study area 
Chiang Mai province is a central city located in the Northern part of 
Thailand and is an ancient cultural capital of the northern region of Thailand. It has a 
long-term progression of historical characteristics, culture, and economy. The 
population of the province is 1,678,284 living in 7,763 square kilometers, which are 
subdivided into 25 districts (amphoe). The districts are further subdivided into 204 
subdistricts (tambon) and 1,915 villages (muban).  
 Chiang Mai is a blend of rural and urban characteristics. Its locals have lived 
in the formation of traditional communities where they have had a high native 
identity and have strong social relations. They have retained the traditional culture, 
religious and social practices that characterized Lanna lifestyle. On the other side, 
following the National Economic and Social Development Plan, the Town and 
Country Planning Department of the Ministry of Interior has selected Chiang Mai.   
It is to be given top priority in its development as a primary city in the northern 
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regional center13 to develop and provide decentralization of industrial growth and 
economic and commercial activities from Bangkok Metropolitan to urban center in 
other regions. Consequently, in the city of Chiang Mai, there is the growth of urban 
areas and high productivity level with the concomitant migration of rural people.  
Being the center of the north, not only in the central administrative branch, 
division headquarters of the government departments and ministries are found in 
Chiang Mai like the Bank of Thailand, National Village and Urban Funds office, etc. 
There are many projects in this province and central government budgets have been 
allotted for its local investment and development. Furthermore, Chiang Mai has 
positioned itself to become a Creative City and is considering applying for Creative 
City status with UNESCO and become the hub for information technology and 
electronics of the northern part of Thailand. Also, it is the center for education 
mainly providing higher education for the people of the northern region. Therefore, 
from these points of view of demographic and social composition, industrial and 
investment, education, urbanization and important administrative agencies, Chiang 
Mai province has been selected as the main study area for conducting the present 
survey towards civil society organization from a local perspective.  
As mentioned, Thailand political reform since the late 1990s effected the 
political changes with a diversity of state and non-state groups’ occurrence, 
including civil society organization.  In the municipalities, the Ministry of Interior 
(MOI) mandated the municipalities to encourage and support local residents to form 
neighborhood associations (self-reliance community) under the government’s 
                                                 
13 The urban and metropolitan development strategies of the Fourth National Economic and Social 
Development plan (1997 - 1981) mentioned that the urban growth center of the upper northern region 
is Chiang Mai. 
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guideline structures and incentives.  The main study focuses on the government-
designated terms related to the development of civil society organizations in the 
municipality. Those organized groups, based on the concept of neighborhood 
associations, which were perceived as the early forms of such associations, were 
also commonly seen in the countryside villages.  The study area included other 
surrounding provinces with upper northern region 1 which are Lamphun, Lampang 
and Mae Hong Son, scoping in the municipality and the survey sample is as 
indicated in Table 2.1.  
 
 Chapter 3 
Emergence of Civil Society through Political Structure 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous literature in Chapter 2 showed that the strength of the state 
could dictate the strength of a civil society. The political structure, which may be the 
political actors of the state and political institutions as well as political policies and 
strategies, usually affects political outcomes through its strategic position. It may be 
observed that the emerging trend of civil society is mostly based upon the influence 
of the state and political institutional actions. The state and political institutional 
actions may pervasively influence directly and indirectly the development of civil 
society organizations. Conforming to this belief, Tsujinaka (2014) asserts that the 
state always tries to mold and influence civil society organizations, while Schwartz 
& Pharr (2003) claims that the state could promote several patterns of civil society 
organizations based on rules and regulations of political systems and state 
sovereignty. Therefore, I perceive that most civil societies are organized 
autonomously beyond the control of the state and are sometimes adopted as a 
mechanism in response to the state policies by influencing political opportunity 
structures.  
As stated by Tsujinaka, there are two forms of contrasting perspectives of 
civil society in Japan. First, the institutional-statist perspective that emphasizes on 
the relatively strict regulatory environment by a strong interventionist state control 
or by a socially penetrative public administration to compensate for its weak 
jurisdictional power. The other perspective is the social-pluralist that focuses on the 
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emerging citizen activities and movements through spontaneous social drives, 
especially in social modernization that has been booms and waves of vitalization 
among civil society organizations (Schwartz & Pharr, 2003).  
According to Pekkanen, the state actions have promoted one type of local 
group as neighborhood associations in Japan. He asserted that the state has 
structured incentives to promote this pattern of development that nurture social 
capital-type civil society groups based on the state’s rules and regulations. 
Consequently, these small local groups can contribute to building up stocks of social 
capital and perhaps improve the performance of local governments (Pekkanen, 2006, 
pp. 3-5). The exchange of advancement of interests indicates a strong cooperation 
between the state and civil society in response to state policy through political 
opportunity structures.  
This study is concerned with the political structure affecting particular 
patterns of civil society organizations, especially through the rule of law and 
political strategy in Thailand. Furthermore, this chapter analyzes several patterns of 
civil society organizations based on the previous literature by first discussing the 
political structure of Thailand through the image of elitist democracy, then explicitly 
capturing the basic nature and roles of civil society in Thai political structures.  
 
3.2 Political structure as elite democracy in Thailand  
    Political structure mostly consists of the powerful elites who ultimately 
exert the highest influence in determining the nature of political structures. Thailand 
political elites may include the military, bureaucrats, politicians, and capitalists. 
These influential groups usually affect political outcomes by the virtue of strategic 
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positions in powerful organizations and movements. They acquire and exercise their 
power and ability to bargain with one another, as well as generate political pressure 
for reform such as bringing down dictatorial regimes that eventually leads to the 
liberalizing of political systems (Bunbongkarn, 2004, p. 138).  
  Since the state is the main institution and has the legitimacy of the rule of 
law in politics, it therefore has the powerful sovereignty in relation to other internal 
actors or institutions within the political, economic, and social systems. For that 
reason, there is a competition for gaining political power among the military, 
bureaucrats, politicians, and capitalists. Whoever wins the election becomes 
occasionally significant. All functions go along with the influence and nature of the 
political culture as a patron-client relationship. Politics has become the arena of 
fighting factions to which elite groups dominate and thus reflecting a high degree of 
political instability and unstable democracy.  
There are two periods considered in this section, the past political structure 
and the present political reform in 1997. Most Thai scholars perceived these reforms 
as the periods of change to confer a full democracy in Thailand through people’s 
participation and the decentralization stipulated in the 1997 Constitution. Moreover, 
these periods of change led to the political restructure and revision of plural political 
and social actors. 
 
3.2.1 Political structure from 1932 to 1997 
Military-bureaucratic regime   
From 1932 to 1979, there had been approximately sixteen military coups and 
about nine of which were successful. In regards to the political structure, since 1932 
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and to the present day, the military has played a significant role by seizing the power 
from the parliament and political parties. From 1932 to the early 1990s, the coup 
groups were elevated and changed only the government in power while elections 
were held and political parties were allowed to function. However, the appointed 
members limited the parliament because it was deemed that the bureaucrats who 
were represented by the military and civil servant elites manipulated the political 
force in Thailand. In this sense, Thai politics was called the “bureaucratic polity” or 
“military-bureaucratic regimes”. 
Despite of the 1932 democratic revolution in Thailand from absolute 
monarchy to constitutional monarchy led by People’s Party14, it is difficult to ensure 
whether Thai polity conferred to full democracy. Anek Laothamatas accounted that 
the country was under the rule of either military or elected governments that relied 
heavily on the support of the armed forces (Laothamatas, 1988, p. 451). At least four 
decades15 after the revolution, the military elites were the main power of the state. 
They had frequently staged the coups and undertook the centralized political power 
and administrative reformation. In addition, it was assumed that authoritarianism 
flourished in which Suchit Bunbongkarn further argued that Thai people preferred a 
stronger and decisive political leadership that the army could provide.  For this 
reason, it was easy for the military leaders to seize the power without mass 
resistance (Bunbongkarn, 2013, p. 165). During this period, the coup led by military 
                                                 
14 A small group of military and civil servants who had studied abroad, called “ Khana Ratsadon” , 
demanded King Prajadhipok become a constitutional monarch and grant the Thai people a 
constitution.   
15 From 1932 to 1960s. 
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leaders Colonel Phraya Phahon Phonphayuhasena (1933) and Lieutenant General 
Phin Choonhawan (1947) gave way to the army and its leaders to dominate the 
legislature and the cabinet.  Moreover, nationalism was used to strengthen the 
military regime, especially during the period of Field Marshal Phibunsongkram 
(1950) with the aim of establishing autocratic rule in accordance with 
modernization. 
Absolute military rule was enforced from 1957 to 1963. Field Marshal Sarit 
Thanarat and his successors, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn and Field Marshal 
Prapas Charusathien, launched coups against democracy. Bunbongkran crafted that 
the military leaders during these periods were anti-democratic and that they needed 
political stability, strong leadership, and rapid economic development rather than 
democratization.  In accordance to this claim, the culture of the armed forces 
emphasized on strong leadership, discipline, order, and hierarchical structure, which 
led the military to respect the military doctrine and organizational culture and ignore 
democracy (Bunbongkarn 2013, p. 172). Not only did the military hold their power 
in the politically but also socio-economically, through the state legitimate 
intervention. Hence, Thai democracy being manipulated by the military elites had 
essentially started with authoritarianism. 
However, Thai scholars claimed that the student demonstrations in 1973 and 
1976 were the transition periods to democracy in Thailand.  In 1973, students and 
pluralists succeeded in fighting for democracy wherein they called for a new 
constitution, political reform, and elected parliament from the tiny dictatorships16.  It 
                                                 
16 Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachon, Colonel Narong Kittikachon and General Praphas 
Charusathien were regarded as a military group who seized power from the government from 1963 to 
1973, until public protests forced them to step down and they became known as the “Three Tyrants”. 
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could have been the end of a four-decade of absolute military rule and it could have 
paved the way for full-fledged democracy, unfortunately, the role of student groups 
had ended in October 1976 with the return of dictatorship.  The coup resulted in a 
familiar autocratic political pattern with even more extremist overtones 
(Samudavanija, 2002, p. 98). With the crackdown of violence caused by 
dictatorships, Thanom attempted to return to the country through his partisan group 
in the government.  Thai scholars (Chai-Anan and Likhit)  described the events in 
October 1973 and 1976 as results of political instability and turmoil. The insurgency 
of the students originated from the confusion and unmet aspirations with the gap of 
social change led to a political conflict.  Pressure group politics, polarization, and 
confrontation politics were achieved through bargaining among established patron-
client factions (Samudavanija, 2002; Dhiravegin, 2011). Fragmentation and 
polarization, including instability of parliament system, led Thailand to the 
resumption of the military dictatorship having high political stability.  
Clearly, the bureaucratic polity could completely demonstrate military elite 
power in which the military could control the political institutions and might 
struggle for power among different factions.  It ruled several times mainly by coup, 
declaring martial law, designing the military government and promulgating the new 
constitution.  The trend in Thai politics is that the military is one of the major 
political actors who design Thai political structure as a traditional powerful 
bureaucratic polity.  
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Semi-democratic regimes and political-economic alliances  
The economic opportunities, which were made available after the decline of 
the military rule in the 1980s, led businessmen represented by capitalists and 
commercial classes17 to take more active roles in party politics.  Not only the 
military-bureaucrats but also businessmen began playing a major role in the socio-
economic system and political decision-making through the cabinets and 
contributions of financial support, which effectively changed the relationship 
between bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic groups in politics. In that event, the 
political arena shifted from the bureaucratic polity to representative democracy. 
Before 1973, when the military set up their own political parties, the military 
cliques appointed the cabinet and the members of the parliament.  However, after 
1973, the subsequent political violence and government instability caused the 
military to lead democratic governance and enter to semi-democratic regimes. From 
the 1980s to early 1990s, socio-economic changes caused the growth of business 
forces. Thai society became pluralistic for it was constituted of the middle class and 
businessmen and where several of them turned into an association of political parties 
and politicians. Significantly, the economic opportunities led the political parties to 
establish links with businessmen and military bureaucrats. Bunbongkarn claimed 
that the bureaucrats accepted the politicians as new patrons who could support and 
protect their advancement and privileges (Bunbongkarn, 2013, p. 38) .   From that 
time on, Thai politics had evolved into a period of parliament politics through the 
representative democracy and by the political intervention of the military 
bureaucrats. Nonetheless, there was a struggle for political power among the 
                                                 
17 Chinese merchants who were Chinese immigrants, some were local-born Chinese.  
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political parties for parliament seats and cabinet posts. Due to the fact that a 
powerful political party was necessary in order to win the election and receive 
strong financial support, the politically influential bureaucrats had to cooperate with 
businessmen to strengthen their economic power in the elections.   
From the 1980s, Thai democracy had brought forth unstable coalition 
government and political networks. The bargaining power of a candidate became the 
rule of the game to win a seat in the government.  Political networks had played a 
significant role in electing politicians and government officials.  Therefore, 
favoritism and vote buying had characterized the elections. As mentioned earlier, the 
military bureaucrats represented their political power through cooperating with 
capitalists who were budgeting-sponsors of their political party. As a result, the 
capitalists changed their role as significant members of the political party in terms of 
capitalism with extreme political power.  In addition, the political networks also 
expanded to rural areas due to the centralized state power’s inability to provide basic 
services to the rural people.  This expansion had paved the way to new political 
opportunities that supported the growth of rural capitalists and network politicians 
who rose to power through their ability to structure the vote.  Local politicians 
provided benefits for their constituencies in exchange for their votes. Through this 
common practice of patronage, their constituencies had become reliable political 
machines. Candidates were also assigned to various provincial networks in order to 
win the election. 
Notably, the semi-democracy under General Prem’ s leadership provided an 
opportunity for political parties to establish links between business and social groups 
leading the military to receive monetary return.  Gradually since the 1980s, under 
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General Prem’ s18 government about 40%  of businessmen had become politicians 
and later in 1983 the number of businessmen had increased to 49.7%.  (Phongpaichit 
& Piriyarangsan, 1992, pp. 70-71) . Businessmen began playing a major role in the 
economic and political decision-making through the cabinets and financial supports 
but instead of being members of a political party, some of them founded their own 
political parties.  Then from 1988 to 1991, the aim of General Chatichai in turning 
Indochina from a battlefield into a marketplace resulted to free trade and investment. 
At that time, the government initiated many infrastructure projects19 including the 
transformation of some of the state enterprises to private businesses which expanded 
the private sectors rapidly. The business elite groups supported most of the political 
parties during this period. Later however, a problem with corruption arose in 
General Chatichai’s government that caused General Suchinda Kraprayoon to start a 
coup in 1991.  However, the uprising in May 1992 against General Suchinda 
reflected the changes in political roles and attitude of the armed forces not to 
intervene in politics while increasing the political awareness of the public. 
Consequently, middle class, scholars, and business leaders began working more with 
political parties to protect and foster their interests through the democratic process 
(Bunbongkarn, 2013).  
                                                 
18 General Prem Tinsulanonda is a retired Thai military officer who served as the Prime Minister of 
Thailand from 1980 to 1988.  He initiated to use amnesty to negotiate with the members of the 
Communist Party of Thailand.  Consequently, many communist members, including former student 
protestors returned home. He now serves as the Head of the Privy Council of the King of Thailand, 
Bhumibol Adulyadej. 
19 An expansion of the telecommunications network in partnership with the state-owned Telephone 
Organization of Thailand (TOT), development of the Eastern Seaboard of Thailand and road and rail 
networks in partnership with the Mass Rapid Transit Authority ( MRTA)  in the Greater Bangkok 
Area. 
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3.2.2 Political structure after 1997 
Electorate democracy and business conglomeration 
Since the 1980s, the political parties during the era of political networking 
had become more popular through the trend of family politics. Like other Asian 
countries such as Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia, Thai politics is still 
dominated by elite family ties.  In the survey conducted by the King Prajadhipok’ s 
Institute (2013), Stithorn Thananithichot shows that the percentage of the members 
of the House of Representatives who have been elected from the same family had 
continually increased from 3.1 percent to 14. 2 percent from 1979 to 1997.  In the 
2011 election, the percentage increased to 18 percent20.  Moreover, in comparison 
with other countries, Thailand became the world’ s top country with the highest 
percentage of family politics (42%), besting the Philippines (37%) and Japan (33%) 
by 5 and 9 percent, respectively (Thananithichot, 2013, p 350). According to the rule 
of the game, the direct role of businessmen has been increasing in Thai politics. The 
family politics has become an effective political mechanism of networks and 
privileges. Consequently, the shift to representative democracy is a relative political 
direction to the newly established business conglomerate party. 
After the political insurgency in 1992, the economic crisis in 1997 and the 
new constitution provided incremental opportunities for the capitalists to be 
involved in the political system. Even though the economic crisis revealed that the 
bureaucrats and network politicians were incapable of solving national problems, the 
1997 constitution promulgated the new electoral system that supported big and 
                                                 
20 There were 210 members of the House of Representatives elected who came from the ruling Pheu 
Thai party 19 families, the Democrat Party 17 families, Bhumjaithai 4 families, Chart Thaipattana 3 
families and Phalang Pracha Chon and Rak Thailand one family each. 
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wealthy parties. In the proportional representation system21, a party leader gains 
more control over the party’ s candidates.  The first party list member becomes the 
Prime Minister while the other candidates who are positioned at the beginning of the 
party list will have a high potential to be cabinet members.  
This system provides a trend for political parties to restructure and form their 
own parties by recruiting wealthy and influential political players for gathering 
campaign funds and maintaining their popular votes. Thai Rak Thai party under the 
leadership of Thaksin Shinawatra which attracted many business conglomerates, 
political parties, and important bureaucrats to join the party.  The business 
conglomerates were composed of telecommunication and satellite groups and agro-
industry and food groups.  The following families owned the telecommunications 
groups the Shin Corporation, by the Shinawatra family; the BEC world and 
television Channel 3, by the Maleenont family; and the Jasmine International 
Company, by the Bodharamik family. The agro-industry and food groups were 
Chaoreon Pokkapan or CP Company that was owned by the Chearavanont family 
and the Nestle Thai Public Company by the Mahakijsiri family (Pathmanand, 1998, 
pp. 69-71).  
In the 2001 election, the Thai Rak Thai party got the highest number of seats 
(by constituencies and proportionalities). The first Thaksin government consisted of 
12 business conglomerates, 9 former bureaucrats, and 8 politicians, meanwhile, the 
number of business conglomerates increased to 15 seats ( Bowornwathana, 2011,     
p. 41). Under the business conglomerate government, Thaksin ran the public 
administration by a monopolization trend, using the CEO form of management and 
                                                 
21 Any party receiving less than 5% of the total votes would not have its candidates elected.   
66 
 
employing by contract in the government while the voters were considered 
customers. Bowornwathana assumed that the Administrative Reform was 
implemented to consolidate power from other ministers and high bureaucrats into 
the hands of the Super CEO Thaksin (Bowornwathana, 2011, p. 41). 
The successive influence of business conglomerate on executive 
administration and public policies is apparent.  The business conglomerate would 
receive quota seats in various positions of government, especially the ministership as 
a direct benefit.  Moreover, the business conglomerate would receive indirect 
benefits from policy decision-making process through government projects, 
including budgeting, auction, concession, and contracts. Thai politics has returned to 
money politics with the new political leader on account of huge sums of money to 
fund election campaigns became a key factor in winning the elections.  
 
“Thaksinomics” and populist democracy  
Thai administration changed when Thaksin Shinawatra became the Prime 
Minister in 2001. The economic crisis in November 1997 led to the downfall of the 
government of Chavalit Yongchaiyuth that not only resulted in the IMF’s agreement 
in Chuan Leekpai administration but also formed a conducive environment for 
Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai party to campaign on an economic nationalist 
platform (Pongsudhirak, 2013, p. 5). The Thaksin government had made significant 
changes in policy paradigms with the centralized style of CEO management and 
government. The Prime Minister CEO recentralized his power to the Governor CEO 
and Diplomat CEO (Phongpaichit, 2014, p. 388). A performance-based management 
(PMB)  system that clearly delineates contractual relationship and delegation of 
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authority in the bureaucratic lines of governance was reformed (Intarakumnerd, 
2011, p. 46). Kasian Tejapira argued that it combined aggressive neo-liberalism with 
capitalist cronyism, and absolutist counter-reform politics with a populist social 
policy to transform radically the existing patterns of power relationships and elite 
resource allocation (Tejapira, 2006, p. 10) .  There are two key concepts underlying 
his success in catching the attention of the public:  a)  state-led economy and             
b) welfare policy.  
The state-led economy policy under Thaksin government could be addressed 
as dual-track policy and cluster-oriented.  The main thrust of Thaksinomics is the 
Dual-track development model, which aims to enhance international 
competitiveness by strengthening the external side of the nation’s economy. Exports, 
foreign direct investments, and tourism attempted to increase the capabilities of 
domestic and grassroots economies by implementing projects such as the Village 
and Urban Community Fund22, One-Tambon-One-Product project (OTOP)23 and 
Small, Medium and Large Project24 (Intarakumnerd, 2011).  
On the other hand, the cluster-oriented economy, which aims to develop 
geographical proximity, was used as the main industrial policy to promote 
interactive and collective learning and generate positive externalities for 
participating actors at national, regional, and local levels.  The national level was 
used to create coherent and innovative advanced industrial cluster in both services 
                                                 
22 Small scale micro-credit to provide revolving fund for individuals and households called “one 
million baht” to increase local capabilities of fund management and stimulate grassroots economy. 
23 State sponsorship of provincial business schemes for entrepreneurship that support each Tambon’s 
champion product. 
24 Direct injections of cash into village development funds called “the SML schemes” to enhance 
community work. 
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and manufacturing sectors such as automotive, textile and garment, software and 
tourism. At the regional level, 19 geographical areas had to plan and implement their 
own cluster strategy focusing on a few strategic products and services under the 
monitoring of CEO Governors who were appointed by the central government.  At 
the local level, it was applied to increase the capacity of the grassroots economy 
(Intarakumnerd, 2011). 
  The welfare policy was a key to the social contract between Thaksin and his 
voters.  The social contract ensured that his party would get legitimacy to run the 
country while people would benefit directly via the policy (i.e., the three-year Debt 
Suspension for Farmer Program25). The most popular welfare policy is the Universal 
Healthcare Coverage: “30 Baht for any diseases” 25 26. The policy made a huge reform 
in Thai healthcare system that guaranteed all Thai people a quality and equal 
accessibility to health care services for 30 Baht, approximately 1 US dollar. 
However, those workers who were in the formal sector covered by the Health 
Welfare for State Employee Scheme or Social Insurance Scheme were not eligible.  
During the rule of Thaksin government, the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB) were subsequently responsible for the overall cluster 
policy of the country.  The Board of Investment (BOI)  substantially paid more 
attention to issues underlying long-term competitiveness of investments 
(Intarakumnerd, 2011) .  The Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand (IFCT), 
SME Bank, Small Industry Credit Guarantee Corporation (SICGC) and Innovation 
                                                 
25 State policy sponsorship for the farmers to stop repaying and slowly reducing their debts to the 
bank for three-year. 
26 The scheme on health service with flat user fee of 30 Baht for poorest citizens, include children 
under 12 years of age, senior citizens aged 60 years and over to ensure equitable health care. 
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Development Fund (IDF) had supported the provided funds. The Federation of Thai 
Industry (FTI) and Thai Chamber of Commerce (TCC) had been the most powerful 
private-sector organizations that exerted a strong influence on the government’ s 
economic policies. 
 
3.3 The influence of political structure on the civil society 
As far as political decisions and strategies are concerned,  Thai political 
structures from macro down to the micro level are comprised of the state 
(government), military bureaucrats, and business politicians. Moreover, the political 
culture that is based on patron-clients relationship and political elite style supports 
those political actors who play a crucial role in the political structure which 
ultimately affect the civil society organization.  
The civil society formation influenced by the Thai political structure has 
three phases. The first phase was after the transition to democracy in 1932. Thailand 
was mostly under the military dictatorship, which represented the most dynamic 
forces and powerful political mechanism known as the autocratic regime.  Thai 
scholars perceived that the military rule in Thai politics declined after the uprising in 
1973 to 1976 (Laothamatas, 1988; Samudavanija, 2002; Bunbongkarn, 2004; 
Sawasdee, 2006; Dhiravegin, 2011). Many coups had been launched to demonstrate 
the intention of the military leaders to gain control over the government and 
legislation such as when the junta abrogated the old constitution and promulgated a 
new one and when the military and bureaucrats controlled political parties. Thus, a 
government would be set up through appointment by the junta or its own favorite 
parliamentary party.  During this period, the autocrats who were the military 
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represented the most significant role in the allocation and distribution of power, 
which resulted to Thai politics long-term bureaucratic polity. 
As a result, during the domination of the bureaucrat-military force, civil 
society organizations were not the main providers of politics in Thai society.  The 
military and bureaucratic forces considered civil societies as philanthropic 
organizations formed as voluntary groups in relation to religious organizations and 
civic groups. The religious organizations were the traditional Buddhist temples and 
Christian missionaries that performed philanthropic functions by providing 
community development and serving as schools that offer education and/or hospitals 
to the public. There were other organizations in the form of ethnic groups too. The 
overseas Chinese formed an association of Chinese immigrants that provided 
assistance and protection to serve the needs of occupational groups, new 
immigrants, and poor Chinese. This later became a Chinese commercial association, 
especially, during the period of Field Marshal Sarit government to co-opt with his 
political strategy about economic development.  However, with the threat of 
communism from China, the National Cultural Act of 1942 by the National Cultural 
Commission of the Ministry of Education was enacted to regulate all the 
organizations.  In subsequent years, several additional Acts were passed to control 
Chinese clans, business associations, and labor organizations (Pongsapich, 1999,  
pp. 325-326). 
The civic associations were initiated as Liberal feminism. The Women City 
Club (Samakhom Satri Thai Haeng Sayam)  was formally established in 1932 to 
promote gender equality whereas the Women’s Culture Club was formed in 1943 in 
order to promote social activities and culture and provide welfare for those who are 
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in need. The Thai Red Cross was formed in 1890 to care for wounded soldiers and 
provide general medical services and supplies.  However, most of the associations 
provided services as a donation for social development. 
It was widely accepted that under the strict control of the state, most civil 
society organizations were weak and small because their activities supported the 
government relating to charity, educational supports, and donations.  Concerning 
civic associations that supported group members with relevance to race, religion or 
language, the basic role and responsibility of civil society organizations focused 
mainly on social services that restricted its political role.  
The second phase was presented by the increasing popular demand for 
democratization and socio-economic participation.  From 1973 to 1976, civic 
movements emerged to protest against the authoritarian government and discredit 
the dictatorial rule. The major group was a student organization called the “National 
Students Center of Thailand” that led a mass uprising against the military rulers who 
demanded politics to be more liberal and to confer to full democracy. Despite this, 
civil societies continued to grow during the three years of democratic rule and 
various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as labor unions, farmer 
groups,  and assembly of the poor spring up. Although their activities produced 
conflict with the government officials, the military rule returned in 1976. However, 
instead of working against the military rulers, civil society organizations worked 
with civilians, political parties, and especially with business groups due to the 
economic change that led to more political-economic alliances and pluralistic 
societies. 
72 
 
Civil society organizations flourished during the 1980s. Many organizations 
worked at the grassroots level focusing on cooperation with state institutions in 
solving social and economic problems mainly on rural development. Through this 
attempt, civil society movements became stronger. The Student Federation of 
Thailand, the Confederation for Democracy, the Farmers Federation of Thailand, 
labor unions, assembly of the poor, and other middle-class groups led the uprising in 
May 1992 against the authoritarian government, led by the National Peace-Keeping 
Council and Parliament-nominated General Suchinda.  The uprising prompted 
political reform in terms of decentralization and public participation.  
Civil societies also held protests against economic policies which in fact 
contributed to the finance and economic downfall, particularly in the rural areas. 
Statistics showed that in 1998, some 170 demonstrations and rallies were held, and 
immensely increased in 1993 to 1994 to more than 750 protests, mainly from small 
farmers in the Northeast (Pongsapich, 1999, p. 327) .  These patterns developed as 
Thai political structure opportunities for grassroots demanding for social issues, 
including financial and economic crisis, environment campaigns, and public 
governance.  During this transition to full democracy, civil society pushed for 
success in democratizing the political system and public participation concerning 
social issues. It became the source of social movements which stimulated the public 
participation through its networking and initiated the civic consciousness of the 
state, private, and social sectors.  Strong and reliable civil society can represent the 
interests of the public and check on the state power manipulation (Bunbongkarn, 
2004, p. 143). Civil society cannot be understood in isolation but it is a network of 
various groups or organizations, which link the state with the individuals.  
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Continuously, Thai civil society influenced the political reform including the 
enactment of the 1997 constitution. Even with the struggles of some groups 
continued against the state power to achieve social justice,  the state had become 
stronger again when Thaksin government came to power in January 2001. He stated 
that “Company is a country and country is a company” which is the same 
management concept.  His government had launched populist policies to appeal to 
the rural majority, which should in principle strengthen civil society.  Nevertheless, 
there seemed to be problems to be overcome since those policies related to the 
corporatist model co-opt civil society and restrict its autonomy. As a result of civil 
society coming under increasing government restriction and control, it has become a 
part of the state and easily manipulated and dominated by state agencies. Therefore, 
political structure leads the third phase of Thai civil society to be straddled in the 
boundary between civil and political society.  
 
3.4 Redefinition and reshaping of civil society 
The idea of a strong government had been raised substantially into the 1997 
constitution, which directly and indirectly influenced the third phase of Thai civil 
society.  The state has the authority to redefine the ideology and reshape civil 
society.  Politically, the process of social movement stimulates the public’s 
participation through its networking and initiates civic consciousness.  The social 
movement had involved opposing elites and the authorities to achieve the collective 
goals.  Since 2005, many NGOs and social movements sought to destroy elected 
governments while supporting a military coup in 2006 ( Kitiriandlarp & Hewison, 
2009)  including the latest coup in 2014.  It seemed that the civil society’s role has 
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changed. However, the emergence of social movement has been associated with the 
process of democratization. The other point of view by mid-1980 was that Thai civil 
society flourished beyond the control of the state. Many NGOs were established and 
focused on cooperating with state institutions in solving social and economic 
problems. To summarize, there are two perceptions of the role of civil society. First, 
it is interesting that the civil society movement has been divided into two groups: the 
pro-government and the anti-government groups in modern Thai politics.  Second, 
the civil society is increasing as a mechanism of state-society for solving economic 
and social problems.  
 
3.4.1 Redefinition of the ideology through political groups  
The People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD)  or the Yellow Shirts was 
originally the anti-Thaksin coalition and the conservative force associated with the 
royalists and the military (Kitirianglarp and Hewison, 2009: 454). The PAD played a 
crucial role of civic movement in the Thailand political crisis of 2005 to 2006 and 
2008. The PAD was formed to lead demonstrations against the Thaksin government 
in which the leaders include Sondhi Limthongkul and Major General Chamlong 
Srimuang.  The PAD membership not only consisted mainly of a group of ultra-
royalists led by Sondhi but it had also expanded to include conservative Buddhist 
groups, working-class Bangkok residents and anti-Thaksin Southerners who were 
supported by some factions of the Thai Army, some leaders of the Democrat Party, 
and the members of the state-enterprise and labor unions. Some mentioned that PAD 
had mainly urban support in contrast to Thaksin whose base had been essentially 
rural.  
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The PAD was formed to lead demonstrations throughout 2005 and 2006 
against the Thaksinomic system pushing the Thaksin government to resign due to a 
variety of factors such as unsatisfied populist economic policies and recentralized 
government, intervention on the press and rushed privatizing process of state 
enterprises.  In addition, the PAD accused the Thaksin government of selling Shin 
Corporation to Temasek Holdings in January of 2006 and planning to overthrow the 
monarchy and establish a republic with a single party. These accusations aggravated 
their conflict of interest and corruption. The PAD voluntarily dissolved after its 
goals had been accomplished but in May of 2008 the PAD re-established and began 
their street protests by seizing the Government House to pressure Samak 
Sundaravej’s People’s Power Party27 and coalition government to resign.  The 
biggest street protest of PAD was the blockade of Parliament prior to a crucial 
legislative session. They hijacked public buses to take control of the government’s 
provisional offices at Don Muang Airport and seized control of Suvarnabhumi 
International Airport against Thaksin's brother-in-law Somchai Wongsawat in 
November of 2008.  The PAD’s sieges and protests ended after the Constitutional 
Court dissolved the three parties including People's Power Party and banned its 
leaders for five years from politics.  The army promoted the new coalition 
government, Abhisit Vejjajiva from Democratic Party was elected as Premier in 
2009. 
 On the other hand, the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship 
( UDD) ,  commonly called Red Shirts, is a political pressure group opposed to the 
People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). The UDD leaders were Jatuporn Prompan, 
                                                 
27 Thaksin-affiliated party won a plurality in 2007 general election. 
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Nattawut Saikua, Veera Musikapong from Pheu Thai Party, together with Charan 
Ditthapichai and Weng Tojirakarn.  The UDD is composed of mostly rural masses 
from the Northeast ( Isan)  and North Thailand, urban lower classes from Bangkok 
and some intellectuals.  The movement seems to have received support from the 
former Prime Minister in exile, Thaksin Shinawatra. 
The UDD was first formed to oppose the military government, which 
overthrew the former Prime Minister in exile Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006 - 2007 
and opposed the military’s 2007 constitution. The UDD led major anti-government 
rallies in April 2009 and in March t o  May 2010 for the Thai Parliament to be 
dissolved.  The UDD claimed that Abhisit’s government illegitimately took power 
and asserted that the Thai Army and the judiciary supported it so that a general 
reelection could be held.  The UDD also demanded the replacement of the 
Aristocratic polity, which allows the military and the bureaucrats to effectively 
interfere in politics.  The group’s main target was the immediate resignation of 
General Prem from the President of Privy Council. Many scholars perceived that the 
UDD always led violent clashes with military forces and the PAD group. There were 
many times that the leaders and supporters have been jailed and the government had 
to declare a state of emergency.  The degrees of protest by the Abhisit government 
got higher in April 2009 during the ASEAN summit at Pattaya. In 2010, the UDD 
moved to Rajaprasong area and protested for more than 8 weeks. After their burning 
of the buildings around Rajaprasong area and City Halls in some provinces,  the 
protest ended with the army in control. 
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After the 2011 national election, Phua Thai Party won the election and 
Yingluck Shinawatra28 became the prime minister with her coalition government. 
The PAD tried to do a campaign to cancel the election but received no support. 
Yinglak proposed the amnesty law in October 2013 causing the anti-government 
protests called The People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) to occur. The 
group leader was MP Suthep Thaugsuban, who was a former Democrat Party and 
who appointed himself as secretary-general, was supported by various organizations 
including the Democrat Party, the People’s Alliance for Democracy, student activist 
groups, and pro-military groups. 
Anti-government protests continued with demonstrators occupying 
government offices, blocking major road intersections and holding mass rallies 
in Bangkok to call for the resignation of Yingluck Shinawatra.  The political crisis 
has raised fears of a violent response from supporters of Thaksin.  The military by 
General Prayut Chan-ocha then seized power in a coup d’état on 22 May 2014.  
In summary, these political events are an underlying perspective that 
considers the political alliances of social movements that develop new forms of 
political agency embedded in notions of identity and interests. Some groups are as a 
conservative force while the others are as a supportive force of progressive or 
radical change.  It is evident that the civil society organization led its social 
movements to anti-elected governments to operate defensively and protect specific 
identities and interests.  Those groups believed that the elected government had 
failed to protect their interests; an outcome which means that direct democracy took 
over representative politics in modern Thai society. In terms of discursive practice, 
                                                 
28 Sister of Thaksin Shinawatra.  
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the Thai civil society movements have been classified as a pro-government group 
and anti-government group through their forms of network alliances.  Accurately, 
these oppositions involve the distinctive ideology of nationalism versus neo-
liberalism, communitarianism versus populism and clean politics versus big money 
politics (Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009, pp. 460-464).  
The PAD and PDRC movements  based on opposition adopted nationalism 
alliance with royalists and the other conservatives were in contrast with neo-liberal, 
underlying the Thaksinomics and pro-rich cronyism. Opponents targeted Thaksin’s 
regime by setting the privatization policies as a rush agenda of the privatizing 
process of state enterprises. The suspicions were corruption and conflict of interest 
in his network of cabinet, business partners, and family. Obviously, the policies aim 
to establish social safety nets and promote grassroots economy such as universal 
health care, debt suspension, village and urban community investment funds, the 
promotion of entrepreneurial initiatives and people’s bank to support the recovery of 
business and individual capitalist. Those policies were argued to be throwing money 
into communities without resolving poverty while making villagers shrink to 
consumer capitalism. The populist policies were destroying the communitarian ideas 
that aimed to strengthen rural communities through local development strategies 
while rejecting the market, consumerism, and materialism. Remarkably, the money 
politics discourse under the Thaksin government was highlighted through the images 
of corruption, cronyism, and collusion.  The sale of Shin Corporation to Temasek 
Holdings caused a great controversy in Thailand and created a conflict of interest 
for Thaksin Shinawatra and his family, as well as the tax exemption, the timing of 
stock sale two days after the adoption of the Telecommunications Act and the 
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impact of the media on National Security Policy. The PAD saw the transactions as a 
proof of a conflict of interest (Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009).  
 
3.4.2 Revitalization of urban civil society “Neighborhood Community” 
The civil society is not as a counterweight to the government, but it is 
increasingly becoming a mechanism of state-society for solving economic and social 
problems.  Conforming to the new 1997 constitution that aims to promote popular 
participation and encourages a strong civil society and democratic 
decentralization29, the Ministry of Interior ( MOI)  has launched a policy for the 
municipality to promote and support the establishment of neighborhood community, 
called “Chumchon Yoi Naikhet Tessaban”.  
Neighborhood community has been established to conform to the 
government’s policy.  Neighborhood community can support the municipalities as 
the lowest level of administration to facilitate more efficiency and effectiveness in 
providing public goods and services and encourage the participation of local 
residents in municipal affairs.  Since 1987, the MOI has mandated the municipality 
to promote and support the establishment of a local group of residents in the 
municipality (Ministry of Interior Order no. 0413/ V1553) .  This policy had been 
adopted to solve the slum or crowding problems that mostly affected Bangkok, 
however, it later became unpopular.  At that time, it seemed that neighborhood 
community was one consequence of urbanization in Thailand, which was 
accompanied by the effort of Thailand government to advance a country that 
                                                 
29 The public participation and decentralization have been mentioned in Sections 45-46, Sections 76-
79 of Thailand 1997 Constitution. 
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promotes industrialization and business.  The concerns of urbanization were 
announced in the Fifth and Sixth National Economic and Social Development Plan 
1982 - 1986 and 1987 - 1991, continually.  One of the visible phenomena is the 
growth of urban areas with the concomitant migration of rural people to such 
localities.  The rapid increase of city population brought about local problems such 
as housing shortages, the rising of urban slums, crimes, health care problems and so 
on. There were nearly 2,000 communities in the city areas, which held their statuses 
as slums in 1992 and then in 2001, the numbers of slum communities increased to 
more than 5,000 communities. In Bangkok only, Metropolitan has nearly 1,300 slum 
communities which increased from 843 communities in 1992 and four–fifths of 
slum communities existed in the regional areas30.  Later, according to the Eighth 
National Economic and Social Development Plan (1997-2001)  with the promotion 
of the participation of people and self-reliance and mutual assistance policy, 
neighborhood community revitalized and became the collaborative mechanism 
between the state and local residents.  
According to the national plans, Thaksin’s government had launched 
populist policies as a major mechanism to strengthen the neighborhood community 
in which the populist policy under Thaksin government, in principle, should be able 
to strengthen civil society. However, some argued that his populist policy became a 
key of the social contract between Thaksin and his voters.  The social contract was 
thought to ensure that his party and political networks would get legitimacy to run 
the country while the people will get benefit directly via the policy.  Actually, all 
governments after 1997 have implemented an incremental populist policy that 
                                                 
30 Retrieved from National Housing Authority of Thailand, http://www.nhanet.or.th/chs/slum.html 
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resulted in civil society becoming a part of the state and being easily manipulated 
and dominated by state agencies. 
At present, it is remarkable that the establishment of neighborhood 
community responds to the flourishing of civil society in Thailand, and that the 
promotion of neighborhood community’s establishment can facilitate the 
participation of local residents in municipal affairs. The encouragement on the roles 
of local residents in managing and maintaining their own resources and the 
environment as well as the mutual aids through community development illustrates 
the strengthening of social capital and civil society at the grassroots level.  On the 
other hand, the penetration of partisan politics is reflected through the relationship 
among the local officials, politicians and neighborhood communities that would be a 
political strategy for creating sustainable loyalty support as partisan.  Furthermore, 
due to the promotion of local government and the interest of local residents, the 
number of neighborhood communities is growing and many local residents are 
involved in their neighborhood communities.  
 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the relationship between civil society organizations and the 
state has been discussed through th e  several factors in Thai politics. Thai political 
structure is underscored by the political elites who are usually able to affect political 
outcomes through their strategic position. The strong influence of political structure 
from political elites as military leaders, business politicians, and business 
conglomerates have emerged and penetrated the powerful political institution.  In 
addition, with regard to the political culture as a patron-client relationship, the 
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political structure can directly and indirectly influence the structure, ideology, and 
activities of civil society organizations in Thailand.  
The characteristics of the political structures and civil society in Thailand are 
indicated in Table 3.1.  At least four decades after the 1932 revolution, such a 
political level down from micro to macro level had been the traditions of democratic 
authoritarianism and centralization that was manipulated by the military elite rule. 
Civil society is a realm of charity that is composed of religion and a civic 
association that performed philanthropic functions by providing social service and 
community development with a restricted political role.  Nonetheless, after the 
decline of military rule, politicians took a key role instead. Thai polity has come up 
with an unstable coalition government through semi-democracy. From 1973 to 1992, 
civil society continued to grow with the stimulation of public participation and 
political network that was first aimed to counteract the military state and later aimed 
at social issues. From 1997 to present, the business conglomerate has been in power 
as the new political boss.  It is precise to mention that the political structure has 
become a one-party dominance underlying electorate democracy and corporatism. 
Thus, civil society has become a mechanism for monitoring political activities as 
well as a provider for the electoral campaign.   
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of the political structures and civil society in Thailand 
Political structure 
Political culture 
& ideology 
Political boss 
(political actors) 
Civil society role 
Democratic 
authoritarianism 
manipulated by the 
military elites.  
Patron-client 
relationship and 
centralization 
(State-centric) 
Military 
factions 
Realm of charity 
composed of religion, 
civic association that 
performs philanthropic 
functions by providing 
social service and 
community development 
while restricts the 
political role.   
Semi-democracy  Patron-client 
relationship and 
family politics 
Politician and 
its political 
network:  
bureaucrat-
military, 
businessmen 
and local 
politicians 
Social movement with 
advocacy for group’s 
interests and social issues 
Electorate 
democracy 
Patron-client 
relationship and 
corporatism 
through state-led 
policy 
Politician as 
business 
conglomerate 
Pro- and anti-state 
through a network 
alliance that serves for 
political and social 
reform. 
 
It is assumed that the political structures and political culture support the role 
of political actor affecting the civil society organization. Through its authority, the 
state could influence several patterns of civil society organizations based on rules of 
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the game in political systems. In addition, civil society is organized autonomously 
beyond political opportunity structures. However, instead of having an oppositional 
relationship with the state, the state and political institutions have developed civil 
society organizations.  The direct injections of populist policies encourage and 
support local residents to facilitate more efficiency and effectiveness in providing 
social services and participation.  On the other hand, the creation and giving of 
incentives to neighborhood communities of the state can show its virtue. However, 
the state, being a political patron, may need the support from civil society 
organizations to realize a political goal and vice versa.  Therefore, civil society has 
become a part of the state and easily manipulated and dominated by state agencies. 
In the next two chapters, this study will empirically focus on the nature and 
functions of civil society at the grassroots level, including the relationship between 
civil society and politics that can explain the development of civil society and the 
state-civil society relations in Thailand. 
 
 Chapter 4 
Civil Society and Neighborhood Community in Thailand  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter denoted that the state has influenced several patterns of 
civil society organizations through state authority and political structures. 
Furthermore, the powerful elites who are military-bureaucrats, politicians, and 
businessmen have played the highest role in Thai’s political structures. They have 
always exerted their power-intervening pattern and development of civil society. 
Generally, civil society is a voluntary group that is a non-state and non-market 
sector that works autonomously in contributing the vast sphere to sustain the 
associational life and public goods without gaining the power with the state and 
holding their own private interests (Tsujinaka, 2008). However, it has an ambiguous 
status which indicates that civil society is possibly organized and/or shaped by the 
state and presents its roles as the necessary effective function of the state in serving 
public needs.  In this sense, Tsujinaka considered neighborhood associations in a 
straddles boundary of state and society (Pekkanen, Tsujinaka & Yamamoto, 2014). 
Moreover, as the state and its institutions become more legitimate, it is noticeable 
that the modern state favor to adopt the direct instrumental based on the rule, 
regulation and financial support and indirect method of favoritism, cronyism, and 
pressure. Consequently, civil society could be endangered by the administrative and 
economic mechanisms of the modern state through the reciprocity and inequality of 
uneven power and status.  This would be the political strategies for creating 
sustainable loyalty support as partisan through government sponsorship of 
86 
 
organization and resource endowments. It is possible that civil society has become a 
part of the state and easily manipulated, dominated and polarized by state agencies. 
The first purpose of this chapter is to present explicitly the basic 
characteristics, nature of activities as well as political relations of civil society 
organizations in Thailand. The empirical survey data were directly gathered in 2013 
from the civil society organizations in northern Thailand. It is to be mentioned that 
this survey followed the cross-national survey on civil society organizations (known 
as JIGS Project) which conducted a similar type of surveys in other 14 countries31 
funded by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and 
Technology. Therefore, identifying the basic characteristics, nature of activities as 
well as political relations through the comparative perspective approach is essential 
to grasping the nature of civil society.  
The cross-national nature of the JIGS surveys provides rich comparative data 
concerning civil society activities in various countries. In this section, data from 
specific JIGS national surveys (mainly Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Japan) is 
used to demonstrate key similarities and difference in overall civil society structures. 
The selected countries are other developing democratic countries in Asia that have 
relatively common factors of long-term control under elite democracy, composing of 
the Philippines and Bangladesh. In the Philippines, the elites who dominate in 
                                                 
31 The Japan Interest Group Study (JIGS) project is a multinational comparative study of interest 
groups and civil society that collects survey data. Although, its initial point of reference is Japan, 
it has been conducted in 14 countries (known as International Comparative Studies on Interest 
Groups and Civil Society) which include Japan, Korea USA, Germany, China, Turkey, Russia, 
the Philippines, Brazil, Bangladesh, Poland, Estonia, Uzbekistan, and India (1997-2014). 
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politics are capitalists as a dynasty, financial interests, and other political rent-
seekers. They have influenced the local and national government policies that 
contributed to the low level of effective political participation (Tasnim, 2007,        
pp. 88-91). In the case of Bangladesh, since its independence in 1971 with 
confrontational democracy, elite democracy has shown the strong influences of 
army interventions when military leaders ruled the country. These interventions had 
also been the strong influences of two political parties’ monopolistic structure where 
the citizens and civil society groups have become co-opted and divided and acting 
for the political end of these parties (Tasnim, 2007, p. 96). It is noteworthy that the 
parties’ decision-making, policy formation, including leadership selection become as 
family affairs that illustrated the political system of Bangladesh becoming a dynastic 
democracy (Amundsen, 2013).  
From the discussion above, it may be observed that in all developing 
countries’ cases, civil society would have been rather politicized and co-opted by the 
political structures as an elite democracy. The present study concentrates more on 
GDP and Freedom House that become severe and distinct in the consideration of all 
selected cases. The GDP Growth in Figure 4.1 shows that the developing countries 
based on JIGs project are at almost the same level under 1 trillion USD. Turkey is 
quite high while Uzbekistan is very low. However, the economic situation of 
Thailand, the Philippines, and Bangladesh are moderate. 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
Figure 4.1: Gross domestic product32 (GDP) in the year 2013 classified by country 
 
Figure 4.2: Freedom house score33 in the year 2013 classified by country 
Remark: 1 = highest level of freedom / 7 = lowest level of freedom 
                                                 
32 GDP website http:// www.data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny/gdp/mktp.cd 
33 Freedom house website http://www.freedomhouse.org  
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Figure 4.2 shows the freedom status of JIGs project in some Asian countries, 
in which Japan, South Korea, and India are Free, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Bangladesh, and Turkey are Partly Free while China and Uzbekistan are Not Free. 
However, the rating is based upon the political rights and civil liberties of the 
citizens of each country.  
 
Figure 4.3: Model for comparison 
 
 
The freedom house score reflected that most developing countries in Figure 
4.3 are partly free, except Uzbekistan which is not a free country. The GDP shows 
that all developing countries are at the same level under 1 trillion USDs. Turkey is a 
partly free country with quite a high GDP about 820 Billion USD.  Thailand, 
Bangladesh, and the Philippines are also partly free countries where their GDP are 
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less than 400 Billion USD, that are 387 Billion USD, 272 Billion USD and 129 
Billion USD, respectively. Uzbekistan is not a free country and is very low of GDP 
growth with 52 Billion U.S. dollars. As a result, Figure 4.3 shows the model of the 
position of Thailand in comparison to Bangladesh and the Philippines. However, 
this research uses only Rajshahi district to represent Bangladesh, Cebu to represent 
the Philippines and Chiang Mai to represent Thailand. 
This chapter proceeds by giving more consideration to the civil society in 
Japan that has influences on its vibrant nature. Figure 4.3 shows good reference 
point of Japan with highest freedom status and GDP among JIGS countries. 
However, this study uses only Kyoto to represent Japan. It is perceived that Kyoto34 
and Chiang Mai are similar in long-term progression and the historical 
characteristic, culture, and economy. Both cities were the original capital of Japan 
and of the northern region of Thailand (Lanna Kingdom35). There are some citizens 
who still associate in groups and live in the formation of traditional communities. 
They have retained the traditional culture, religious and social practices that 
characterized life and the members still have a high native identity and have strong 
social relations (Sattayanurak, 1998). These will serve the cities in their tourism and 
traditional crafts. However, the modern trend of both cities has been perceived as the 
information technology and electronics cities. Kyoto has become the home of the 
headquarters of famous technology and electronics corporation with populations 
about 1.4 million people. On the contrary, Chiang Mai is also one of the cities 
                                                 
34 This information is Retrieved September 6, 2016, from Grolier Online http://ea.grolier.com/ 
article?id=0235870-00 
35 Por-Khun Mengrai made Chiang Mai the capital city of Lanna Thai (the north) in about 1300 A.D. 
(Noranitipadungkarn, 1973: 6)  
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selected by the Town and Country Planning Department of the Ministry of Interior 
to be given top priority in development as a regional center and become the hub for 
information technology and electronics of the northern part of Thailand nowadays. 
Consequently, there is the growth of urban areas and high productivity level with the 
concomitant migration of rural people with the population size of about 1.5 million, 
the same as Kyoto.  
All selected four cases are the civil society at the urban and local level. The 
sample distribution and return sample are presented in Table 4.1 below. 
 
Table 4.1: JIGS sample distribution and return 
Country City Year Data Source/ Survey Method 
Sample 
Distribution 
Valid 
Return 
Sample 
Return 
Rate (%) 
Philippines* 
(Ma. Rosario 
Piquero-
Ballescas) 
Cebu 2004-2005 
Organization 
Directory/ 375 159 42.4 
Interview 
Japan (2nd)* Kyoto 2006-2007 
Telephone 
Directory/ 1923 286 14.9 
Mail 
Bangladesh* 
(Farhat Tasnim) Rajshahi 
2006-
2007 
Organization 
Directory/ 1227 504 41.1 
Mail and 
Interview 
Thailand Chiang Mai 
2012-
2013 
Organization 
Directory/ 
1976 237 12 
Mail and 
reconfirmed 
with some 
Organization by 
phone interview 
      
Total 5501 1187 Average 21.5% 
*Sources: Cross-national survey on Civil Society Organizations and Interest Groups Code Book 
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The second major goal of this chapter relates to a more distinctive pattern of 
neighborhood communities as civil society organizations in Thai’s political context. 
The empirical survey data have been adopted to investigate the basic characteristics 
of neighborhood communities which reflect on civil society theory.  The data 
collection, based on the questionnaire of Japan’s NHAs survey, had been done 
during 3 months in 2012 with the presidents of neighborhood community in the 
Upper Northern Region 1 which composes of 4 provinces namely Chiang Mai, 
Lamphun, Lampang and Mae Hong Son. The total group’s number was 156 and the 
respondents were 142 communities36. In connection with the concept that state has 
shaped civil society, this study is to delve more deeply into the basic characteristics 
of neighborhood community, focusing on its features and functions, nature of 
activities and trends of the relation between the neighborhood community and the 
government.  This study concentrates on the government-designated terms and 
resources, including the membership and number of participating households, 
management styles, and financial supports.  The present study has also tried to 
explicit the nature of activities which involves the participatory role of self-reliance 
and mutual assistance towards their communities’ development and social services. 
This could significantly illustrate the strengthening of social capital and civil society 
at the grassroots level. Moreover, to examine the relationship among associations in 
the social and political process, the interacting with other social, political and 
economic actors have been inquired.  With the promotion of participatory role, the 
collaborative mechanisms between state and local resident groups encourage 
                                                 
36 The sampling was 142, including 76 NCs of Chiang Mai, 43 NCs of Lampang, 17 NCs of 
Lamphun and 6 NCs of Mae Hong Son. 
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contributing social services. This study survey also reveals the high involvement of 
neighborhood community activities which mainly involves the field of grassroots 
economic empowerment, women empowerment, social awareness and networking 
building, etc., but relatively low in the functions that relate to advocacy. It is evident 
that neighborhood community participation is high in community development and 
social service providing functions caused by the government guidance and grant 
supports.  Additionally, the data also point out to clientelism trend and state-
corporatism through policy implementation that pushes a partisan to occur in 
neighborhood community interaction with the political actors. 
 
4.2 Nature of civil society organization surveyed in Thailand  
Civil society organizations could be found in many countries with the 
differentiation of features, nature of activities and relationship with the state.  This 
section provides cross-national perspective information from the survey in Thailand 
and other JIGS countries that reveals the features and tendencies of activities, 
including its nature of interaction with the state of civil society organizations in 
Thailand. The following are the results of the survey that provide the illustration of 
basic characteristics related to self-categorization, objectives, membership and 
resources. 
 
4.2.1 Self-categorization by the civil society organizations 
Table 4.2 shows the nature of self-classification by the civil society 
organizations of Thailand, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Japan. The 237 
responding civil society organizations in Thailand were asked to categorize 
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themselves in terms of subcategories that illustrate the nature of their organizations 
(Question 1). The result shows that 24.89% of respondents had identified themselves 
as social welfare organizations. Citizen organizations are 17.72% and agriculture 
and farmer related organizations are 17.30% while the others under 6% are 
economic related organizations, NGOs, government-related organization, culture 
and religious organization etc. It is possible that most of the civil society 
organizations have played an important role in providing social services and 
agricultural activities due to the fact that majority of Thailand is agricultural. Almost 
40% of the population have maintained a traditional agriculture and more than 60% 
live in the formation of traditional communities37 where the local government could 
not provide them local services delivery. Another noticing feature is that there is no 
self-identify as a labor union and federation in Thailand although Chiang Mai city is 
the main city and plays an important role in being a hub for information technology 
in northern Thailand. It is assumed that civil society organizations in Thailand prefer 
to be identified as social welfare organization than their other identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 National Statistical Office of Thailand website http://web.nso.go.th/ 
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Table 4.2: Nature of self-classifications by the civil society organizations 
Self-classification 
Thailand
 % 
Philippines 
%* 
Bangladesh
 %* 
Japan
%* 
Agriculture and farmer related 
organization 17.30 2.60 18.25 11.97 
Economic or business organization 5.91 6.60 11.11 24.65 
Labor union or federation - 3.30 3.17 9.15 
Education and research related 
organization 2.11 10.60 3.37 4.23 
Culture organization 4.22 0.70 3.17 8.10 
Government or administration-
related organization 3.38 1.30 0.20 6.34 
Social welfare organization 24.89 8.60 44.25 8.45 
Professional organization (medical, 
local, engineers etc.) 1.27 6.60 1.59 5.99 
Citizen organization 17.72 21.90 0.40 5.99 
NGO (including foreign or 
international organization) 5.06 0.70 6.55 -** 
Religious organization 4.22 13.90 0.60 2.11 
Recreation and sports related 
organization 2.95 0.70 6.35 1.06 
Others 10.97 22.52 0.99 11.97 
*Sources: Cross-national survey on Civil Society Organizations and Interest Groups Code Book 
**there is no self-classify question as NGO in Japan 
 
Table 4.2 also shows that in Bangladesh, the social welfare organizations are 
highest with 44.25% of respondents, in the Philippines, the citizen organizations are 
21.9% of respondents while in Japan, economic or business organizations are 
24.65%. It is noticeable that civil society organizations in developing countries are 
concerned with the social well-being while the developed country like Japan tended 
to be concerned with economic and business.  
 
4.2.2 Policy interest 
The 237 responding civil society organizations were free to choose as many 
answers that relate to their function and activities towards the list of 25 government 
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policies. Figure 4.4 shows the list of top 5 policies selected by civil society 
organizations of Thailand, The Philippines, Bangladesh, and Japan.  
 
Figure 4.4: Top 5 policy interest of Thailand, the Philippines, Bangladesh and Japan 
 
 
It is worth mentioning that Figure 4.4 ensures that Thai’s civil society 
organizations concentrate their policy interest (Question 2) mainly on social welfare 
and well-being that are mostly related to their service providing. The policy interest 
related to healthcare and social welfare is quite high with 95.38%. Local and rural 
development is 61.76% and poverty alleviation is 45.80% while 39.92% is 
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concerned with education, academic, sports and recreation and cultural and religion 
is 36.13%.  
Not only in Thailand but civil society organizations in all selected countries 
concentrate their policy interest mainly on healthcare and social welfare policies, 
except the policy interest in Japan which indicated that education, academic sports, 
and recreational policies38 are of higher interest. In Bangladesh, the policy interest 
related to healthcare and social welfare is quite high with 85%, in the Philippines is 
moderate (51.57%) while in Japan is only 36.17%.  
More interesting is that the policy interest of civil society organizations in 
Thailand and Bangladesh are similar, like local and rural development is about 62% 
in Thailand and 60% in Bangladesh, poverty alleviation is about 72% in Bangladesh 
and 46% in Thailand and education, academic, sports and recreational policies is 
about 47% in Bangladesh and 40% in Thailand that are mostly related to their social 
well-being. In the Philippines, it seems that most of the policy interest are concerned 
with the social well-being of their locality. The tendency of policy interest in Japan 
is more widely directed to the public like 32.9% for industrial promotion and 27.3% 
for the environment, energy, and national resources. It is assumed that the civil 
society organizations in all developing countries, not only in Thailand, are 
concerned with social life and well-being for their local needs. Conversely, it seems 
that civil society organizations in Japan not only pay their attention to social well-
being but also concentrate in several policies like education, industry, governance 
and environment. 
                                                 
38 The education, academic, sports and recreation in case of Japan become highest percentage from 
the combination of 2 lists of policies that are education policy and educational, sports and recreation 
policies. 
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4.2.3 Objectives 
Table 4.3 indicates the chosen answers concerning the objectives (Question 
3) that comply to each organization. In Thailand, most of the civil society 
organizations prefer to provide information, benefits, and services to their members 
and also to the public in general rather than interacting with the government. The 
civil society organizations prefer to provide education and training opportunity 
(39.83%) or provide information (36.86%) while relatively in low scale to make the 
policy recommendation (11.02%) or to assist in licensing and registration (10.59%). 
However, they seem to require advocacies for subsidies from the government 
(31.36%) which could serve their local needs and development.   
Moreover, Table 4.3 shows that the objectives of civil society organizations 
of the other three countries have the tendency to provide service and information to 
their members and to the public in general; like providing service to the general 
public 74.60% in Bangladesh, providing information to the members 72.08% in 
Japan and 56.77% in the Philippines, protecting standard of living and right and 
pursuing economic profit for the members 60% to 70% in Bangladesh, and 
providing education and training about 50% in Japan and Bangladesh.  This implies 
that the civil societies’ services are mostly for the society. 
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Table 4.3: Objective of the civil society organizations 
Objectives of CSOs 
Thailand
 % 
Philippines 
%* 
Bangladesh 
%* 
Japan
 %* 
Providing information to members 36.86 56.77 49.80 72.08 
Pursuing economic profit for 
members 28.81 15.48 60.12 38.16 
Protecting the standard of living 
and rights of the members/clients 23.73 37.42 70.44 34.28 
Providing education and training 
opportunities for members/clients 39.83 31.61 51.39 52.65 
Advocating on behalf of the 
members in order to gain subsidies 
from government 
31.36 10.97 23.61 13.78 
Assisting members in licensing 
and registration procedures 10.59 12.90 5.56 13.78 
Providing policy recommendations 
for public policy making 11.02 8.39 6.55 41.34 
Providing education and 
information for the good of the 
general public 
19.07 18.71 
 
36.11 12.37 
Providing service to the general 
public 28.39 19.35 74.60 24.73 
Providing funds to other 
organizations 14.83 8.39 6.75 8.13 
*Sources: Cross-national survey on Civil Society Organizations and Interest Groups Code Book 
 
Another perceptible point is that the civil society organizations in a 
developed country like Japan has a relatively strong interaction with the government 
such as under making policy recommendation it is about 41.34% while in the other 
developing countries it is only approximately 10%.  
 
4.2.4 Members 
It is perceived that the most important characteristics and the strength of civil 
society organizations to achieve their objectives and roles can be judged by their 
pattern. Figure 4.5 shows that the distribution of individual members of civil society 
organizations (Question 6) is skewed towards the left. It may be observed that it is 
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common among the civil society organizations to have a low scale of members 
within 1 to 500 persons.  Approximately 18% of civil society organizations in 
Thailand have members within 1 to 50 persons and relatively have a high number of 
members of about 24% within 100 to 500 persons. It is interesting that 51% of civil 
society organizations in Bangladesh and 29% in the Philippines have members 
within 1 to 50 persons while the civil society organizations in Japan have relatively 
high members of about 27% in the scale within 100 to 500 persons. This asserted 
that most of the civil society organizations are rather small in scale. 
 
Figure 4.5: Pattern of individual members of civil society organizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.5 Employee and volunteer 
In fact, not only the membership alone can provide the real picture and the 
strength of civil society organization, but also the numbers of employee including 
the volunteers who can provide skill and vibrancy of civil society organization. 
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Among the surveyed, in the case of Thailand (Question 7) as well as other 
developing countries, there are relatively low scale of a full-time and part-time 
employee if compared with Japan that could be an impact of their low funding. 
Table 4.4 shows that Japan’s number of employees, both full-time and part-time, is 
two times more than the other developing countries.  On the other hand, volunteers 
are rather high in scale in developing countries than the civil society organization in 
Japan. Although the volunteers would provide the necessary human resources to 
serve the vibrant nature, they may lack some skills and important roles to achieve 
their objectives of civil society organizations. 
 
Table 4.4: Number of employees and volunteers of civil society organizations 
Full-time Employee Thailand % Philippines %* Bangladesh %* Japan%* 
0 48.52 69.18 67.86 14.98 
1-9 35.02 20.13 22.62 73.17 
10-29 11.81 10.06 7.74 9.06 
30-- 4.64 0.63 1.79 2.79 
Part-time Employee Thailand % Philippines % Bangladesh % Japan% 
0 84.39 79.25 85.52 50.52 
1-9 12.24 15.72 11.90 39.02 
10-29 3.38 4.40 1.39 9.41 
30-- 0.00 0.63 1.19 1.05 
Volunteer Thailand % Philippines % Bangladesh % Japan% 
0 54.43 - 19.84 85.02 
1-9 21.94 - 38.69 7.67 
10-29 19.83 - 24.60 5.23 
30-- 3.80 - 16.87 2.09 
*Sources: Cross-national survey on Civil Society Organizations and Interest Groups Code Book 
 
4.2.6 Resources 
Resources are also the key to understanding the vibrant nature and strength 
of civil society organizations. It is difficult to compare with the other countries 
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because of the growth of economic proportion of each country. However, the civil 
society organizations require funding and budgets to provide social welfare and 
social well-being. Table 4.5 summarizes the sources (Question 8) that the civil 
society organizations mentioned as their resources and the percentage of their 
benefiting from the sources. 
 
Table 4.5: Funds providing sources for civil society organizations 
Fund-providing sources Number of receiving CSOs % 
Government ministries and administrative branch 54 (22.8%) 
Local government 44 (18.6%) 
International agencies and NGOs 12 (5.1%) 
Personal benevolence 5 (2.1)% 
Credit union or bank 8 (3.4%) 
No answer 114 (48.1%) 
 N =237, Respondent= 123 *Some CSOs may receive funds from multiple sources. 
 
It is interesting that in the case of Thailand along with other developing 
countries; more than 50% of civil society organizations do receive government 
funds. In Bangladesh, 51% of civil society organizations receive the funds from the 
central government and more than 1% receive from the local government (Tasnim, 
2007, p. 145). Among the 123 respondents surveyed, 98 (80%) civil society 
organizations received funds from both central (44%) and local (36%) government. 
The table shows 22.8% of civil society organizations received funds from the 
government and its administrative branch and 18.6% received from the local 
government. It also revealed that some civil society organizations received funds 
from a credit union or the bank that would provide funds for their member’s 
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investment, like cooperative groups. It is also apparent that more than 50% of 
financial assistance is accompanied by a condition.  
Figure 4.6 comparatively shows the annual budget in 2011 and 2012 
(Question 9) of Thai civil society organizations. The available data that is about 146 
(60%) in 2011 and 168 (70%) in 2012 illustrate that civil society organizations have 
various range of budgets. As indicated in Figure 4.6, most civil society organizations 
in Thailand operate within a small budget. The most common, 1 of 4 of the 
respondents (24 - 25%), is the budget of under 100 thousand Baht. There are also 
14% of civil society organizations having an annual budget within 100 - 499 
thousand Baht.  However, in some cases of civil society organizations like a credit 
union and cooperatives, the budget may even exceed 10 million Baht. 
 
Figure 4.6: Annual budget of civil society organizations39 
 
* The budget is provided in Thai Baht. 1 US $= 35.32 THB and 1 THB = 3.32 JP Yen (According to 
currency exchange rate of Bank of Thailand date Feb 5, 2016).  
                                                 
39 91 (38%) of CSOs in 2011 and 69 (29%) of CSOs in 2012 did not provide their budget statistics. 
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After revealing the basic characteristics of civil society organizations in 
Thailand through the objective and policy interests, it shows that they have a strong 
tendency towards social welfare and local development. The civil society 
organizations could imagine themselves as the associational life in serving public 
needs and providing public capacities to serve and support their members and the 
public.  Those groups are small in scale with regard to members, employees, and 
volunteers with a relatively low budgeting that are necessary resources to support 
the strength of civil society organizations and its vibrant nature.  According to the 
revealed data, most civil society organizations in Thailand naturally requested the 
funding support from the government, we need to understand more which type of 
activities these organizations are involved in and how do they relate to politics or 
state action.  
 
4.2.7 Cooperation with government 
Naturally, civil society organizations seem to be autonomous and can 
function independently from the government. However, by regulations, most civil 
society organizations have the formal relation with the government for registration 
and licensing. Figure 4.7 shows rate of government relation (Question 12) belonging 
to each direction of civil society organization.  
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Figure 4.7: Nature of formal relation with government 
 
Civil society organizations go to the government for accreditation 71.0% and 
license 52.5% which would support them to receive easily the government funds 
44.7% and come up with the administrative guidance provided by the government 
for 38.4%. Moreover, they cooperate with the government 35% and exchange 
opinions 31%. It is assumed that civil society organizations are considered as 
important stakeholders to the government. However, there are low rates of sending 
representative and position offering to the government, about 16.5% and 2%, 
respectively. As a result, it may be observed that by the nature of the relation of civil 
society organizations has a rather high rate of involvement with the government.  
The relation of civil society and government interaction of each country has 
been further analyzed to understand the tendency of participation. Table 4.6 shows 
the relation perspectives of civil society organizations in Thailand, the Philippines, 
Bangladesh, and Japan. Generally, most civil society organizations in developing 
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countries have a relatively high rate of accreditation and license from the 
government which is almost 4 times of the civil society organization in Japan. In the 
case of Thailand, it is possible for civil society organizations to conform to the 
regulations to get rights and privileges. However, their relation with the government, 
such as the administrative guidance, the funding support, and the exchange of 
opinions are moderate which illustrate that they have a good partnership with the 
government. Another observation that has been made manifest is that 37.8% of the 
cooperating and supporting policies and budget activities of the government of civil 
society organizations in Thailand are higher than other countries that would support 
their activities providing and supporting local development. 
 
Table 4.6: Relation of CSOs with government in perspective 
Relation with government 
Thailand 
% 
Philippines 
%* 
Bangladesh 
%* 
Japan%
* 
Accredited 71.0 91.2 94.4 22.6 
Licensed 52.0 81.8 84.1 34.1 
Receiving govt. funds 48.8 -- 49.4 -- 
Administrative guidance 41.9 15.1 56.7 24.7 
Cooperating and supporting 
policies 37.8 12.6 8.3 6.3 
Exchanging opinions 34.6 30.8 36.9 9.1 
Sending representative 18.0 26.4 19.8 3.5 
Having joint projects 16.6 27.0 11.3 -- 
Receiving foreign funds through 
govt. 2.8 -- 11.5 -- 
Position offering 2.3 3.1 4.8 1.4 
*Sources: Cross-national survey on Civil Society Organizations and Interest Groups Code Book 
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4.2.8 Influence to the policies  
Figure 4.8 shows the rate of influence of the civil society organizations on 
the government policies (Question 11) related to the problem or issues in the 
geographical area which also reflects the nature of its participatory role to some 
extent.  
 
Figure 4.8: Influence of civil society organization towards the government policies 
 
As mentioned in 4.3.1, civil society organizations are moderate in 
exchanging opinions with the government and have a better network to deal with the 
administrative guidance including to cooperate and to support the government 
policies. However, Figure 4.8 illustrates that the civil society organizations think 
that about 30% have no influence, 33.8% have a little influence and 26.71% have 
some bit of influence while only 84% have high influence on the government 
policies. This implies that the civil society organizations of Thailand have some 
influence on the government policies that would support and provide for their social 
needs and well-being. 
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Table 4.7: Influence of civil society organization in perspective 
Influence of organization  Thailand % Philippines %* Bangladesh %* Japan%* 
A lot of influence 8.4 14.5 7.3 3.5 
Some bit of influence 26.7 31.4 56.9 7.3 
A little influence 33.8 26.4 21.2 34.8 
Almost no influence 9.3 15.1 9.1 41.1 
No influence 21.8 12.6 5.4 11.5 
*Sources: Cross-national survey on Civil Society Organizations and Interest Groups Code Book 
It is interesting that Table 4.7 shows the influence of civil society 
organization in perspective which indicates that most civil society organizations in 
developing countries have a pretty high influence towards the government 
particularly on the policies related to the issues of their geographical area. It is 
significant that it is moderate and tends to be of low influence in Japan. It is possible 
that the civil society organizations in developing countries need to provide more 
influence for social welfare, well-being, and local development through the 
government policies. 
 
4.2.8 Policy making  
Another direct involvement of civil society organizations in influencing the 
government is the interaction towards policy-making. Figure 4.9 shows the 
percentage of success among the civil society organizations of Thailand, the 
Philippines, Bangladesh and Japan in policy making and blocking. The respondents 
were asked whether they have even been successful in influencing the government 
in any decision on policy-making (Question 17) and blocking (Question 18) any 
decision.  
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Figure 4.9: Success in policy-making and policy-blocking in perspective 
 
It is striking that more than 50% of civil society organizations in Thailand 
had admitted their success in influencing government decisions. Their success is 
high if compared with other developing countries including Japan. Furthermore, 
Thailand’s involvement in policy blocking with 19.5% is a bit lower than that of 
Japan’s civil society organizations. The result reveals that civil society organizations 
in Thailand have a strong influence on government decisions in making policies and 
could succeed in blocking such policies that went against their interests.  
 
4.2.9 Lobbying 
To measure the nature of lobbying of the organization, the civil society 
organizations were asked to rate the frequency of different activities (Question 15) 
such as direct individual contacts, forming coalitions and arranging meetings or 
presenting information to the public. We perceived that similar as other countries, 
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the overall frequency of lobbying of civil society organizations in Thailand is rather 
low. 
 
Figure 4.10: Lobbying activities 
 
 
The most common are forming a coalition with other organizations (22.6%), 
presenting information to mass media (9.6%), and organizing seminars, round table 
meeting or rally (8.6%), rather than contacting the government departments and 
agencies (7.5%) directly.  Only 1% is involved in contacting both parties in power 
(1%) and opposition (0.5%), including appealing to influential people (1%) which 
indicate the weakness in personal contact among civil society organizations in 
Thailand. This implies that the forming of coalitions and networks that link easily to 
the pattern of civic movement, mass protest, and demonstration may be the most 
vital democratic means in Thailand. On the other hand, the parties’ bodies may have 
accused almost civil society organizations of their biased position. 
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4.2.10 Concluding Remarks 
As mentioned, this first section has tried to understand the civil society’s 
characteristics, functions, and issues, as well as to investigate the nature of its 
participatory role and its relation with the government. In this chapter, the 
characteristics of the civil society in Thailand has been focused on and analyzed 
based on the comparative discussion. The following points summarize the findings 
of the basic and distinctive identity of civil society organizations in Thailand. 
First, through the basic attribute related to self-classification, policy interest, 
and objective, civil society organizations represent the most important function as an 
association life engaged in social development as well as in several countries which 
are mostly found as welfare and service oriented which provide service and 
information to their members, beneficiaries and also the public in general. 
Moreover, the civil society organizations in Thailand are mostly involved at local 
levels of the society which is in need of civic engagement, welfare assistance, and 
local development. 
Second, the basic structure of civil society organization like membership, 
employees, volunteers, and resources could illustrate the vibrant and strength of civil 
society organizations. However, it is precise to say that civil society organizations in 
Thailand are mainly run by low scale members and employees, the same as other 
developing countries. On the contrary, there is a   rather high scale of volunteers that 
they have to fulfill the number of manpower to provide local activities. Moreover, 
they operate within a common budget under 500 thousand Baht per year. This means 
that they have few skilled manpower and resources to engage in different social 
developments. 
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Third, the rate of involvement with the government is rather high through the 
rules and regulations, and financial instruments. By regulations, most civil society 
organizations have the formal relation with the government for registration and 
licensing which would support them to receive fund provided by the government. 
Through the survey, it has been exposed that the civil society organizations are 
considered as an important stakeholder to the government. They received the 
administrative guidance and work in cooperating with and supporting policies and 
budget activities of the government despite of their nature as an autonomous group. 
Fourth, it is interesting that civil society organizations in Thailand have a 
rather high influence towards the government policies which impact their social 
needs. The most direct involvement in issues of civil society organizations and the 
government is determined by its capacity and success in influencing government 
decisions. Through the survey, more than 50% had admitted their success in 
influencing government decision and nearly 20% could succeed in blocking such 
policies that went against their interests. It reveals that these organizations are rather 
high in the functions that relate to advocacy. The using of forming coalitions and 
network, including civic movement, mass protest, and demonstration may be the 
most vital democratic means in Thailand.  
 
4.3 Neighborhood community as a civil society in Thailand 
Regarding the concept that the state has shaped civil society, the second 
section presents how the state has strengthened civil society organization in the new 
form of neighborhood communities in Thai’s municipality that provide more social 
services and participation at the grassroots level. This study explains about the basic 
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characteristics of neighborhood community, focusing on its features and functions 
toward state-designated policies. The empirical survey data have been adopted to 
investigate the basic characteristics of neighborhood communities which reflect on 
civil society theory. Moreover, to examine the relationship among associations in 
the social and political process, social, political and economic actors have been 
inquired.  With the promotion of participatory role, it becomes the collaborative 
mechanisms between state and a local group of residents for contributing the social 
services.  
It is accurate to state that neighborhood associations are found in many 
countries with the differentiation of features, functions, nature of activities and 
relationship with the state. The neighborhood associations in the Philippines, called 
“ the barangay”  are as a local group of residents of more than 50 households who 
compose a community.  However, the barangay serves as the smallest delineated 
administrative division of the government40.  In Singapore, there is also “ the 
community center” , similar to “kominkan”  in Japan, that is a public meeting where 
members of a community tend to gather for local group activities and social support, 
including a place for the government to disseminate information and policies, as 
well as gather feedback from grassroots. In Indonesia, RT/RW41 has an aspect of a 
neighborhood association which acts as a subcontracting organization of the 
government. It is to be positioned at the lowest unit of a development-oriented 
                                                 
40 Local Government Code of the Philippines, Local Government Units, Book III, Sec 384 to Sec 
386. 
41 Rukun Tetangga (RT) means neighborhood association which normally consists of 20 – 50 
households. Rukun Warga (RW) is a community association which each consists of 10 to 15 RT. 
Kelurahan is the lowest level of local government that is normally composed of 10 RW (Winayanti 
and Lang, 2004). 
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government. Naoki Yoshihara and Raphaella Dewantari Dwianto asserted that 
RT/RW is one of the local institutions at the grassroots level which is developed by 
and co-opted into the government and is still an effective instrument of the state 
(Yoshihara & Dwianto, 2003). It shows that neighborhood association is the 
government policy. It takes the role at the bottom of the social scale which is to be 
co-opted and posted at the lowest unit of a development-oriented local government.  
In a developed country like Japan, there are several types of a local group of 
residents which have a long history stretching back to a number of periods of 
spontaneous origin, composing of goningumi, juuninngumi and its development like 
chonaikai42 (Yoshihara & Dwianto, 2003). Yutaka Tsujinaka mentioned that 
neighborhood association in Japan is nationwide by organizations and by the high 
rates at which citizens participate in the groups (Pekkanen, Tsujinaka & Yamamoto, 
2014). According to Pekkanen, neighborhood associations are voluntary groups of 
local residents based on geographically delimited and exclusive residential area. It is 
asserted that neighborhood associations’ membership is extended to all local 
residents who live in a state designated area and who come up with multiple 
activities related to the local environment, social security and welfare, social events 
among the residents and the like (Pekkanen, Tsujinaka & Yamamoto, 2014).  
However, one key element in their history is the centrality government policy to 
their spread and current prominence throughout Japan. More interesting that they are 
perceived as creatures of the government, simply providing low cost services as the 
lowest layer of local government. Their activities also include the cooperation with 
                                                 
42 There are several terms of neighborhood associations in Japan based on geographically delimited, 
these include ku, chokai, burakukai, kukai, shuraku, chiku, jokai, shinkokai and the like (Pekkanen, 
Tsujinaka and Yamamoto, 2014). 
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local government, primarily in disseminating information from government to local 
residents (Pekkanen, 2006).   
According to its feature and related functions and activities above, we 
assumed that neighborhood association referred to voluntary groups based on 
residential proximity whose membership is drawn from geographically delimited 
and exclusive residential area. Most often is set out and designated through the state 
policy.  Their activities are multiple and are centered on local community 
development, also include cooperation with local government to facilitate more 
efficiency and effectiveness in providing public good and social services (Pekkanen, 
2006, Pekkanen, Tsujinaka & Yamamoto, 2014). In sum, by the nature of 
neighborhood association, that is the strength of state which influences on civil 
society structures.  The following are the presence of neighborhood communities in 
Thailand.  
 
4.3.1 Term and definition of neighborhood community  
It is remarkable that Thailand’s neighborhood communities perceive their 
own roles as local resident’s organizations which are formally organized and 
recognized by the municipal government. It is perceived that the Ministry of Interior 
stipulates those regulatory frameworks to promote them as an organization. 
Thailand’s 1997 Constitution stipulated the association of groups to promote 
population participation and to encourage a strong civil society and democratic 
decentralization. However, this constitution did not mention directly any regulation 
of group associations or neighborhood communities’ establishment but there are 
some new principal clauses and sections that are even non-existent in any 
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constitutions which are as mechanisms for supporting the assembly of people 
(Section 45-46), including the promotion of popular participation (Section 76, 79) 
and the protection of individual rights and liberty (Section 26).  
Although the legal change provides for the freedom of association and 
opposition there are the barriers for the formation of groups in Thailand. In practice, 
the neighborhood communities had no legal existence. The formation of groups is 
without law and usually based on the designated geographical area which stimulates 
a system or a mechanism reliant on bureaucratic discretion. By this way, the 
municipality could select which groups are allowed to organize and enroll. The 
literature review showed that Japan’s neighborhood associations, which had no legal 
status before 1991 but existed only as unofficial voluntary associations, frequently 
worked with local governments in contractual relationships. However, Tsujinaka 
mentioned that an effective legal change made the change for neighborhood 
associations to register and gain legal status nowadays (Pekkanen, Tsujinaka & 
Yamamoto, 2014).  
According to the territory-based administration structure in Thailand, the 
local administrative system comprises of province and district43 levels in which the 
central government dispatches its officials, provincial governors, and district officers 
to work as representatives of the government and coordinators of the other central 
ministries and departments. Nevertheless, the ministerial organizations formally stop           
at the district level.  The subdistrict44  (tambon) is a subdivision level after the 
                                                 
43 Thailand is divided into 76 provinces with 878 districts, excluding the metropolitan area of 
Bangkok (Department of Provincial Administration, March 5, 2015).  
44 District is divided into 7,255 subdistricts and 74,965 villages (Department of Provincial 
Administration, March 5, 2015) 
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district   and the village (muban) is the lowest subdivision of local administrative 
system.   
It is noteworthy that each province could generally be divided into district 
level (cities or amphur) with a capital district (main city or amphur muang) by 
territory.  Compared to the administration, the capital district has no subdivision 
level after the district in the local administrative system which is different from the 
other districts which have subdistricts and villages.  There is instead a form of a 
municipality as a local government which the mayor and council are elected by the 
people.  There are three levels of the municipality that are based on the population 
size and its income. Figure 4.11 shows the level of the municipality in Thailand. 
 
Figure 4.11: Classification of Thailand’s municipality 
 
The population of city level (tessaban nakorn) is at least 50,000 residents 
while the town level (tessaban muang) is at least 10,000 residents.  Both levels are 
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usually located at the capital district but are different based on the geographical size 
of administration, the density of populations, and incomes.  Throughout this study, 
Chiang Mai City, Lampang City, Lamphun Town Municipality and Mae Hong Son 
Town Municipality are considered. The township level (tessaban tambon), which is 
the lowest level unit of the municipality consisting 5,000 residents, may extend over 
parts of more than one subdistrict.  The administration consists of a Mayor and 
different councils.  However, the municipality has no high degree of autonomy in 
dealing with local affairs because most of its administrative staff are appointed 
centrally by a commission attached to the Ministry of Interior.  
Following the promotion of popular participation and encouragement of a 
strong civil society and democratic decentralization by the 1997 constitution, 
including the Eighth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1997-2001), 
the establishment of neighborhood community has been reinstated and adopted in 
the widespread area of the municipal government.  Up to the present, with the 
concrete promotion of people participation, self-reliance and mutual assistance, 
neighborhood community becomes the collaborative mechanism between the state 
and the local resident groups. Basically, neighborhood communities were redesigned 
from block or living zone of local residents. These include all single-detached 
dwelling, condominium, crowded community, slum area, housing estate and the 
like. The principles of membership are based on two aspects. First, the membership 
is determined by the residential proximity of local residents to a particular 
geographic delimited area without compulsion or member fees.  Second, they are 
volunteers to enhance community conditions through the concept of self-reliance 
and mutual assistance.  The administration has been operated by community 
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committees composing of the president, deputy, and other committee members. The 
other committee members are most often comprised of 9 people but no more than 15 
people, depending on request or necessity in administration and are recognized by 
the municipality.  However, they are not full-time employees instead they act as 
volunteers who work without any salary, called “Chumchon Yoi Naikhet Tesssaban 
in Thai (CCY)”.   
Some previous literature referred to neighborhood communities in different 
meanings based on the pattern of their relation with local government and translation 
of meaning.  Ganhawiang translated and used “neighborhood community”  in the 
meaning of “chumchon-yoi” (Ganhawiang, 1992). Mahakanjana gave the meaning 
and called those groups as “(Municipal’s) Cooperative Community Groups”  or 
CCGs due to their need to cooperate with the local government and because they 
associate as community groups (Mahakanjana, 2004).   
The last two words “naikhet tessaban”  can be translated into English as “ in 
the municipal area” which refers to all the local areas under the administration of the 
municipal government.  The previous word “chumchon-yoi”  can be separated into 
two words, i.e., “chumchon”  and “yoi” .  “Chumchon”  means “community”  which 
generally refers to a local group of residents who live in a specific geographical 
area. “Voi”  has no direct meaning in English b u t The Royal Institute Dictionary of 
Thailand 2001 defines this word as relative to a small unit. Therefore, “ chumchon-
yoi”  could refer to a  small community.  However, each CCY should compose of at 
least 50 households on a voluntary basis, where neighbors are familiar with each 
other and associate in a form of community (Chiangmai Municipality Act of 2003: 
Community Committee Affair). It is precise to mention that the members openly 
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demonstrate a sense of community among them, share common goals and mutual 
trust, encouraging social gatherings and distributing and maintaining their own local 
issues.  
In short, the using of the term and definition of neighborhood community in 
this study does not deny the characteristics of neighborhood association, which are 
1) local groups of residents in such a geographical delimited area, designed by the 
municipality through block, zone and the alley, 2) the membership is voluntary 
amassed from local residents who live in the designated area with their neighbors, 
acquaintances and friends, 3) the administration is done in the form of community 
committees who serve as the representative of the residents, 4) aiming to encourage 
self-reliance, mutual assistance, social service for its members, reflecting the 
collaborative mechanisms between state and local resident groups more than being 
the organizations under the command line of the government. However, the strength 
of neighborhood community would be supported and promoted through regulatory 
and financial instruments of the state, both direct and indirect.  Under the 
circumstances, neighborhood community will be used as a specific term to call those 
groups in this study.  The data collection, based on the questionnaire of Japan’ s 
NHAs survey, had been done in 3 months with the presidents of Neighborhood 
Communities in the Upper Northern Region 1 with the 4 provinces namely Chiang 
Mai, Lamphun, Lampang and Mae Hong Son (see Appendix 1).  The total group’ s 
number was 156 and the respondents were 142 communities45. 
 
                                                 
45 The sampling was 142, including 76 NCs of Chiang Mai, 43 NCs of Lampang, 17 NCs of 
Lamphun and 6 NCs of Mae Hong Son. 
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4.3.2 Establishment period of neighborhood community 
According to the data acquired through the survey in 2012, Figure 4.12 
shows a graph of the number of neighborhood communities that have increased 
approximately 100% since 1997.  
 
Figure 4.12: Establishment period of neighborhood community 
 
Figure 4.12 shows the immediate post periods of 1997 that saw the highest 
rates of establishment of neighborhood communities. Before 1997, there were totally 
58 neighborhood communities but increased about three times from 1997. It is plain 
to see not only the remarkable increases in the number of neighborhood 
communities after 1987 but also the increase in 1997 which exhibits the population 
growth and the reconstitution by the government policy.   It is quite a surprising 
result that many neighborhood communities were formed, especially after the period 
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of 1997, to conform to the government policy. It is more than double in Chiang Mai 
(3.6 times in 1987 and 3.8 times in 1997) while 4 and 4.8 times in Lampang, 12 and 
1.4 times in Lamphun, and 6 times in Mae Hong Son in 1997. This may signify that 
the numbers of neighborhood communities were established and sprung up to 
conform to the government policy implementation since 1987 and 1997, and 
continued in the big cities through 2007 according to the administrative expansion. 
However, the number of neighborhood communities does not increase more because 
those organized groups have been designed with geographically delimited area in 
the same regional block or zone of living by the municipality.  
It is remarkable that not only the administrative structure with state relation 
but also neighborhood communities have the influence to form their groups based on 
Thai villages and Buddhism culture. It is apparent that many communities form their 
community not only by the delimited geographical area but also by unity in mind, 
trust and close relationship through their kinships. The discourse of Thai villages in 
Community dimension is noteworthy. This refers to the idea that the local authority 
and resource management by Western and Thai researcher is perceived as 
harmonized independent units that have their own culture, focus, and emphasis on 
the value of stable and harmonious collaboration on the basis of kinship relations 
(Ganjanapan, 2001, pp. 11-60). Moreover, most of the neighborhood communities 
could have only one temple as the center of unity in mind. According to the report of 
Village and Urban Community Fund Project (2013), it showed that in 2002 the 
registered number of neighborhood community were at least 3,377 communities, up 
to date there are approximately 3,528 communities throughout the capital cities of 
Thailand. 
123 
 
4.3.3 Scale of neighborhood community  
Generally, neighborhood communities maintain natural form of villages, 
using the households as the basic units of membership, which are geographically-
delimited, beyond the municipality designated upon block or zone. According to the 
administrative function of the district levels could be divided into sub-districts and 
villages except in the capital district.  However, for administrative functions within 
the capital district, neighborhood communities enjoy close relationships with the 
municipalities which could be perceived as the lowest level of its administrative 
functions. By this way, the government has regulated the framework for establishing 
the neighborhood communities, building community facilities and encouraging 
social gatherings to deal with local issues.  In 1992, The Ministry of Interior 
designated the number of participating households of neighborhood communities 
that are at least 50 households.  At present, there are no exact numbers of 
memberships to form such neighborhood communities. The government has only 
given the terms for neighborhood communities’ structures that all registered 
neighborhood communities are necessary to form their community committees of 9 
to 15 committee members.  All designated households (in block or zone) are 
positioned as the representative organizations of neighborhood communities.  The 
local residents can participate and volunteer as members of the community. Thus, 
neighborhood communities vary in scale.  Subsequently, we focus on the scale of 
neighborhood communities in terms of the number of participating households. 
Figure 4.13 presents the results of the number of participating households (Question 
3), using a scale of 50 household segments. 
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Figure 4.13 Scale of participating households of neighborhood communities 
 
Figure 4.13 displays that the distribution of participating household is 
skewed towards the left.  The average number of participants in neighborhood 
communities slightly falls under middle-scale with the average of 339. 46 and the 
participating households, which are less than 349, are approximately 63. 4%  if 
compared with the total number of participating households. 
Not just in Thailand, neighborhood associations in Japan likewise vary in 
scale throughout the country. It is interesting that majority of neighborhood 
associations in Japan are rather small in scale. Tsujinaka mentioned that the numbers 
of participating households less than 100 are approximately half of the total number 
at 47.3%, reasonably higher than 7 times if compared with Thailand. The average 
number of participating households is 228.1 (Pekkanen, Tsujinaka & Yamamoto, 
2014).  
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It is more interesting that the number of participating households in Japan 
shows a trend with the more populous areas. Tsujinaka asserted that the densely 
populated areas have larger neighborhood associations. In large urban areas with 
populations greater than 500,000 people, the neighborhood associations with less 
than 50 participating households account for no more than 6.0% and less than 100 
participating households are only 10.2% while in the 200 to 499 households are 
32.0% and more than 500 participating households are 31.4%. On the other hand, in 
the sparsely populated areas with populations less than 500,000 people, the 
neighborhood associations with less than 50 to 499 participating households are 
approximately 4.2 to 11.2% (Pekkanen, Tsujinaka & Yamamoto, 2014).   
On the contrary, Figure 4.13 also shows the number of participating 
households crossed with the population in the municipality of Thailand is tentatively 
approximately half of the total number at 56.8%  in town level.  There are some 
differences in the city level which show Lampang City bearing a high percentage of 
72.2 while Chiang Mai City has a rather low rate of participating households at 
27.3% .  Therefore, the proportions of the population did not affect the number of 
participating households in Thailand. According to an in-depth interview and 
participatory observation46, it was found that Thai village culture with a close 
relationship and trust, including Buddhism culture, would have affected the group 
formation. The majority of neighborhood communities in Mae Hong Son, Lamphun 
Town Municipality and Lampang City are long-term Thai villages and Buddhism 
culture and involve a handful of village households while the neighborhood 
communities in Chiang Mai City developed in response to the industrialization and 
                                                 
46 Informal interviews with some presidents of neighborhood communities in year 2012. 
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urbanization where there has been a decreasing trend in the numbers of participating 
households. Therefore, the length of residence is an important factor for membership 
because it opens an opportunity to build relationships with many of the people living 
in the area. 
At present, it is perceived that the distribution of the number of 
neighborhood communities is based on the size of the population and the 
geographical area of the municipality designed by state policy in block or zone. In 
the City level, it appears high with 90 communities in Chiang Mai and 43 
communities in Lampang while there are 17 communities in Lamphun and only 6 
communities in Mae Hong Son Town level. Although the scale of households based 
on state designated geographical areas are not different, at approximately 600 to 800 
households, the evidence shows that the number of participating households in 
Town level are more than 50% while in the big city like Chiang Mai are less than 
25%. This reflects the low resident proportions in major urban areas and the fact that 
neighborhood communities’ natural village and Buddhist culture are basically what 
accounts for the cohesion of the group.        
 
4.3.4 Internal structure of neighborhood community 
Basically, the governance structure of neighborhood community constituting 
the president and directors who become the committees by positions. It is most often 
comprised of 9 people but no more than 15 people depending on the request and the 
opinion of community’s members or the necessity of the administration during four- 
year term. The president is usually from direct election while the other positions can 
be selected by the president and/or by direct election. In principle, the president 
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selects the deputy and others, including secretary, treasurer, public relations and 
supplies. The other committees help manage and promote local communities’ 
capacity-building of sanitation and public health, saving and fund management, 
women and occupational development, social welfare, safety and security, education 
and cultural activities (Chiangmai Municipality Act of 2003: Community’s 
Committee).  
 
Table 4.8: Selection means of president, committee, and director 
Selection means of neighborhood community president Percentage Number 
Election by Member 84.5 120 
Mutual voting among committee 7.8 11 
Recommendation by the committees 2.1 3 
Appointed by the president 0.7 1 
Guidance by the Municipality 4.9 7 
Total 100.0 142 
Selection means of neighborhood community committee Percentage Number 
Election by Member 39.7 56 
Mutual voting among committee 31.9 45 
Recommendation by the committees 7.8 11 
Rotating basis 1.4 2 
Appointed by the president 12.8 18 
Guidance by the Municipality 6.4 9 
Total 100.0 141 
Selection means of neighborhood community director  Percentage Number 
Election by Member 30.0 42 
Mutual voting among committee 23.6 33 
Recommendation by the committees 37.1 52 
Rotating basis 0.7 1 
Appointed by the president 3.6 5 
Guidance by the Municipality 5.00 7 
Total 100.0 140 
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Table 4.8 shows a pattern of the selection (Question 7) of neighborhood 
community president, committee and subgroup directors. The election is the most 
common method for choosing a president (84.5%). The selection of committee uses 
either of the two methods of election by members (39.7%) and mutual voting among 
the committees (31.9%). It is interesting that there are some neighborhood 
associations that use the appointment by the president as the third method (12.8%). 
On the other hand, the selection of subgroup director uses either of two methods of 
recommendation by the committees (37.1%) and election by members (30%). The 
third method is mutual voting among committees (23.6%).  
Remarkably, the election is the best means of choosing the president which 
is likely to use direct democratic methods and enforce participation from the 
members. Whereas using mutual voting among the committees and recommendation 
among the committees would be perceived as a representative democratic but 
sometimes reflect the choice in their hands. However, there are few possibilities to 
use the method of guidance by the municipality. Although most neighborhood 
communities nurture a handful of Thai village culture with a close relationship, 
including patron-client system, the election perhaps could be of greater legitimacy as 
a fair way of choosing leaders. Consequently, it was found that in most 
neighborhood communities the leaders who have high respect and appreciation from 
members were elected and have been invited to be the president and the community 
committee member. According to the survey, respondents were able to indicate that 
the average years of service of the president is 6.15 years, which illustrated that most 
of the presidency are in the full length of term. Table 4.9 presents some more related 
profiles of the president and the core leaders (Question 6).  
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Table 4.9: Profiles of the president, committee members, and subgroup director. 
Number and Percentage of President and directors (classified by age) 
  President Committee members Subgroup director 
Age Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number 
Less than 40 years old 0.7 1 8.0 26 5.1 13 
40-50 years old 21.0 29 28.5 93 18.8 48 
50-60 years old 37.0 51 36.8 120 39.4 101 
More than 60 years old 41.3 57 26.7 87 36.7 94 
Total 100.0 138 100.0 326 100.0 256 
Number and Percentage of President and directors (classified by gender) 
  President Committee members Subgroup director 
Gender Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number 
Male 66.9 95 51.2 133 44.50 97 
Female 33.1 47 48.8 127 55.50 121 
Total 100.0 142 100.00 260 100.00 218.00 
 
Table 4.9 shows that more community committee members are men than 
women. There is a gender imbalance in the presidency, with the number of men 
twice than that of women. Oddly, though, there are more female subgroup directors 
more than men are but we can see indirectly that most of the core leaders are men. 
The first reason is that all neighborhood communities is composed of at least 3 main 
subgroups wherein one of them is a woman and the occupational development 
group, hence, the directors are women. Moreover, the governance structure of 
neighborhood community has a community committee members of 9 people but no 
more than 15 people and the subgroup directors will become the committees by 
positions.  
Table 4.9 also shows that the number of community committee members is 
mostly elderly persons; almost 70 to 80% are between 50 to 60 years old or older. It 
seems that the younger generation may not take as much interest in the 
neighborhood community the older generation does. In other words, the younger 
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generation is too busy with their jobs to devote the amount of time needed to work 
as a leader, the same as Japan NHAs (Pekkanen, Tsujinaka & Yamamoto, 2014). In 
addition, the length of residence is an important factor for neighborhood community 
leaders because they can have the opportunity to build long-term relationships and to 
develop appreciation and respect from many people who live in the same area. Most 
of the presidents have lived in a neighborhood for a long time in an average of 43.94 
years. 
It is notable that the occupational backgrounds (Question 8) are relatively an 
important factor to the presidents, directors and community committee members. 
Because the governance structure of neighborhood community is voluntary, the 
leaders could be a group of persons who can contribute a great deal of time working 
for their communities in a variety of situations. Table 4.10 shows that most of the 
leaders are non-salaried employees, including small-sized business owners, self-
employed and retirees.  
 
Table 4.10: Occupational backgrounds of the president, committee, and director. 
  President Committee member Subgroup director 
Grocery store (small retailer) 35.29 40.71 34.29 
Labour (daily employed) 5.88 23.89 14.29 
Agriculture 0.98 0.88 0.00 
Handiwork 1.96 4.42 0.95 
Self employed 22.55 11.5 21.90 
Full time employee 2.94 0.00 0.95 
Part time employee 0.00 0.88 1.90 
Civil servants 3.92 2.65 1.90 
Retiree 22.55 15.04 20.00 
Others 3.92 0.00 3.81 
N 102 113 105 
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It may be that the main occupational background for the leaders is grocery 
store owner (small retailer). In which case, they would have the stability in their 
career paths and would be able to dedicate their free time to work on the community 
activities. In other words, the face-to-face encounter from their business as a center 
for selling daily goods would promote familiarity and appreciation from the 
community. Therefore, the people whose employment is based on economic life are 
relatively more likely to be leaders in the neighborhood community (Pekkanen, 
Tsujinaka & Yamamoto, 2014). Furthermore, many retirees and self-employed are 
ranked as second and third at approximately 20% enjoy active participation as 
leaders. However, salaried employees and labor worked are found small in number. 
This finding is significant for the state role in fostering neighborhood 
community through the promotion of terms and regulations for group organization 
and management style. It was found that the state designated geographical area and 
the form of the committee perhaps portray the neighborhood communities being in 
the same pattern, including highlights of their relationship with the local residents. 
Nonetheless, they are voluntary groups of residents who have a close relationship 
with a norm of reciprocity and trust (Putnam, 2000), including the management style 
of face-to-face collaboration towards social gathering. These become the 
motivations for residents to continue to devote their time to the organization as well 
as their perceptions about what the Neighborhood Community should really be 
doing, especially their self-community development. 
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4.3.5 Field of activities and finance  
It is precise to say that the government promotes a particular pattern of 
neighborhood community to encourage local residents to share responsibility and 
participate in social gathering, problem-solving and community development in both 
economic and social terms. Furthermore, this pattern would sometimes reduce the 
burdens of the municipal government in providing public goods and services and 
promote the cooperation between local government and its residents. The Question 
10 in the survey ask the respondents inquired concerning the main purpose of group 
formation, about 52.8% of neighborhood communities perceive that their main 
purposes are to promote mutual friendship within the community, 32.4% aim to 
manage and develop the living environment of community and 12.7% need to 
independently deal with community problems while less than 2% aim to assist the 
municipality or to lobby the municipality. In other words, these ensure that most 
neighborhood communities have encouraged local residents to conform with the 
government policy and the provision of the 1997 Constitution towards self-reliance 
and mutual assistance.  
Typically, neighborhood communities are voluntarily organized groups 
without full-time or professional staff. It was discovered that the associated 
committees and members participate in a variety of activities together through the 
concept of self-reliance and mutual assistance. Most of the activities relate to the 
enhancement of human and community development towards the low quality of life, 
inaccessibility to the welfare services and public health, living environment and 
sanitary problems, pollution and environment, living safety and disaster prevention, 
educational services and the promotion of local cultural festivals and friendship. 
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Nonetheless, through regulations and financial instruments, the government has a 
significant role to provide them the directions of activities. It was revealed that not 
only the central government supports the grants through short-term and long-term 
policies, the local authorities, especially the municipality, usually give the guidance 
of activities to neighborhood community by community development officer too.  
Through the survey Question 23, there are the varied types of activity which 
depend on the community members’ needs and their problems. The respondents 
were able to indicate up to three main types of activity. Accordingly, the first rank, 
about 46.5% presented the preferability of the residents to participate in the local 
cultural festival. The latter is related to their living environment with 28.7% of 
respondents. The second-rank is the assisting with public health and welfare services 
which is about 26.4% and the local cultural festival is about 24.8%, followed by the 
quality of life 21.7% of the respondents. The third-ranked is the quality of life with 
22.7% and others, including community network and knowledge sharing, about 
20.3% of the respondents. Evidenced by activities, it was found that the most 
common activities of respondents (about 120 respondents of 146 of Neighborhood 
Communities) are the elimination of mosquito breeding areas and elderly care which 
is related to the public health and welfare services, including the SML project which 
is related to leveraging of quality of life and community’s economic development. 
The latter are religious ceremonies and local cultural festivals (119 and 117 of 
respondents, respectively) which are related to culture and friendship. What is more, 
the survey question 24 about the conjunction with the organization for doing any 
activities and the participatory observation, 71.6% of respondents indicated that 
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those activities are guided and supported by the municipality with the guidance of a 
community development officer.          
According to the government policy, there are three main groups of activities 
which were assigned to such neighborhood community to form their subgroups in 
conforming with the government policy and can receive the grants support which are 
Primary Health Care Group, Women Group, and Savings Group. Table 4.11 shows 
the respondents’ view (Question 28) towards the significance of local government 
policies affecting to the neighborhood community during 5 years, in the same 
structure in the form of committee.    
 
Table 4.11: Average of the significance of local government policies  
Subgroup Average Definition 
Saving Group 3.3 Medium 
Public Health Group 3.7 High 
Woman Group 3.3 Medium 
Elderly Group 3.6 High 
Other Group 3.3 Medium 
 
Primary Health Care Group is drawn from local residents within designated 
area of a neighborhood community. The members are volunteers and take 
responsibility for assisting with public health and welfare services, living 
environment, life safety, environment and maintaining of public facilities such as 
cleaning, garbage disposal, fire prevention, elimination of mosquito breeding areas, 
disease control, recycling, and others. The members also act as sources of 
information for the municipal government and the police in reporting on drugs and 
crime. They sometimes cooperate with the Ministry of Health in organizing the 
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training session to improve municipal residents’ basic knowledge about health and 
environmental and sanitary issues. 
Women Group is sometimes known as the housewife club. The members are 
drawn from the women within the neighborhood community. The main objectives 
are to promote the occupational development of women and to preserve culture and 
friendship. Most of the activities relate to the creation of more job opportunities and 
self-employment for the members. This group usually cooperates with the local 
government to provide the basic training for the members to produce local products 
to increase extra income. In several neighborhood communities, the Women Group 
invites professionals to provide the training about regional food to the members by 
receiving the grants from the municipal government (Interviewed with the Leader 
Groups on April 2004). Moreover, they also cooperate with the local government to 
promote and maintain the traditional arts, local cultural festival, and religious 
cemetery.  
Savings Group is organized to promote the money deposit among the 
members. This group also provides the revolving loans for small-business 
investments and supports the scholarship for the members’ children. In some 
neighborhood communities, the members set up revolving funds and cooperatives. 
The grant support has been received from the central government (Village and 
Urban Community Fund - 1 Million Baht). Generally, the members have to deposit 
50 Baht every month and receive the deposit interest per year. The members can 
apply for the revolving credit of about twenty thousand Baht after they continuously 
deposited money for at least 6 months. They will need to collaborate with three 
members to be their guarantors in order to receive a low interest (0.5% per month). 
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Likewise, this group would get more support from the central government to receive 
the grants of SML projects to promote and develop the members’ quality of life, 
including the occupational promotion and maintenance of public facilities.  
Neighborhood community sometimes forms the other group’s activities. 
According to the government policy, that encourages the elderly care project, sports 
for elderly and pension to serve aging society in Thailand, the neighborhood 
community is led to form senior citizen’s groups to take care of the elderly persons 
and to promote the creation of relationships among the members and with the young 
generation.  The other groups’ activities are based on the local residents’ needs. 
According to the above mentioned, the fundamental basis of Thailand’s 
neighborhood community is the designated residential group which distribute the 
mutual collaboration and is closely related to social capital through its special and 
unique structure. It is perceived that the government designed the neighborhood 
community to have specific function through the formation of subgroups which are 
at least 3 main subgroups as mentioned above. In the case of Japan, the 
neighborhood association serves as a nucleus for subgroups (extra-local groups with 
project teams created to deal with pressing issues) and as the pivot to organize and 
coordinate with other groups’ activities in the community (Pekkanen, Tsujinaka & 
Yamamoto, 2014). However, those groups must deal with or distribute to the 
management of local community development based on mutual collaboration among 
individual members affiliated with the organizations. Additionally, there is solid 
relationships and trust among community residents which are refined through 
working together actively.  
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4.3.6 Mutual collaboration and cooperation with Municipality 
The neighborhood community in Thailand has most effectively been 
managed through mutual collaboration among the fellow residents and the 
government designated structure and functions. It is interesting that the working 
together among community residents resulted from the community’s monthly 
meeting through its structures and functions. The information in 4.3.1 and 4.3.4 
indicate the pattern of at least 9 to 15 persons of community committee for 
community management and administration. Also, the leaders of subgroups 
committee are as the community committee by posts. It appears that a hierarchy 
system exposes their internal administration which integrates all structure and 
functions as an internal web that combines and also enhances the direct and active 
participation of all community residents. Generally, the majority vote is a tool for 
policy formation and decision-making. The community members will usually share 
their problems and decide about their activities. About nearly 60% of the 
respondents of the survey research asserted that the meeting is the most popular 
channel for the members to disseminate information and usually make decisions or 
design their activities through the meeting. This pattern has also been done with all 
subgroups committee and the members, especially, the Saving Group wherein all 
active community members will deposit their money and apply for revolving loan 
fund, including doing the monthly payment for their credits while the committees 
will use that occasion to do loan approvals (in-depth interviews and participatory 
observation, 2012-2013).   
Furthermore, all neighborhood communities cooperate through their external 
networking system. It was found that community networking system is an 
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alternative channel that stimulates the collaboration among neighborhood 
communities. All communities usually join as a cluster in which the community 
development officer conducts the sharing of experiences and distributing or 
exchanging their activities on problem-solving and information to others based on 
their functional groups and the responsibilities such as women’s auxiliaries, 
elderly’s groups, primary healthcare and sanitary groups (in-depth interviews and 
participatory observation, 2012-2013). Therefore, the collaborative relationship 
between communities and subgroups become a powerful platform for transferring 
knowledge, experience and information and training through their network system 
(Kongjit & Tonmukayakul, 2012). It is corroborated that the local residents will 
increasingly share responsibility in local development and problem alleviation, 
based on a participation approach, self-reliance, and mutual assistance. 
Aside from the mutual collaborative relationship among the local residents 
within their community, the neighborhood communities also work with other 
organizations, especially, the municipal government. According to the field 
research, it was perceived that municipal government shapes neighborhood 
communities. Due to the deficiencies in staff aimed at providing the public good and 
services to local residents from their over-expanding of administrative areas, one 
objective of the formation of neighborhood communities is to serve as the supporter 
of the municipal government to facilitate more efficiency and effectiveness in 
providing public good and services. The municipal governments supposed and 
expected that neighborhood communities and local residents could participate in 
municipal affairs.  Therefore, many activities have been set in cooperating and 
controlling through financial instruments by the municipality. 
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The platform to serve the relationship between municipality and 
Neighborhood Communities have been done actively through the monthly and 
yearly meeting. The municipality has adopted this platform to assist the direct 
communication with the presidents and core leaders who are representatives of the 
community and subgroups members for disseminating the information.  More than 
85% of respondents from the questionnaires showed that the municipality usually 
requests the committee to circulate the information to the members. By this way, the 
president and core leaders will act as the coordinator or messenger between the 
municipal government and local residents. On the other hand, the president and the 
core leaders will report community problems or needs, including assessing and 
relaying the success or failure of activities and problems to the municipal officers. 
Moreover, the municipal government supports the financial flows to neighborhood 
communities. According to the central policy, the municipal government has to 
allocate 10% of the budget of local expenditure to boost the neighborhood 
community’s activities and community development. Therefore, the yearly meeting 
will enable the neighborhood communities to propose their projects or community 
development activities to get financial support from the municipality (in-depth 
interviews and participatory observation, 2012-2013).  
Significantly, the financial relationship is another key found to create 
varying incentives for the organization of neighborhood communities. The 
distinctive pattern of neighborhood communities in Thailand is an organized group 
that has been shaped by the state based on voluntary local residents. They are not 
full-time employees but still, can contribute to building up social capital and to 
developing the capacity building of community development. However, it is 
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assumed that the financial instrument of the government supports most of the 
activities of neighborhood communities. The concrete financial supports from the 
central government have been launched through Thailand’s grassroots policies such 
as Village and Urban Community Fund (Initiated Fund for 1 million Baht, 2001) 
that serve the Savings Group to provide a revolving loan fund for individuals’ small 
businesses and to stimulate the grassroots economy. Moreover, the SML project 
stimulated the neighborhood community based on their members’ size to empower 
and strengthen the local residents to develop and manage community business on the 
principle of participatory approach (from 200,000 to 300,000 Baht). The process of 
developing the products or services are expected to build social capital as local 
residents work together to improve the communities economy and quality of life. 
The Primary Healthcare and Sanitary Group is indirectly supported through the 
Universal Healthcare Coverage (30 Baht Health Scheme) to provide equal 
accessibility and quality healthcare services. This program has been launched to 
serve low-income and disadvantaged persons including low-income adults with 
monthly income below 2,000 Baht, elderly persons, children under 12 years of age, 
disabled, monks and war veterans (Chandoevwit, 2003). Another project is the 500 
Baht Universal Pension Scheme that serves every elderly person (60 years of age or 
older) who is not in any elderly public facility or who does not currently receive 
income permanently. At the local level, the municipal government usually supports 
the neighborhood community through fiscal year plan and sometimes stimulates the 
local cultural festival and occupational training to women’s group. However, the 
financial support and policies that have been provided through the municipality are 
disposed to become a platform for the cooperation with Municipality.   
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4.3.7 Effectiveness with state’s policies and incentives 
As indicated in the introduction, the state acts to promote the neighborhood 
community in the municipality to conform to the 1997 constitution in order to 
promote popular participation and to encourage a strong civil society and democratic 
decentralization.  The state supports the gathering of local groups of residents to 
encourage self-reliance, mutual assistance and to serve as collaborative mechanisms 
between the state and local residents. Likewise, the state helps to facilitate more 
efficiency and effectiveness in community development and provide more social 
services. It is apparent that neighborhood communities are successful at encouraging 
face-to-face interaction to strengthen interpersonal ties and create a collaborative 
relationship to facilitate various community developments and sustain social capital. 
Neighborhood communities use direct contact among fellow local residents to 
cooperate in the planning of the activities and facilitate activities such as cultural 
events, local festivals, assisting with public health and welfare services, and 
maintenance of public facilities. The success in creating social gathering and 
engagement among fellow local residents can indicate the effectiveness of the state 
policy and sustainability of social capital. 
Through the rules and regulations, the Thai government has the pervasive 
authority to stipulate and conduct the activities of neighborhood communities. The 
neighborhood community is established to conform to the government’s policy, 
leading to easy manipulation and domination by state agencies. The survey research 
(Question 24) indicated that the first rank of neighborhood communities (71.6% of 
the respondents) preferred to do the activities in conjunction with the municipality 
while the second rank (42.9%) has performed the activities among their 
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neighborhood communities network. The monthly meeting become as a significant 
means that support their close relationship and organize their yearly activities. 
Sometimes, the mayor and cabinet prefer to participate in the communities’ monthly 
meeting and cooperate with local residents in the cultural festival. Furthermore, the 
community development officer who is the representative of the municipality is the 
key person to guide or conduct the decision-making towards the activities of the 
neighborhood community. The results emphasized the mutual collaborative 
relationship among the members and the cooperation with the municipality. 
In addition, the financial supports represent the incentives to facilitate all 
neighborhood communities in various community developments and well-being. It 
is observed that neighborhood communities and subgroups are organized and 
supported by the municipality. They are a voluntary organized group of residents 
that associate without self-budgeting and full-time employment. This would be the 
political strategies for creating sustainable and loyal support as partisan.  However, 
these groups have been organized based on the participatory approach and most of 
the local residents are involved in their neighborhood communities and have created 
their committee for management to receive the financial support.  
The Village and Urban Community Fund Program is well known as the One-
Million-Baht village fund that involves a revolving loan fund and small investment 
purpose for individuals. It is perceived that the government borrowed the idea from 
a micro-credit program of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. The government 
expected the Village Fund program to bring about an increase in the income and 
asset accumulation, create financial resources for further investment, foster 
community-capital management skills, sustain economic development and promote 
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self-reliance.  The Village Fund program stimulates local communities to create 
projects for themselves, at the same time, allows local people to participate more in 
the decision-making process for projects in their communities. The committee is 
legitimate to manage the regulation for individual’s deposit, decide on the loan 
recipients, the loan amount, and the interest rate charge, depending on each 
individual case. However, the regulations that the committee implements have to 
comply with the Village Fund Act, which stated that this loan is one year in length. 
The fund would be allocated through the Government Savings Bank (GSB) or Bank 
for Agricultural and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). Also, the loan amount 
should not exceed 20,000 Baht per person, but can be extended to 50,000 Baht in 
special cases. As the result, this process has practically operated successfully with 
relatively high rate of repayment, an increase of individual’s deposits and the new 
approval of member’s share. Moreover, the eligibility for loans provides newly 
available investment opportunities which stimulate and strengthen the grassroots 
economy. It was found that the GDP is relatively high while the poverty decreases. 
According to another project that brings benefit to the grassroots is the SML grant 
fund that enhances the capacity building of community development, especially, to 
improve the communities’ economy and quality of life. Neighborhood communities 
have to form the committee to receive the money support and they have to decide 
which project would be implemented. The participatory approach is also used to 
stimulate the engagement of community members to do the majority vote for 
decision-making and implementation of related activities. These two programs can 
facilitate the strengthening of the savings group for local economic development and 
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can sustain social capital by affiliating to the personal relationship that deepens trust 
and working together actively. 
The Primary Healthcare Group usually gets the direct financial support from 
the municipality that dictates the planning of the activities through the fiscal year 
expenditure to facilitate the housing problems, environment, public health and 
welfare services. An indirect financial support is from the central government to aid 
group activities such as the 30 Baht Universal Healthcare to gain access to low-cost 
health services. This has been implemented to reduce people's medical expenses, 
specifically for low-income, disadvantaged and elderly persons who have the 
greatest burden to pay for medical services. Moreover, it is preparing to cope with 
the situation of aging society in Thailand, at the community level. The Senior 
Citizen group has been set up to improve social services for older persons, promote 
their participation in social activities, and compile valuable data derived from older 
persons’ wisdom. The central government distributes 500 Baht per person for senior 
citizen scheme targeting to enhance public facilities for elderly persons who do not 
currently receive income permanently.   
Neighborhood communities are organized groups that have been shaped by 
the state designation based on voluntary local residents. Without full-time 
employment, it is assumed that the financial instrument of the government supports 
most of the activities of neighborhood communities.  The high collaborative 
relationship among the members and the cooperation with the municipality can 
contribute to build up social capital and develop the capacity building of community 
development. However, the concrete financial supports would be received from both 
the central government and local government that have been launched through 
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Thailand’s grassroots policies. It is plain to see that the state supports the gathering 
of local groups of residents to facilitate more efficiency and effectiveness and 
encourage self-reliance, mutual assistance. Moreover, it could help in administrative 
purposes to facilitate more efficiency and effectiveness in providing public good and 
services. 
 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the characteristics of neighborhood community in Thailand 
has been focused on and analyzed. The following points summarize the findings of 
the distinctive identity of neighborhood community. 
First, neighborhood communities represent the most important function as 
neighborhood associations in several countries that promote social gathering and 
strengthen strong community development. In Thailand, the state acts to promote 
neighborhood community in the municipality. We do not deny the characteristics of 
neighborhood associations which are local groups of residents in such a 
geographical delimited area where the membership is voluntary associated with their 
neighbors and friends. These encourage self-reliance and mutual collaboration and 
manage various activities in the form of community committees who are as the 
representatives of the residents.  It was revealed that neighborhood communities 
have been shaped and conducted 100% by the state. It is noteworthy that the group 
formation has to conform with the state designated regulations and has to be 
recognized by the state, leading all neighborhood communities to be in the same 
structure and pattern of management. The financial instruments are powerfully 
significant for the state’s role in fostering neighborhood community to accomplish 
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various activities through the policies and financial supports. Therefore, many 
activities have been set in cooperating and controlling through financial instruments 
by the municipality. However, neighborhood community’s members are voluntary 
associates without salary. They are charity workers for social gathering and 
community development.  
Second, the senior citizens or retirees who are self-employed are relatively 
influential to the presidents, directors and community committee members. They are 
a group of persons who can contribute a great deal of time working with their 
communities in a variety of situations while the younger generation is too busy with 
their jobs. The Thai village culture of close relationship and trust with Buddhism 
culture have contributed to them forming solid relationships and being trustworthy.  
Third, neighborhood communities could highlight their relationship with the 
local government through the cooperative activities and financial instrument. It has 
been established that the community development officer acts as a coordinator who 
powerfully connects the local residents and the municipality to promote mutual 
collaboration. Additionally, the patterns of monthly and yearly meeting enhance and 
stimulate the cooperation between the president or core leaders with the 
municipality. The monthly meeting opens the way for the transmission of 
information from the municipality to local residents while the president and core 
leaders will report the result and assess the activities which have gained the financial 
support from the governments. These patterns reinforce neighborhood communities 
to work in cooperation with the municipality.  
Fourth, neighborhood communities are voluntary groups of residents without 
full-time employment but they can strengthen community management skill and can 
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create high social capital. It is discovered that the participatory approach and federal 
system network of neighborhood communities facilitate the capacity building 
towards occupational development and income generation for women group 
activities. At the same time, the primary healthcare and sanitary group could 
function for welfare services with a high quality of life for their local residents, not 
to mention crime and drugs prevention. The financial sustainability program has 
successfully achieved the most effective way towards community development and 
well-being. Those activities are the basic functions for neighborhood communities in 
Thailand that stimulate and enhance self-reliance and mutual collaboration. 
Fifth, these organized residents are low in the functions that relate to 
advocacy. On the other hand, the clientelism trend significantly pushes a partisan to 
occur in a neighborhood community interaction with the government. It is 
comfortable for the state to gain neighborhood communities as partisan groups 
through government sponsorship of organizations and resource endowments. 
Evidently, the municipality is structuring the pattern of neighborhood community 
and is giving them incentives; therefore, regulations and financial instruments are as 
mechanisms for neighborhood communities to become as a political partisan with 
strong relationship. 
In summary, the development of civil society and the state-civil society 
relations in Thailand focusing on the basic characteristics and functions of civil 
society, including the relation between the civil society and politics could be 
summarized in two dimensions. Firstly, we perceived that typically, civil society 
organizations in Thailand represent the most important function as association life 
engaged in the social development, provide service and benefits to their members 
148 
 
and also the public in which the majority are local development and welfare-
oriented. These organizations are autonomous and can be independent from the state 
and operate mainly with a low scale of members and employees. These have a high 
scale of volunteers who provide their manpower skills for local activities. Moreover, 
the most direct involvement in issues of civil society organization and the 
government is determined in its capacity and success in influencing a government 
decision. However, these organizations prefer to cooperate with and support the 
policies and budget activities of the government. Second, Neighborhood 
communities are organized groups that have been shaped by state designation based 
on voluntary local residents. The financial instrument of the government supports 
most activities of neighborhood communities. These could have resulted to the high 
cooperation with the municipality. On the other hand, it can contribute to building 
up social capital and develop the capacity building of community development 
beyond their high collaborative relationship among the members. This could 
significantly illustrate the vitality and strength of civil society organizations at the 
grassroots level. 
In Thai political structure, the political elites are usually able to affect 
political outcomes through their strategic position, still, the creating and incentive of 
neighborhood communities of state can show the virtue of state. Rather than having 
an oppositional relationship with the state, the state and political institutions have 
developed civil society organizations. Furthermore, with political culture as patron-
clients relationship, the political structure dominates and intervention corporatism 
directly and indirectly influences the structure, ideology, and activities of civil 
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society organization in Thailand. It is significant that civil society tend to be a part of 
the state and is easily manipulated and dominated by state agencies. 
 
 Chapter 5
Neighborhood Community and Political Relation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters present the basic characteristics and trends of civil 
society in Thailand focusing on neighborhood community and on the broad 
understanding of other civil society organizations. The most important function of 
civil society is serving as an association that is engaged in social development. It has 
been determined that most of its provisions are welfare and service oriented which 
offer services and information to its members, beneficiaries and to the public in 
general. Essentially, civil society is involved with the government through rules and 
regulation, and financial instrument. By regulations, most of them have a formal 
relation with the government for registration and licensing and they prefer to work in 
cooperation and in support of policies and budget activities of the government. As for 
neighborhood communities, they could deepen their relationship with the local 
government through the 100% received fund from both central and local 
governments. In view of their interaction with the local government, neighborhood 
communities have a considerable tendency of becoming a partisan.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, civil society also interacts with the political and 
economic governance. The use of party (money) politics and the patron-client relation 
was a basic mechanism for gaining long-run loyalty and support that will lead to the 
partisanship of the dependent clients.  Clientelism denotes the linkage between the 
state as a patron and civil society as clients derived from fictive kinship and friendship 
of society systems such as cultural practices and strategies. On the other hand, state 
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corporatism under elite capitalism has shown the socio-political process in which 
organizations representing monopolistic functional interests engage in political 
exchange. These concepts describe the relation of the state and civil society, under the 
circumstance that the state has constructed the civil society organization in the 
municipality of Thailand. Moreover, the numerical data analysis has also provided a 
clear understanding that those actions of civil society, especially neighborhood 
communities, are more involved in local partisan politics that impact the strength and 
vitality of civil society organizations.  
 
5.2 Neighborhood community and its personal relation 
By nature, a neighborhood community is shaped by the state and the 
municipality. It is relative for the state to design and conduct its structure and pattern 
of activities in accordance with the provision and implementation of policies of local 
governments. Chapter 4 indicated that the state is legitimate by rule, regulation and 
financial instrument in fostering neighborhood communities to manage and carry out 
various activities for them through the policies and financial supports. I have assumed 
that neighborhood communities also contribute to governance by engaging in the 
political process, for instance when the neighbors articulate their demands to the local 
government. This section tries to investigate the neighborhood community’s relation 
with political actors that mostly involve bureaucrats and local politicians in order to 
measure how much influence the neighborhood community has in local partisan 
politics and its effect on the strength and vitality of civil society organizations. 
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5.2.1 Personal relation with institutions  
Table 5.1 reports the results of Question 51 of the neighborhood community 
survey. The 142 responding neighborhood communities in Northern Region 1 were 
asked to rate their trust on the 8 different types of institutions regarding their requests 
and opinions. To measure the level of trustworthiness, from a scale of 1 to 5 was used, 
the level 1 means not at all, 3 is the average and 5 means very trustworthy.  
 
Table 5.1 Relationship of neighborhood communities and important institutions 
Institutions Average* S.D. Definition 
Local government 3.70 0.781 High 
Local politicians 3.50 0.780 High 
National government 3.45 0.785 Average 
Police 3.35 0.715 Average 
Courts 3.24 1.044 Average 
Mass media 3.01 0.866 Average 
Political parties and politicians 2.89 0.879 Average 
Others  2.83 1.169 Average 
Civic groups (NGOs, NPOs) 2.51 1.014 Average 
*N= 142, Rating scale: valid =  1 -1.49, 1.50 -2.49, 2.50 - 3.49, 3.50 -4.49 and 4.50 - 5.00 
 
From the ranking table, the neighborhood community thinks that the local 
government and local politicians are significantly trustworthy institutions giving them 
high points while reckoning the others as moderate. As mentioned, the municipality 
has not only shaped and recognized neighborhood communities but has also fostered 
these to execute various activities through the policies and financial supports. 
Moreover, it is determined that the municipality has provided internal structure and 
administrative guidance and has set many activities to nurture cooperation and gain 
control through financial instruments. The municipality has adopted the platform of 
monthly meeting to boost their direct communication with the president and the 
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director of a subgroup. This platform enables the dissemination of information to the 
residents and increases the opportunity for the neighborhood community to request or 
present their opinions on matters such as the success or failure of activities and 
problems to the municipality officers (local government) and municipality council 
(local politicians). It is clear that neighborhood communities have a strong 
relationship and high trust for the local government and local politicians. 
 
5.2.2 Personal relation with actors  
As indicated in 5.2.1, local government and local politicians are the most 
important institutions for announcing the demands and opinions of neighborhood 
communities. In Question 50, the 142 presidents were asked to rate their usual 
interaction with the actors both privately and publicly. Considering that the 
municipality structures the pattern and provides policies and financial support to serve 
various activities of neighborhood communities, it is assumed that the interactions 
between the president and the municipality are relatively high than the others. 
According to the ranking presented in Figure 5.1, about 67% of the respondents 
admitted that they have a personal relationship with those who work in the 
municipality, including the municipality official (19.13%), municipality council 
(17.97%), senior officials of the municipality (16.09%) and community development 
officers (14.20%). Basically, neighborhood communities publicly interact to 
cooperate and work with community development workers who always provide the 
administrative guidance and support in doing various activities. Also, since 
neighborhood communities are designated in such a geographical delimited area, I 
assumed that most of the presidents privately worked in a contractual relationship 
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with the local government and local politicians who receive the appreciation and 
respect of local residents resulting in a long-term relationship with their fictive 
kinships and neighbors. 
 
Figure 5.1 Relationship of neighborhood communities and important actors 
 
 
To win the election, parties and/or candidates will seek to penetrate and even 
to subordinate the core institutions of the neighborhood community. It is interesting 
that if the patron-client relationship becomes a common practice, it could be 
comfortable for the local government and local politicians to gain neighborhood 
communities as partisan groups through government sponsorships of organization and 
resource endowments. This relationship would be deeply anchored on fictive kinship 
structures and feelings of a debt of gratitude, including clientelistic network which is 
not only due to the supply side of political patron offering help, security, and 
prosperity for the clients in exchange for vote and long-term loyalty, but also for the 
clients’ demand for such support.  
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5.2.3 Relation with municipality 
Question 31 of the survey asked the respondents to rank up three 
administrative tasks that were being commissioned from the municipality in order of 
their importance. Table 5.2 reports the percentages of those tasks are as follows, 
31.15% for circulating notices, 30.6% for distributing newsletters, 23.72% for 
undertaking administrative tasks, 10.66% for recommending members for 
committees, 1.93% for collecting contributions and 1.85% for other subcontract tasks.  
 
Table 5.2 Subcontracted task from municipality 
Task  Percentage 
Circulating notices 31.15 
Distributing newsletters 30.69 
Undertake administrative task 23.72 
Nominating delegation committee members 10.66 
Collecting contributions 1.93 
Other 1.85 
N=142 
  
Looking at the implementation rates for these activities, Table 5.2 reports that 
neighborhood communities have undertaken activities such as circulating notices and 
distributing newsletters which are common tasks to disseminate information from the 
municipality to its members. It is noteworthy that among all neighborhood 
communities, 23.72% were requested to undertake administrative tasks and 10.66% 
were subcontracted to nominate delegation. This outcome implies that the 
municipality was a direct subcontractor for the 34% of the activities that 
neighborhood communities were requested and directed to perform. 
Moreover, Question 32 asked respondents about the ideal relationship between 
neighborhood communities and the municipality in dealing with community 
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problems. The 67.61% of the respondents think that neighborhood communities 
should function as a bridge between the municipality and the residents. On the 
contrary, 20.42% say that they should just undertake tasks just as directed by the 
municipality and 11.97% think that they should cooperate with the municipality.  The 
respondents reckon that neighborhood communities cannot act independently or just 
leave everything to the municipality which confirms their need to cooperate with the 
municipality in dealing with community problems. Hence, it is possible to support 
more than half of the neighborhood communities to develop a close relationship with 
the municipality. 
  
5.3 Political activities conducted by neighborhood community 
5.3.1 Lobbying 
Although Chapter 4 indicates the most important functions of neighborhood 
community, there are less than 2% aiming to assist and lobby the municipality. 
Nevertheless, 142 responding neighborhood communities were asked to rate 8 types 
of lobbying behavior (Question 37) from a scale of 1 to 5 concerning their 
engagement in such behavior. To measure, level 1 means never, 3 sometimes and 5 
means always. Table 5.3 ranks the lobbying behaviors based on the Likert scale mean 
and the standard deviation has been calculated to show the diversity and centrality of 
answers. 
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Table 5.3 Lobbying activities 
Lobbying activities Average* S.D. Definitions 
Consult the corresponding section in the 
municipality 3.85 0.959 Always 
Formal meeting with municipality 3.81 0.921 Always 
Consult municipality council (local politicians) 3.40 0.903 Sometimes 
Consult senior officials in the municipality 3.37 0.840 Sometimes 
Holding public comment sessions 3.34 0.899 Sometimes 
Attend municipality round-table conferences 3.30 0.974 Sometimes 
Petitioning of local assembly 2.66 1.245 Sometimes 
Consult influential persons outside the 
municipality (excluding politicians) 2.14 1.077 Seldom 
*N=142, Rating scale: valid =  1 -1.49, 1.50 -2.49, 2.50 - 3.49, 3.50 -4.49 and 4.50 - 5.00 
 
The result reveals that neighborhood communities always consult with the 
corresponding section in the municipality and participate in a formal meeting with the 
municipality as a common method to reflect their demands and opinions about 
policies. Neighborhood communities communicate their requests to the department 
within the municipality that is designated to work with them such as the Division of 
Community Development, the Division of Social Welfare and the Division of Public 
Health and Environmental Services. A community development officer is a key 
person who powerfully connects the local residents to the municipality as well as 
guides or conducts the decision-making as to the activities of the neighborhood 
community. Moreover, the platform of the monthly and yearly meeting has been done 
actively to cultivate the relationship between the municipality and neighborhood 
communities. In this platform, they sometimes consult with influential persons like 
local politicians (municipality council) and senior officials in the local government, 
hold public comment sessions and conduct informal meetings with the municipality 
but they hardly engage in some specific lobbying behavior with persons outside the 
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municipality. In addition, all neighborhood communities only provided positive 
responses to Question 44. Those who considered a smooth interaction with the 
officers has an average of 3.62 which is higher than 3.55, the average obtained under 
the member households’ participation in activities if they have to carry out the 
problems.  
According to the view that the state structures neighborhood communities,  
I perceived that the municipality is the main channel for neighborhood communities 
to advance their demands and that bureaucracy is the main interlocutor (Pekkanen, 
Tsujinaka & Yamamoto, 2014), especially when communicating with a community 
development officer (see discussion in Chapter 4). 
 
5.3.2 Neighborhood communities’ evaluations of municipality responses 
Table 5.4 reports the level of importance and satisfaction regarding the 
municipality’s support to neighborhood communities and its provision of valuable 
opportunities to communicate their positions effectively. The 142 responding 
neighborhood communities were asked to rate the importance and satisfaction from a 
scale of 1 to 5 wherein level 1 means not at all, 3 is the average and 5 means very 
much important and satisfied.   
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Table 5.4 Evaluation of the municipality’s response 
Municipality engagement Important Satisfaction 
  Average Definition Average Definition 
Providing subsidies to your NC 2.69 Average 3.34 Average 
Providing administrative information 3.38 Average 3.33 Average 
Commissioning work 3.35 Average 3.35 Average 
Responding to requests 2.72 Average 3.15 Average 
Providing forum for discussion local 
problems 3.16 Average 3.21 Average 
Supporting NC activities 3.19 Average 3.24 Average 
Policies implementation Important Satisfaction 
  Average Definition Average Definition 
Developing the living environment 3.47 Average 3.57 Satisfied 
Revitalizing community and cultural 
activities 3.35 Average 3.27 Average 
Ensuring safety 3.81 Important 3.55 Satisfied 
Developing public facilities 3.51 Important 2.57 Average 
Improving health, welfare, and medical 
services 2.54 Average 3.35 Average 
Improving school and social education 3.18 Average 2.56 Average 
Undertaking environment policies 3.33 Average 3.25 Average 
Revitalizing agriculture and forest 3.30 Average 3.09 Average 
Revitalizing business investment and 
industry 3.01 Average 3.54 Satisfied 
Urban development and planning 3.31 Average 3.21 Average 
Revitalizing tourism 2.50 Average 2.49 Slightly 
Organizing international exchange 3.08 Average 2.95 Average 
*N=142 Rating scale: valid =  1 -1.49, 1.50 -2.49, 2.50 - 3.49, 3.50 -4.49 and 4.50 - 5.00 
 
The results revealed that neighborhood communities consider the municipality 
engagements as important and satisfactory. The municipality always supports their 
several activities although they consider that responding to their requests and 
providing financial support are not that important averaging at 2.72 and 2.69 
respectively. Conversely, neighborhood communities consider that the policies 
implemented by the municipality are inclined to be relatively important, especially 
policies like ensuring safety and developing public facilities and living environment. 
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Too, their satisfaction towards policy implementation is relatively high in relation to 
their living environment, living safety and revitalizing business investment. However, 
if we report only the positive responses (i.e. “very important,” “important,” and 
“average”), there are almost three-quarters of all neighborhood communities who 
acknowledge the importance of both municipality support and policy implementation 
adding up to 76.42% and 74.26% while with reference to satisfaction the figures are 
85.08% and 77.83%, respectively.  
In Chapter 4, it has been made apparent that the municipality engagement and 
policies implementation could provide and support the basic requirements or the main 
purpose of those group formations. Also, it was found that several policies 
implementation and financial supports could benefit the main activities of 
neighborhood communities related to social well-being and community development 
like primary health care, promotion of occupational development, and revolving loans 
for small-business investment, etc.  
 
5.3.3 Success and influence 
Question 35 more specifically inquired whether neighborhood communities 
judged that they had been successful in having their demands accepted by the 
municipality. Table 5.5 reports the results and it is striking that nearly 89% of the 
respondents consider that their requests were positively responded to by the 
municipality while only 11% of respondents answered as almost not successful.  
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Table 5.5 Success and influence on political process 
Success Percentage Influence Percentage 
Almost none 0.70 Not at all 6.34 
Very little 10.56 Not very much 19.72 
Some 32.39 Moderate 29.58 
Many 53.52 Some influence 32.39 
Almost all 2.82 Influential 11.97 
 
Similarly, Question 38 inquired concerning the extent of influence 
neighborhood communities have on municipality decision-making. The 142 
respondents indicated, based on self-evaluation, that their influence on policy is 
nearly 74% (moderate to influential) while 26% answered that they don’t influence 
the decision-making process that much. It can be concluded from the results that 
neighborhood communities have a strong influence on municipality decisions 
regarding policy making or decline the policy.  
 
5.3.4 Monitoring policies implementation 
Based on their strong relationship with the local government, there are many 
neighborhood communities that are interested in monitoring the performance of 
policies if the policies are relevant to them. The Question 33 in the survey asked the 
respondents if they only monitored the policy relevant to them, if they usually 
engaged in monitoring, or if they did not engage in monitoring at all.  
The result reports that 38.03% of neighborhood communities regularly engage 
in monitoring whereas 59.15% engage in monitoring when the policy is relevant to 
them, and only 4% of the neighborhood communities never engage in monitoring 
activities.  
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Figure 5.2 Implementation status of monitoring 
 
 
There are many neighborhood communities that are interested in the public 
service provided by the municipality because of its role in policy formation and 
implementation as well as on the provision of various social services and local 
development. 
 
5.3.5 Mobilization 
Figure 5.3 depicts how neighborhood communities are involved with the 
municipality when making requests or presenting their opinions. The neighborhood 
community was asked to indicate their use of each of the different means of 
mobilizing their members in Question 36 like direct individual contacts, meeting, or 
engaging in social mobilizations. 
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Figure 5.3 Actual mobilization experience 
 
 
The actual mobilization experience of neighborhood communities that submits 
request forms is high at 53.62%. It is the usual petitions that are used for public 
facilities and problem issues. Meetings have been used by 14.89%, signature 
collection by 11.49%, and personal contact via phone call by 9.36%. Only a few at 
0.43% engage in a demonstration which indicates the use of the pattern of civic 
movement, mass protest, and demonstration. In order to resolve the problems, 
neighborhood communities have engaged in monthly meetings and always use the 
request forms as the actual method for their petitions which are a platform structuring 
by the municipality. It is telling that a limited number of neighborhood communities 
have engaged in significant mobilization. 
 
5.3.6 Election Involvement 
Figure 5.4 depicts how much neighborhood communities are involved in 
election activities, especially in supporting any candidate in the local election.  
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Figure 5.4 Involvement in election 
 
 
In the neighborhood community survey, Question 30 queried about the 
endorsements and support for the candidate during local assembly elections by asking 
the respondents to choose among five responses of “always,” “only recently,” 
“sometimes,” “in the past but not anymore,” and “never.”  
It is notable that nearly 64% of the respondents had conducted election 
campaigning. The respondents indicated that they had undertaken activities in which 
about 35.9% of the respondents confessed that they had always participated in 
election campaigning and about 19.7% responded that they had sometimes 
participated in activities. It is more intriguing that 6.3% answered that they had done 
election campaigning recently, yet, 1.4% had done it in the past and did not want to 
do it anymore. In contrast, about 36.6% of respondents replied never.  
Due to their long-term relationship with the local government and local 
politicians, it is possible for neighborhood communities to support the candidates who 
have a close relationship with them or who have provided local development. 
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Noticeably, more than half of neighborhood communities participated in election 
campaigning wherein their direct involvement in election campaigns seems almost 
customary for them (Pekkanen, Tsujinaka & Yamamoto, 2014).  
 
5.4 Summary 
The goal of this chapter is to elucidate the roles of neighborhood communities 
regarding political relations which include their relationship with the institutions and 
the nature of their participatory roles. In this chapter, the political relation of 
neighborhood communities has been focused on and analyzed based on the empirical 
survey data and previous literature. As mentioned, Thai political structure is 
highlighted by the political elites who are usually able to affect political outcomes 
through their strategic position.  In modern Thai political structure, it has become 
noteworthy that it is strongly influenced by political elites such as military leaders, 
business politicians who are able to penetrate into the powerful political institution. 
Moreover, with the political culture of patron-clients relationship, the political 
structure can influence either directly or indirectly the structure, ideology, and 
activities of civil society organizations in Thailand. The following points summarize 
the findings about the distinctive functions of neighborhood community as political 
partisan in Thai political context.  
First, since neighborhood communities have been shaped and recognized by 
the municipality, it is inevitable that all neighborhood communities have established a 
political relationship with the municipality as the main institution. As I examined in 
section 5.2, it shows the relatively high result regarding the neighborhood 
communities’ association with the municipality. It was learned that the municipality 
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has not only provided internal structure and administrative guidance and subsidies but 
also the platform structuring of the monthly meeting which deepens their relationship.  
Second, the main important actors who act as interlocutor of the neighborhood 
communities are the municipality officials, municipality councils, senior officials and 
community development officers, all working for the municipality.  It is assumed that 
the relationship between neighborhood communities and the municipality could 
function into two levels - as a coordinator and as a subcontractor. As pointed in 
Chapter 4, the main function of group formation is to provide social gathering and 
community development based on self-reliance. Furthermore, the results show that 
most of the neighborhood associations work with the municipality in dealing with 
community issues. Therefore, they have done coordinated tasks such as circulating 
notices and distributing newsletters and requesting their demands to the municipality. 
On the other hand, they have functioned as a subcontractor of the municipality by 
undertaking administrative tasks and some of them nominate delegation committee 
members which reflect the possibility of the political partisan. 
Third, regarding the political activities of neighborhood communities in 
section 5.3, they stipulate their political activities by their day-to-day relationships 
with the municipality. Their trust and confidence in political actors may be associated 
with higher levels of contact and cooperation. It is regarded that the municipality is 
the main channel to advance the communities’ demands and opinions in policies 
through the corresponding section and formal meeting. Moreover, it is the higher 
levels of cooperation with the municipality will be associated with more lobbying. A 
municipality engaged regularly in providing administrative information and 
supporting several activities for neighborhood communities receive a high rate of 
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satisfaction. Furthermore, several policies implementation and financial supports 
could support their basic requirement and accomplish their main activities that have 
been structured by the municipality. In addition, neighborhood communities consider 
that their influence on policy is relatively high. This is made apparent in their strong 
influence on the municipality decisions on making policies and their success in 
demanding policies that relate to their interests. I contest that with high lobbying and 
satisfaction, it would result to the returning of partisanship in political elections.  
Fourth, it is precise to mention that neighborhood communities are a non-
political power. Section 5.3.5 ensures that their actual mobilization experience is high 
at 53.62%, using the request forms for their petitions. They have also participated in 
meetings, using signature collection and personal phone call for contacting the 
corresponding section in the municipality while almost none have shared in engaging 
in demonstration and requesting audit and disclosure. However, these could be a 
platform structuring by the municipality to avoid any pressure and mobilization from 
neighborhood communities. 
Fifth, neighborhood communities are involved in supporting any candidates in 
local elections. Section 5.3.6 reveals that nearly 64% of neighborhood communities 
had conducted election campaigning which illustrates that the direct involvement of 
neighborhood communities in election campaigns seems almost customary for some. 
They could endorse and support people from the local areas and assembly members 
who advocate benefits for the local community (Pekkanen, Tsujinaka & Yamamoto, 
2014). 
I perceived that the promotion of the establishment of neighborhood 
communities could facilitate local residents’  participation in municipal affairs. 
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Additionally, the frequency of contact and cooperation through various activities can 
boost their close relationship. Yet, the relationship between neighborhood 
communities and municipality can be viewed as a reciprocal exchange. This 
relationship would be deeply embedded on feelings of a debt of gratitude which are 
not only due to the supply side of political patron offering help, security, and 
prosperity for the clients in exchange for votes and long-term loyalty, but also for the 
clients’ demand for such support. Therefore, the depth of the relationship between the 
municipality and neighborhood communities will support the local government and 
local politicians to gain neighborhood communities as partisan groups.  
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
Several scholars have perceived that the political structure influences the 
development of civil society organizations. In consonance, this dissertation has 
advanced the understanding on two key points 1) the state and political institution 
pervasively influence directly and indirectly towards the development of civil society 
organizations and 2) how the state has shaped civil society organization at the 
grassroots level in modern Thai politics. This thesis has taken the perspective that the 
emerging trend of civil society is based upon the strong relationship and influence of 
the state which can contribute to sustaining the associational life and public interests.  
The first chapter addresses the main research question concerning the 
promotion of a particular pattern of neighborhood community as civil society in the 
municipality of Thailand. The state’s promotion of neighborhood communities called 
attention to how those groups can be structured as a civil society by the state. In 
addition, I have concluded that the municipality has used the political instruments as 
rules and regulations to structure the group formation and management style. Central 
and local governments providing administrative guidance and financial supports as 
incentives to encourage and support the establishment and activities of those groups. 
In reference to the Thai political structure and political culture of elite democracy and 
clientelism, the state is a political patron that directs the neighborhood communities as 
a civil society organization. The state, acting in that capacity, gives incentives and 
privileges to them so that they could not only provide social services but also support 
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political goals and become a partisan which establishes the connection between civil 
society and modern Thai democracy.  
The second chapter provides an overview related to a theoretical framework 
based on state-society relations. The literature of civil society related to its nature and 
trends as discoursed in a variety of uses and definitions led researchers to conclude 
that the early perspectives viewed civil society as having played a crucial role in 
liberating citizens from oppressive state and gaining full economic and political 
freedom. Furthermore, as the state becomes more legitimate, the state can play its role 
in fostering the political environments that many civil society organizations can 
flourish. It shows that the role of civil society as a coalition has been linked to the 
political and economic governance and has become a mechanism in serving the public 
good. The concepts of clientelism and corporatism which demonstrate the relevance 
of civil society to modern political theory and relate to the influence of political 
structures on civil society in Thailand have been considered in this section. 
Clientelism refers to the linkage between patron and clients derived from kinship of 
patrimonial society system deemed as cultural practices and strategies. The literature 
in corporatism has shown the socio-political process in which organizations 
representing monopolistic functional interests engage in political exchange and 
intervention. These concepts serve as a fundamental explanation related to the nature 
and phenomenon of civil society in such environments as well as a support to 
elucidate the state-society relationship. This study focuses on the circumstance on 
which the state has shaped the civil society organization in Thailand and suggests 
ways to analyze how the prevailing state’s mechanism, strategies and strong 
relationship with civil societies may have an impact on political partisan in Thai’s 
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political context. In order to explore these factors, this chapter also presents an outline 
for dissertation development including the conceptual framework and the utilized 
methodological approach.   
The third chapter discusses the development of civil society organization and 
its relationship with the state. The characteristics of political structures and the 
development of civil society history are divided into three periods. The first period is 
after the Thailand revolution in 1932 when Thai politics was ruled under the traditions 
of democratic authoritarianism and centralization manipulated by the military elite. 
During this period, civil society was a realm of charity composed of religion and civic 
associations but weakened by the strict control of the government. It has performed 
philanthropic functions such as providing social service and community development. 
After the military rule declined, Thai society became more pluralistic. The middle 
class, especially businessmen were the key actors who had supported the budget of 
political parties while the bureaucrats had tried associating with businessmen to 
revitalize their political power and to enlarge their economic control and gain benefits 
and privileges. Consequently, the political structure had come up with an unstable 
coalition government through semi-democracy while civil society continued to grow 
with the stimulation of public participation and political network.  Most of the civil 
society organizations performed the social movement advocating for the group’s 
interests and social issues. The third period started from 1997 with the political reform 
followed by the end of the economic crisis that led the political changes to 
representative democracy with people’s participation and decentralization. The 
political structure has become as a one-party dominance underlying electorate 
democracy and state-corporatism turning into a new and powerful political boss of 
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business conglomerate. The political actors changed to political capitalists and their 
local network led to creating political machines, rent seeking and polarizing of 
political sides through traditional norms of clientelism and cronyism.  Subsequently, 
civil society became a mechanism in monitoring political activities including election 
and government policies implementation.  Nonetheless, the state and political 
institutions always give incentives to the civil society and could influence the 
development of civil society organizations. As a result, the inadequate reciprocity of 
the state as patron and civil society as clients, civil society has become a part of the 
state as a political partisan that is easily manipulated and dominated by the political 
network. 
Chapter 4 answers the first research question and presents the concrete 
outcome that the state has shaped civil society organization in the new form of 
neighborhood community in the municipality. The first section of this chapter 
explained the basic characteristics, nature of activities as well as the political 
relationship of civil society organizations in Thailand using the broad explanation 
derived from the cross-national perspective information with other Asian developing 
countries such as Bangladesh, the Philippines and Japan of JIGS project. The civil 
society organizations in Thailand, like other Asian countries, show themselves as the 
associational life mostly to the local levels of the society that are in need of civic 
engagement, welfare assistance and local development to serve and support their 
members and the public. However, those groups are small-scale with regard to the 
members, employees and volunteers not to mention the relatively low budget which 
are all necessary resources to support the vibrant nature and the strength of civil 
society organizations. It is interesting that civil society organizations in Thailand have 
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a rather high influence towards the government policies that have an impact to their 
social needs. The forming coalitions and network along with civic movements, mass 
protests, and demonstrations may be the most vital democratic means in Thailand. 
The second aim of the fourth chapter is to expound more on the distinctive pattern of 
neighborhood communities as civil society organizations beyond state-designated 
policies, particularly on the basic features and functions. It is apparent that the 
municipality has structured the pattern of neighborhood community and has provided 
them financial supports. With the state’s promotion, neighborhood communities can 
contribute to building up social capital and develop the building capacity of 
community development through a high collaborative relationship among the 
members. The results revealed the high involvement of neighborhood community 
activities that mainly revolves around the field of grassroots economic empowerment, 
women empowerment, social awareness and networking building.  This could 
significantly illustrate the vitality and strength of civil society organization at the 
grassroots level.  
The second research question has been discussed in Chapter 5. By nature, 
neighborhood community is shaped by the state. It is important for the state to design 
and conduct the structure of neighborhood communities and its pattern of activities in 
accordance with the provision and implementation policies of local governments. The 
results supported the inferences made in Chapter 3 that the state is powerfully shaping 
the organization of civil societies through legality, regulation and incentives and that 
the state is building relationships between them by means of distributing benefits and 
privileges to gain control and capture.  Moreover, the findings revealed that the 
political actors are political elites including local government and local politicians 
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who have a strong relationship. They influence most neighborhood communities to be 
a non-political force at the same time providing support to candidates who can benefit 
them in return. It has been established that the municipality is structuring the pattern 
of interaction within neighborhood communities to become as a political partisan with 
a strong relationship based on fictive kinship and friendship.  Therefore, the state 
becomes a political patron which may need the support from civil society 
organizations to realize a political goal. 
Through the course of conducting the research and assessing the results, the 
implication concerning political partisan between neighborhood communities and 
municipality has become clear. The implication that was revealed through this 
research is the significant roles and phenomenon of neighborhood communities as a 
civil society that tend to be a political partisan of the state reflecting through multi-
dimensional factors like policies, culture norms as well as political institutions. 
Moreover, the neighborhood communities could be endangered by the 
administrative and economic mechanisms of the modern state, the reciprocity, and 
inequality of uneven power and status. Based on rule of law, the municipality (state) 
is the main institution that may adopt its interventionist policies and financial 
instruments to manipulate and control neighborhood communities in cooperation with 
the provision of the state. Neighborhood communities have to form their community 
committees among 9 to 15 persons and set up their own subgroup activities such as 
primary health group, savings group, and women group in order to be recognized by 
the municipality and to receive incentives and privileges.   
The municipality has directed internal structure and administrative guidance. 
Even so, neighborhood communities have also cooperated as a subcontractor of the 
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municipality by undertaking administrative tasks that involve nominating delegation 
committee members reflecting the possibility of a channel of a political partisan. 
The municipality is the main channel to advance the demands and opinions of 
neighborhood communities regarding policies through correspondence and formal 
meeting. The conducted platform of the meeting has actively boosted cooperation 
between municipality and neighborhood communities. The municipality has adopted 
this platform to encourage the direct communication with the presidents and core 
leaders who are representatives of the community and subgroups members. The 
platform structuring of the monthly meeting has provided a method for maintaining 
their relationship. Apart from that, the community development officer works for the 
municipality as a mentor of the president and committees providing them various 
activities. The day-to-day interactions may be associated with higher levels of contact 
and cooperation. It is noteworthy that the depth of the relationship between the 
municipality as the patron and neighborhood communities as clients will be 
advantageous for the local government and local politicians in order to gain 
neighborhood communities as partisan groups.  
As discussed in Chapter 3 the political structure that is usually able to affect 
political outcomes and policy implementation of both central and local governments 
refers to the political actors of the state, political institutions, political policies, and 
strategies. The results affirm that neighborhood communities are a non-political force 
and that the government and the municipality provide 100% financial support to them, 
therefore, the policies and financial instruments would justify the direct intervention 
of the government.  
176 
 
 
 
Remarkably, the financial relationship is another key traced to create varying 
incentives for the organization of neighborhood communities. The municipal 
government has to allocate regularly 10% of the budget of local expenditure to boost 
neighborhood community’s activities. In that case, the municipality may request the 
neighborhood communities to propose their projects or community development 
activities to obtain the financial supports from the municipality.    
Financial supports fund several main activities. For instance, since 2001, Thai 
Rak Thai Party had been one of the favored capitalists and a well-funded political 
party.  The Party had launched the attractive policies designed to appeal to the rural 
majority by means of business marketing, entrepreneurial patronage, and populist 
policy. It has initiated programs like village-managed microcredit development funds, 
low-interest agricultural loans, direct injections of cash into village development 
funds (the SML scheme) , infrastructure development, and the One Tambon One 
Product (OTOP) which is a rural small and medium enterprise development program. 
Those policies are pertinent to a corporatist model to co-opt civil society and restrict 
its autonomy. 
Furthermore, trust or confidence in political actors may be associated with 
higher levels of contact. Neighborhood communities consider that the high rate of 
response could show their strong influence on the municipality decisions on making 
policies and their success in demanding such policies that benefit their interests. It is 
essential to ensure the trust and confidence of local residents in the local government 
which encourages their long-term political support. This relationship rooted on 
feelings of a debt of gratitude is not only due to the supply side of political patron 
offering help, security, and prosperity for the clients in exchange for a vote and long-
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term loyalty but also to the clients’  demand for such support.   Hence, it is easy for 
civil society organizations to become a political partisan pillowed a strong 
relationship with the local government. 
The changes towards the political system and political structure became more 
liberal, making impact on the relationship and roles between the state and civil 
society.  Rather than oppositional to the state, the portrait of an understanding about 
civil society was therefore looked into particularly the nature of the cooperation 
between the state, its institutions, and civil society.  By nature, the state that holds 
legitimate sovereignty can foster, create, sustain, regulate and readjust the civil 
society. This research has explored the new patterns of development of neighborhood 
communities based on the geographically-delimited condition that has been 
influenced by the state. Needless to say, this study aims to advance our knowledge to 
grasp the roles of neighborhood communities as a civil society organization and as 
political partisan groups of the state. 
 
 
Appendix 1  
Survey on Neighborhood Community in Thailand 
Northern Region 1 
 
 
Name of the Organization: ______________________________________________ 
Address: ____________________________________________________________ 
Position: ____________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: 
1) This is strictly a research survey having no relation with government, private 
organizations or any International door agencies. 
2) This survey should be completed by your organization’s director or whoever is 
responsible for the daily operations of your organization.  
3) The answers given in this survey can be individual respondent’s point of view 
and do not necessarily have to represent the point of view of the organization. 
4) Some questions in this survey may not apply to your organization. Feel free to 
skip these questions. 
5) The identity of respondent to this survey will be kept confidential. 
6) Please cooperate with the survey/interviewer to complete this questionnaire 
 
 
(Section I) Overview of the Neighborhood Community  
1. When was your community first established?  
    
 
2. When was your community recognized by the local municipality? 
    
 
3. How many residents are living in your community?  
                          Number of    
Type 
Households Residents 
1. Within your neighborhood   
2. Registration members   
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4. Are there any non-registered residents within your community?  Yes__  No_____  
If yes, how many percentage does it have If compare with your membership? 
1. Under 20%  
2.  20% – 40%  
3.  40% - 60%  
4. 60% - 80%  
5. more than 80% 
 
5. Does your community have subgroups?  (please give the number and their 
names) 
1. Name_________________  
2. Name_________________ 
3. Name_________________ 
4. Name _________________ 
5. Name _________________ 
6. Name _________________ 
 
6. How many committees are there within your community? (include the president)   
 
6.1) What are their gender?  6.2) How old are they? Please choose the most 
relevant answer in the table below. 
Status 
Position 
6.1 Gender 6.2 Age 
male female Less than 40 Between 40 to 60 More than 60 
1. President      
2. Committee      
3. Subgroup 
director 
     
 
7. How do you choose your committees? 
1. Election by member 
2. Mutual Voting among 
committee 
3. Nominated by the committee 
4. Members rotate in the position 
5. Appointed by the president 
6. Guidance by the municipality 
7. Other (                                     ) 
 
President                                           Committee                                   Director  
 
 
8. What are the common occupations of your committee and subgroup director?  
(Provide the two most common occupations) 
1. Merchant/grocery 
2. Labour/freelance 
3. Farmer 
4. Craftsman 
5. Business manager/self-
employed 
6. Full-time employee  
7. Part-time employee  
8. Government officers 
9. Retirees 
10. Others_________________ 
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Position No. 1 No.2 No.3 
President    
Committee    
Subgroup director    
 
9. How many times does your community hold the following meetings per year? 
Member meeting__________time/year                      
Committee meeting_______  time/year                   
Subgroup meeting_________time/year   
 
10. Which are the most important functions of your community? (please select 2) 
1st sequence 2nd sequence 
  
1. To promote mutual friendship within the community 
2. To manage and develop the living environment of the community 
3. To independently deal with community problems 
4. To assist the municipality 
5. To lobby the municipality 
6. Others_______________ 
11. How much money can your community earn per year_____?  
And where is the income come from? 
Members fee Activities Government’s 
budget 
Municipality’s 
budget 
Fees others 
      
 
12. How much did your community spend for main activities_________? (Including 
hire staff, and others expenses except the table below.) 
Activities Budget (Baht)  
 Activities Budget (Baht) 
1. Public Health   6. Culture  
2. Career 
development 
  7. Cleaning  
3. Criminal   8. Utility  
4. Welfare   9. Festival  
5. Sports   10. Others:  
 
13. Does your community receive funds or some other type of financial support from 
external sources? If yes, in the space blow, please write the name of the 
community or government agencies that have provided financial support to your 
community. 
Yes _________ No ________ 
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If yes,   
Name of community or agency______________________________________ 
Purpose of using the fund __________________________________________ 
Name of community or agency______________________________________ 
Purpose of using the fund __________________________________________ 
Name of community or agency______________________________________ 
Purpose of using the fund __________________________________________ 
Name of community or agency______________________________________ 
Purpose of using the fund __________________________________________ 
 
(Section II) Context of Neighborhood Community  
14. Please write your community’s address and the name of the municipality. 
Address:______________________________________________________ 
Municipality___________________________________________________ 
 
15. Have the interactions among the residents in your community become more or 
less active compared to five years ago? 
1. More active     4.    Not so active   
2. Slightly more active   5.    Not active at all 
3. No change 
     
16. Are there any changes in population, compared to five year ago? 
1. Increase      4.    Slightly decrease   
2. Slightly increase    5.    Decrease 
3. No change 
 
17. What type of accommodations do the community members live in?  
17.1 How would you describe the environment surrounding the community? 
(Please select 3 main sequences) 
1. Located in agriculture area  
2. Industry area 
3. Business office area 
4. Shop/Store area 
5. Multifamily housing area 
6. Apartment area 
7. School/or Institute area 
8. Other____________ 
 
 
 
 
 
1st 
sequence 
2nd 
sequence 
3rd 
sequence 
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1st 
sequence 
2nd 
sequence 
3rd 
sequence 
   
 
17.2 Tenure of living quarter (Please select 3 main sequences) 
1. Owner   
2. Hire purchase   
3. Rented House 
4. Rented Room  
5. Land rental    
6. Squatter 
7. Other:    
 
17.3 Type of living quarters (Please select 3 main sequences) 
1. Detached house 
2. Town house 
3. Row house 
4. Apartment, flat, condominium 
5. Rented room 
6. Others_______
 
18. How would you describe the composition of households in your community?  
(Please select 3 main sequences)
1. Nuclear families with children 
2. Couple only  
3. Large multi-generational family  
4. Single-person household 
5. Foreigners and their families 
6. Others_____________
 
19. What is the interaction in daily life of the neighbors in your community? 
1. Have no interaction at all 
2. Greet each other politely 
3. Regularly converse with each other 
4. Mutual aids in many activities
 
20. Do you think the residents are active in the community? 
1. Very active 
2. Active 
3. Average 
4. Not very active 
5. Not active
 
 
 
 
 
 
1st 
sequence 
2nd 
sequence 
3rd 
sequence 
   
 
1st 
sequence 
2nd 
sequence 
3rd 
sequence 
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21. How would you describe the environment of your community? Rate your 
community on the following issues. 
                                                        Rating            
Issues 
Very 
poor 
Poor Average good Excellent  
1. Living comfort (quietness and 
cleanliness) 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Living convenience (available of 
stores and services) 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Safety (crime and drug prevention, 
etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Transportation convenience (available 
of public transportation, streets, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Richness of nature (natural 
surrounding and water) 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Traditional culture 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Overall environment compared to five 
years ago 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(Section III) Overview of the activities in your community 
22. Which activities is your community involved in? Choose the most relevant 
answer from the list below. 
Living environment 
1. Cleaning 
2. Collecting garbage 
3. Settling disputes 
Culture and friendship 
4. Festival (Dum Hua) 
5. Sporting events/cultural activities 
6. Preservation of traditional arts  
7. Assisting at weddings and funerals 
Living safety 
8. Disaster prevention 
9. Fire prevention 
10. Crime prevention 
11. Traffic safety classes 
Maintenance of facilities 
12. Bulletin boards 
13. Meeting house and facilities 
14. Streets and streetlight 
15. Water supply 
16. Sewage pipes  
17. Road and paved road 
18. Cemetery, temples and churches 
Health and welfare service 
19. Infant care 
20. Child care 
21. Gender equality 
22. Elderly care 
23. Disabled 
24. Eliminate mosquito breeding area  
25. Disease and epidemic 
Education support 
26. Children’s education 
27. Youth development  
28. Assisting in school education 
Environment 
29. Prevent of pollutions and noise 
30. Recycling and energy 
conservation 
31. Nature conservation and 
environmental education 
Economic activities 
32. Village and urban fund 
33. SML project 
34. Saving 
35. Vocational training 
Other activities 
36. Urban planning 
37. International exchange 
38. Assisting in election campaigns 
39. Community network sharing 
40. Others___________________ 
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1st 
sequence 
2nd 
sequence 
3rd 
sequence 
   
 
1st 
sequence 
2nd 
sequence 
3rd 
sequence 
   
 
23. With reference to “question 22” please indicates the most important activities in 
your community? (Please select 3 main sequences) 
 
 
 
 
 
24. With reference to “question 22” Please put the number of activities in sequence 
according to relevance to the communities which you cooperate with. 
                                      Ranking of activity               
Groups 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. Municipality      
2. Other NHAs      
3. Local political group      
4. Local government       
5. National government      
6. NGOs and NPOs       
7. Others___________________________      
 
25. How many households have directly involved in the following activities? 
                                                                      
Activities 
Less than 
20% 
20 – 
40% 
40 – 
60% 
60 – 
80% 
80% 
up  
1. General meeting   1 2 3 4 5 
2. Environment and community 
development 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Safety and crime prevention 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Traffic safety class 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Maintenance of facilities 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Education and training 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Culture and festival 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Sport and recreation 1 2 3 4 5 
9. political activities 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Others 1 2 3 4 5 
 
26. By what means does your community select or decide to do the activities?  
(Please choose 3 main sequences) 
1. Officer’s recommendation 
2. President or committee  
3. Opinion of other members 
4. Cooperation with others public communities 
5. Following the government policy 
6. Other _____________________
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1st 
sequence 
2nd 
sequence 
3rd 
sequence 
   
 
27. What type of people are mostly involved in community’s activities? (Please 
choose 2 answers according to their responsibility ) 
1. Merchant/grocery   7.  Part-time employee 
2. Freelance    8.  Government officers  
3. Farmer     9.  Retirees 
4. Craft man    10.  Homemaker 
5. Business manager/self-employed 11. Youth/students 
6. Full-time employees   12.  Others:   
  
28. In your view, compared to 5 years ago, how consistent are your sub unit activities 
being implemented? (Please, choose the number that corresponds to your answer) 
                                                  Rating                              
Subgroups  
Very
poor 
Poor Average good Excellent  
1. Saving group  1 2 3 4 5 
2. Primary health care group 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Women group  1 2 3 4 5 
4. Elderly group 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Others_______________________ 1 2 3 4 5 
 
29. What method does your community use to communicate with the residents? 
(Please choose 3 main sequences)
1. Group meeting 
2. Bulletin boards 
3. Face to face (knock door) 
4. Representative or coordinator  
5. Circulation notices  
6. Broadcasting 
7. Telephone 
8. Email 
9. Newsletters 
10. others_______
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(Section IV) Relationship between Community and Municipality 
30. Does your community support or recommend any candidate for the municipality 
election?  
1. Always 
2. Only recently 
3. Sometimes 
4. In the past, but not anymore 
5. Never 
 
31. What activities would the municipality request your community to do??  
(Please choose 3 main answers)
1. Circulating notices  
2. Distributing newsletters 
3. Collecting donations  
4. Nominating committee members 
5. Undertake the administrative task  
6. Other_____________________
32. What do you think is the ideal relationship between your community and the 
municipality in dealing with community problems? 
1. Should just undertake tasks as direct by the municipality 
2. Should function as a bridge between the municipality and the residents 
3. Should cooperate 
4. Should act independently from the municipality 
5. Should leave everything to the municipality’s burden 
 
33. Does your community monitor the municipality’s policy implementation?   
1. Only when the policy is relevant to our community 
2. Always, regardless of relevance 
3. Never 
 
34. Is the community certified or trusted by the municipality? 
1. Not at all     4.  Trustworthy 
2. Not very trustworthy    5.  Very trustworthy 
3. Average 
 
35. How many of the requests of your community were accepted by your local 
government? 
1. Almost none     4. Many  
2. Very little     5. Almost all 
3. Some  
1st  2nd 3rd  
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36. By what means does your community request or present opinions to the 
municipality? 
1. Collecting signature    
2. Submitting request forms     
3. Meeting 
4. Demonstration, parades 
5. Email, phone call, letters 
6. Request for information disclosure 
7. Requesting audits      
8. Other__________________ 
 
37. How often does your community use the following methods to reflect your 
community’s interest and opinions in policies? 
                                    Rating 
Methods 
Never Seldom Sometimes Regularly Often 
1. Consult the corresponding 
section in the municipality 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Consult senior officials of 
the municipality 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Consult municipality 
council  
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Consult influential person 
outside the Municipality 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Formal meeting with the 
municipality  
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Attend municipality round-
table conferences  
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Petitioning of the local 
assembly 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Holding public comment 
sessions 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Others________________ 1 2 3 4 5 
 
38. How would you assess your community’s degree of influence and level of 
participation in the municipal policy decision-making process?  
1. Not at all 
2. Not very much 
3. Moderate 
4. Some influence 
5. Influential 
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39. In your opinion, which of the following statement that best describes the 
relationship your community has with the municipality? (Please select 3 main 
sequences) 
 
 
1. Exchange opinions with your community 
2. Cooperated with and supported policies and budget activities by the 
municipality 
3. Administrative guidance provided by the municipality 
4. Accredited or approved by the municipality 
5. Advisory body of the municipality 
 
(Section V) Relation with Other Communities 
40. Does your NC collaborate with other groups and organizations? Please fill in the 
name of them 
1. ________________________________________ 
2. ________________________________________ 
3. ________________________________________ 
4. ________________________________________ 
5. ________________________________________ 
 
41. With reference to “question 40”, what type of relationship does your community 
have with them? Please put the number in sequence. 
                                                                    
Relationship 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
1. Providing information to your NC      
2. NC provides information to these group      
3. NC provides subsidies      
4. Providing subsidies to your NC      
5. Other      
 
42. What does your NC think about its relationships with NPOs or NGOs in dealing 
with neighborhood problems? 
1. Should work cooperatively 
2. Should work independently 
3. whatever 
 
 
 
1st 
sequence 
2nd 
sequence 
3rd 
sequence 
   
189 
 
 
43. Does your community have any problems in working with NPOs or, NGOs? 
Please circle the applicable numbers. 
1. We do not work with them 
2. No problem in working 
with them 
3. Problems as to who should 
bear the budgeting 
4. Problems in dividing work 
5. Differences in the way of 
thinking 
6. Residents’ lack of 
understanding concerning 
joint work 
7. Other______________
 
 (Section VI) To carry the problems of NHAs 
44. In your NC, how smoothly are the following activities carried out?  Please circle 
the applicable number for each activity. 
                                          Rating    
Activities  
Not at 
all 
Not very 
smooth 
Average Smooth Very 
smooth 
1. Interaction with the officers 
(director positions)   
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Interaction between old 
resident and newly arrived 
resident 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Interaction between 
generation 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Member households 
Participation in activities  
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Financial NC activities 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Providing facilities for 
meeting and other events 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Carrying out work 
commissioned by the local 
government  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
45. Please rate your community’s degree of importance and satisfaction regarding the 
municipality support to your NC.  Please circle the applicable numbers in the 
following issues. 
                                            Rating                                                         
 
 
 
Issues 
Importance Satisfaction 
N
ot at all 
Slightly 
A
verage 
Im
portant 
V
ery  
 Not at all 
Slightly 
A
verage 
     Satisfied 
V
ery  
1. Providing subsidies or grants 
support 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
2. Providing administrative 
information 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
3. Commissioning work  1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
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                                            Rating                                                         
 
 
 
Issues 
Importance Satisfaction 
N
ot at all 
Slightly 
A
verage 
Im
portant 
V
ery  
 Not at all 
Slightly 
A
verage 
     Satisfied 
V
ery  
4. Responding to requests 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
5. Providing forum for discussing 
local problems 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
6. Supporting NC activities in 
general 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
  
(Section VII) Policy of Municipality 
46. Please rate your community’s degree of importance and satisfaction towards the 
municipality policies. Please circle the applicable numbers in the following issues. 
                                            Rating                                                              
 
 
 
Issues 
Importance Satisfaction 
N
ot at all 
slightly 
A
verage 
Im
portant 
V
ery 
 Not at all 
Slightly 
A
verage 
     Satisfied 
V
ery 
1. Developing living 
environment 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
2. Revitalizing community and 
cultural activities 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
3. Ensuring safety 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
4. Developing public facilities 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
5. Improving health, welfare and 
medical services 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
6. Improving school and social 
education 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
7. Undertaking environment 
policies 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
8. Revitalizing agriculture and 
forest 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
9. Revitalizing business 
investment and industry 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
10. Urban development and 
planning 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
11. Revitalizing tourism 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
12. Organizing international 
exchange 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
13. Overall policies   1 2 3 4 5 
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(Section VIII) Personality of the president 
47. How long have you lived in this community? _____ year/s 
 
48. How long has it been since you became the president of your NC? If it is less 
than one year, please write “0” ____ year/s 
 
49. Do you receive any salary from your community? Yes_____ No _____ 
 
50. With what type of individuals do you usually interact privately and publicly? 
Please choose all that apply to your answer.  
1. Community development 
officer  
2. Municipality official 
3. Parent and teacher 
association 
4. Director of local Social 
welfare association 
5. Director of labour union 
6. Director of civic group 
(NGO, NPO) 
7. Political (campaign) groups 
8. Senior officials of the 
municipality 
9. Municipality council 
10. Journalist 
11. Lawyer 
12. National government  
13. Other________________ 
 
51. When announcing the NC’s requests and opinions, how much can you trust the 
following institutions (listed below)? 
                                   
Rating                                  
Institutions 
Very 
low 
Below 
average 
Average Above 
average  
Very 
high  
1. Local government 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Municipality council 
(local politician) 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. National government 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Political party  1 2 3 4 5 
5. Courts 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Police 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Mass media 1 2 3 4 5 
8. NGO, NPO 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Other 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Survey on Civil Society Organization in Thailand 
Northern Region 1 
 
 
Name of the Organization: _______________________________________________ 
Address: _____________________________________________________________ 
Respondent’s position: __________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: 
1) This is strictly a research survey having no relation with government, private 
organizations or any International door agencies. 
2) This survey should be completed by your organization’s director or whoever is 
responsible for the daily operations of your organization.  
3) The answers given in this survey can be individual respondent’s point of view 
and do not necessarily have to represent the point of view of the organization. 
4) Some questions in this survey may not apply to your organization. Feel free to 
skip these questions. 
5) If your organization is a local chapter then please try to answer your questions 
from the point of view of the organization as a whole. If you are not able to do 
so, please answer from the point of view of your local chapter.  
6) The identity of respondent to this survey will be kept confidential. 
7) Please cooperate with the survey/interviewer to complete this questionnaire 
 
 
[Section I: Basic information about the civil society organization] 
 
Q01.Which one of the 13 classifications listed below best describes your organization?  
(Please choose only one) 
1. Agriculture and farmer related organization 
2. Economic or business organization 
3. Labor union or federation 
4. Education and research related organization 
5. Cultural organization 
6. Government or administration-related organization 
7. Social Welfare organization 
8. Professional organization (medical, legal, education, engineers etc.) 
9. Citizen’s group 
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10. NGO (including foreign or international organization) 
11. Religious organization 
12. Recreational or sports related social organization 
13. Other, _____________________________Please specify. 
 
Q02. Indicate below which national and local governmental policies are of interest or 
relevant to your organization’s activities? Choose all that apply. 
1. Financial policies (Management of govt. money) 
2. Fiscal policies (Government tax, debt…) 
3. Trade and international commerce policies 
4. Industrial promotional policies 
5. Civic engineering, construction and public works policies 
6. Transportation and traffic policies 
7. Communication and information policies  
8. Scientific technology and research policies  
9. Local development policies/Rural Development 
10. Diplomatic policies (Foreign policies) 
11. International exchange, cooperation  
12. Aid policies including foreign debt problem 
13. National defense and security policies 
14. Law and order  
15. Justice and human rights  
16. Local government and administrative policies 
17. Labor polices 
18. Social welfare  
19. Agriculture 
20. Consumer protection policies 
21. Environment, energy and natural resources policies 
22. Healthcare policies 
23. Education, academic  
24. Sports and recreational policies 
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25. Poverty Alleviation  
26. Culture and religion 
27. Others, _____________________________ 
 
Q03. What are the main purpose of your organization and the primary goal of your 
organization’s activities? Choose all that apply. 
1. Providing information to members  
2. Pursuing economic profit for members 
3. Protecting the standard of living and rights of the members/clients 
4. Providing education and training opportunities for members/clients 
5. Advocating on behalf of the members in order to gain subsidies from 
Government. 
6. Assisting members in licensing and registration procedures 
7. Providing policy recommendations based on technical knowledge for public 
policy making  
8. Providing education and information for the good of the general public 
9. Providing service to the general public. 
10. Providing funds to other organizations 
11. Others, _____________________________ 
 
Q04. Is your organization registered with any ministry or institution? 
   Yes_______ No________ 
         Q04.1If yes, Name of the ministry or institution______________________ 
 
Q05. When was your organization founded?   
    
Q06. How many members does your organization have? (Round off the exact number) 
Individual Members   Member organization (If it has*) 
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Q07. How many employees does your organization have? 
(1) Full time employees ____  (2) Part time employees ____  
(3) Volunteers ____ 
 
Q08. Does your organization receive funds or some other type of financial assistance 
from outside sources besides membership fee? If yes, in the space below, 
please write the names of the organizations or government agencies that have 
provided financial assistance to your organization.  
          Yes_______ No________ 
          Q08.1 If yes, Name of the organization or agency ____________________ 
          Q08.2 Are the financial assistances accompanied by condition?  
          Yes_______ No________ 
 
Q09. What was your organization’s budget (in Baht) in the year 2011 or 2012? 
In 2011 ____________ or In 2012_____________ (a round figure is Ok) 
Q10. What geographic area does your organization mainly encompass in conducting 
its activities? 
1. Village       2. Subdistrict/Municipality       3. District      4. Province   
5. Regional       6. National          7. International 
Q11. When a policy related problem or incident occur in the 'geographical area' 
indicated in Q10, how much influence does your organization have on these 
problems? 
1. A lot of influence     2. Some bit of influence     
3. A little influence         4. Almost no influence     
5. No influence 
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[Section II Nature of Interaction with the State and Political Parties] 
 
Q12. Circle the statements that describe the relationship your organization has with 
the government or local government. Choose all that apply. 
 
1. Accredited or approved by the government  
2. Licensed by the government  
3. Administrative guidance provided by the government  
4. Cooperating with and supporting policies and budget activities of the government  
5. Exchanging opinions with the government  
6. Sending representative to council and /or advisory bodies of the national 
government  
7. Offering positions to government officials after retirement  
8. Receiving government funds or grants. 
9. Receiving foreign fund through the government  
10. Having joint projects or program with the government. 
 
Q13. What type of relationship and communication do you have with political parties? 
Choose the statement which best corresponds to your organization’s action 
today and ten years before. 
 
1=Never, 2=some of the time, 3=about half the time, 4=Most of the time, 5=Always 
 
Political Parties Now Ten years before 
Pheu Thai  Party  (Thai Rak Thai Party) 1.   2.   3.   4.  5. 1.   2.   3.   4.   5. 
Democrat Party 1.   2.   3.   4.  5. 1.   2.   3.   4.   5. 
Chart Thai Pattana Party (Chat Thai Party) 1.   2.   3.   4.  5. 1.   2.   3.   4.   5. 
Chart Pattana Puea Pandin Party (Chart 
Pattana) 
1.   2.   3.   4.  5. 1.   2.   3.   4.   5. 
Bhumjaithai Party  1.   2.   3.   4.  5. 1.   2.   3.   4.   5. 
Others 1.   2.   3.   4.  5. 1.   2.   3.   4.   5. 
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Q14. During national elections, has your organization taken any of the following 
actions, and if so how frequently? Choose the statement which best corresponds 
to your organization’s actions today and ten years ago. 
 
1=Never, 2=some of the time, 3=about half the time, 4=Most of the time, 5=Always 
 
 Today Ten years ago 
1. Played a role for nomination and election for 
a particular candidate 
1.   2.   3.   4.  5. 1.   2.   3.   4.   5. 
2. Recommended a member/client of your 
organization as a party/election candidate. 
1.   2.   3.   4.  5. 1.   2.   3.   4.   5. 
3. Launched campaign for free and fair election  1.   2.   3.   4.  5. 1.   2.   3.   4.   5. 
4. Participated as independent observers at 
different polling stations during the election 
day. 
1.   2.   3.   4.  5. 1.   2.   3.   4.   5. 
5. Other………………………… 1.   2.   3.   4.  5. 1.   2.   3.   4.   5. 
 
Q15. When your organization appeals to government/ administrations/ political 
parties, how often do you take any of the measures listed below?  
 
1=Never, 2=some of the time, 3=about half the time, 4=Most of the time, 5=Always 
(1) Contacting the parties in the cabinet (by personal interviews, 
phone calls etc.) 1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 
(2) Contacting the opposition parties (by personal interviews, phone 
calls etc.) 1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 
(3) Contacting governmental department and agencies (by personal 
interviews, phone call etc.) 1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 
(4) Appealing to political parties or governmental administration 
through influential people 1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 
(5) Helping to draft legislative bills for political parties or 
governmental organization. 1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 
(6) Presenting research results or technical information to political 
parties and/or government ministries. 1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 
(7) Sending representatives to local or national councils and /or 
advisory bodies to the government 1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 
(8) Asking general organizational members to write letters or make 
phone calls to political parties or government administration 1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 
(9) Engaging in mass protests or demonstrations 1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 
(10) Organizing seminars, round table meeting, rally etc. 1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 
(11) Presenting information to the mass media 1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 
(12) Holding press conferences in order to publicize ideas and let 
know organizations position on different issues and incidents. 1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 
(13) Forming coalition with other organizations or NGOs 1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 
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Q16.Does your organization or any member have personal relationship with any of 
the following persons? (Choose all that apply) 
 
1. An elected parliament member,    
2. A leader of the ruling party,    
3. A leader of the opposition parties,    
4. A governor/mayor   
5. A journalist    
6. A chief or a section chief from a department of a government/local administration    
7. A chief or a staff of an international organization, international NGO,    
8. A judge or a magistrate of the national or local court. 
 
Q17. Has your organization ever succeeded in having a budget, policy, action or 
decision it favored being implemented by a national or local government?      
Yes_______ No________ 
 
Q18. Has your organization ever succeeded altering a budget, policy, action, decision, 
or blocking the implementation of a policy, decision, it did not favor?   
Yes_______ No________ 
 
 
Q19. Do you think that your organization is an autonomous one and can function 
independently from the government and political parties? 
Yes_________ No___________ 
 
Q20. Do you think that your organization is somehow involved in national or local 
politics? Choose the statement that best reflects your organization’s overall 
activities. 
Yes_______ No__________ 
 
Q20A. If yes, does your organization involve in politics on its own or is your 
organization approached by outside sources to become involved in politics? 
(Choose only one) 
1. Most of the time we are approached by outside sources. 
2. There is a balance between internal and external drives 
3. Most of the time, we get involved on our own.  
4. For our existence there is no other way but to meddle in politics. 
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[Section III Relationship among the civil society organizations] 
Q21. What source does your organization use to get information for its activities? 
Rank, in order of importance, three from the list below. 
1____________, 2. _____________, 3. ______________ 
 
1. Government  
2. Local government  
3. Political parties 
4. Parliament members 
5. Elected representative of the local government  
6. Scholars or professionals, think tank 
7. The mass media (Radio, TV, Newspaper) 
8. Technical or trade papers 
9. Foreign government 
10. Foreign NGOs, international organizations etc. 
11. Other domestic organization with similar interests 
12. Members of your organization 
13. Business companies 
14. Others _______________ 
 
Q22. How many times has mass media mentioned your organization during past 3 
years? Write the approximate number of times your organization has appeared 
on national or private television and/or in any national or local newspaper or 
magazine.   __________________ Times 
 
Q23. To what extent do you think the following groups influence politics in Thailand? 
Rate each of the following groups on a scale from 1 to 7 in terms of political 
influence. (1 stands for very little influence, 7 stands for a lot of influence, and  
4 is the neutral point.) 
 
1. Trade (labor) unions and federations   1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
2. Agricultural Organization                      1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
3. Economic, business, and employer’s organization  1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
4. Government Bureaucrats                        1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
5. Political Parties                                       1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
6. The mass media                                      1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
7. Large business /corporations                  1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
8. Scholars and academicians                    1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
9. Consumer Organization                         1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
10. Welfare Organizations, NGO               1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
11. Professional Groups     1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
12. Women movement organizations         1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
13. Local governments                               1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
14. Foreign Gov. and International donor agencies  1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
15. Religious organizations                        1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
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Q24. what type of relation and cooperation does your organization have with the 
following groups? Rate the following groups on a scale from 1 to 7 in terms of 
cooperation with your organization. (1 stands for uncooperative, 7 stand for 
cooperative and 4 is the neutral point.) 
 
1. Trade (labor) unions and federations   1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
2. Agricultural Organization                      1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
3. Economic, business, and employer’s organization  1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
4. Government Bureaucrats                        1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
5. Political Parties                                       1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
6. The mass media                                      1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
7. Large business /corporations                  1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
8. Scholars and academicians                    1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
9. Consumer Organization                         1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
10. Welfare Organizations, NGO               1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
11. Professional Groups     1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
12. Women movement organizations         1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
13. Local governments                               1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
14. Foreign Gov. and International donor agencies 1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
15. Religious organizations                        1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7. 
 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation 
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